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Abstract
Abstract
Data analytics over generated personal data has the potential to derive meaningful in-
sights to enable clarity of trends and predictions, for instance, disease outbreak pre-
diction as well as it allows for data-driven decision making for contemporary organi-
sations. Predominantly, the collected personal data is managed, stored, and accessed
using a Database Management System (DBMS) by insiders as employees of an organ-
isation.
One of the data security and privacy concerns is of insider threats, where legitimate
users of the system abuse the access privileges they hold. Insider threats come in two
flavours; one is an insider threat to data security (security attacks), and the other is
an insider threat to data privacy (privacy attacks). The insider threat to data security
means that an insider steals or leaks sensitive personal information. The insider threat
to data privacy is when the insider maliciously access information resulting in the
violation of an individual’s privacy, for instance, browsing through customers bank
account balances or attempting to narrow down to re-identify an individual who has the
highest salary. Much past work has been done on detecting security attacks by insiders
using behavioural-based anomaly detection approaches. This dissertation looks at to
what extent these kinds of techniques can be used to detect privacy attacks by insiders.
The dissertation proposes approaches for modelling insider querying behaviour by
considering sequence and frequency-based correlations in order to identify anomalous
correlations between SQL queries in the querying behaviour of a malicious insider.
A behavioural-based anomaly detection using an n-gram based approach is proposed
that considers sequences of SQL queries to model querying behaviour. The results
demonstrate the effectiveness of detecting malicious insiders accesses to the DBMS
as anomalies, based on query correlations. This dissertation looks at the modelling of
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normative behaviour from a DBMS perspective and proposes a record/DBMS-oriented
approach by considering frequency-based correlations to detect potentially malicious
insiders accesses as anomalies. Additionally, the dissertation investigates modelling of
malicious insider SQL querying behaviour as rare behaviour by considering sequence
and frequency-based correlations using (frequent and rare) item-sets mining.
This dissertation proposes the notion of ‘Privacy-Anomaly Detection’ and considers
the question whether behavioural-based anomaly detection approaches can have a pri-
vacy semantic interpretation and whether the detected anomalies can be related to the
conventional (formal) definitions of privacy semantics such as k-anonymity and the dis-
crimination rate privacy metric. The dissertation considers privacy attacks (violations
of formal privacy definition) based on a sequence of SQL queries (query correlations).
It is shown that interactive querying settings are vulnerable to privacy attacks based
on query correlation. Whether these types of privacy attacks can potentially mani-
fest themselves as anomalies, specifically as privacy-anomalies, is investigated. One
result is that privacy attacks (violation of formal privacy definition) can be detected
as privacy-anomalies by applying behavioural-based anomaly detection using n-gram
over the logs of interactive querying mechanisms.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“Every new beginning comes from some other beginning’s end.”
Seneca (5 BC - 65 AD)
1.1 Introduction
The recent past has witnessed an exponential increase in the volume of data being
collected by organizations. This has been enabled by the aggressive development of
computing technologies. Data is fuelling most of the revolutionary technologies. Tech-
nological advances and widely available data have nurtured the area of data analytics.
Data analytics aims to discover meaningful insights from the data that may lead to
improved decision-making. Data analytics offers a broad spectrum of benefits, for ex-
ample, it enables a contemporary organization to anticipate business opportunities as
well as enable the delivery of relevant products to its customers. In a nutshell, analytics
over a large volume of data has the potential to impact businesses and our society.
Data comes from multiple sources and may include sensitive personal data. On the one
1
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hand, one cannot deny the importance and value of data, while on the other hand, the
usage, storage, and access to this data can raise security and privacy concerns.
1.1.1 Insider Attacks and Anomalous Access to Databases
Contemporary organizations systems rely heavily on Database Management Systems
(DBMS) to store and manage access to their application data. Organizations need to
take extra care in the management and storage of sensitive application data. Misuse
or leakage of such data can lead to an organization suffering from damages in terms
of reputation and financial loss. The harm caused by data breaches has routinely been
reported in the popular press.
Threats to an organization’s data come from external attackers - outsider attacks or in-
ternal attackers - insider attacks. Traditional security controls such as authentication,
role-based access control, data encryption and physical-security can help to control
access to this data. However, there is a persistent concern of insider attacks whereby
legitimate users of the system abuse the access privileges they hold. A recent survey re-
ported that malicious insiders are the cause of the costliest cybercrimes [4], and in one
study 89% of respondent organizations reported themselves vulnerable be to insider
attacks [5]. A further study reports that a significant level (43%) of data exfiltration
was caused by insiders and half of which was intentional [6]. A challenge in insider
attack detection is that they often go unnoticed for months and years [7]. Therefore,
effective security controls to mitigate insider attacks are desirable.
An Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), in particular, behavioural-based intrusion
detection systems (also referred to as behavioural-based anomaly detection sys-
tems) [8, 3, 9], can play a role in detecting insider attacks. Behavioural-based anomaly
detection systems model normative behaviour of the system user and look for devia-
tions in the run-time behaviour of the users. The primary challenge in designing an
anomaly-based system is how to model normative behaviour.
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This dissertation explores how to model this normative behaviour of users of DBMS, in
order to detect malicious accesses by an insider as anomalies specifically as security-
anomalies. Much of existing literature considers database queries in isolation to model
the querying behaviour of a user [3, 10, 11, 12]. Modelling approaches that consider
queries in isolation can detect a single malicious query, however, are unable to de-
tect a sequence of queries where every single query in a sequence is not malicious,
but the entire query sequence results in a malicious event. An approach for capturing
short-term query correlations to model querying behaviours, based on n-grams, from
the audit logs of DBMS is proposed in this dissertation. The approach considers se-
quences of queries rather than a query in isolation. This leads to a novel white-box [13]
behavioural-based approach for the detection of anomalous DBMS accesses by an in-
sider as anomalies.
Additionally, the dissertation proposes a novel notion of modelling user behaviour
from a DBMS perspective. Referred to as a semantic approach, it utilizes control
charts [14] from the statistical process control domain and detects anomalous accesses
to the databases. In this dissertation, the application of machine learning algorithms,
specifically Frequent and Rare Item-sets Mining algorithms, to model user’s repeated
and infrequent (rare) querying behaviour is explored in order to detect insiders mali-
cious behaviour as a rare behaviour.
1.1.2 Detecting Privacy-Anomaly
The recently enacted EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [15] makes
it more challenging to use personal data for analytics. However, once the data is
anonymized, it is considered to no longer be personal data [15, 16]. Achieving
anonymization is non-trivial while preserving the utility of data. Increasing the level of
anonymization protects data but reduces utility. Thus organizations must trade-off the
need for more in-depth analytics against the privacy of individual’s data. In essence, it
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is a long-standing open problem to get high-quality analytics by querying the databases
consisting of information about individuals while preserving the privacy of those indi-
viduals.
Numerous incidents have been reported where privacy was compromised due to
poor anonymization of released data, for example, the famous case of Netflix [17],
AOL [18], de-anonymization of NYC taxi data [19], and the famous case of the Mas-
sachusetts Governor [20]. In [20], it was shown that by linking on shared attributes
(zipcode, birth date, and gender) in two datasets, Massachusetts Group Insurance Com-
mission’s released data (considered anonymous) and voter rolls, records belonging to
the Massachusetts Governor were identified. Researchers have devised formal pri-
vacy definitions1 [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] when these definitions are followed then the
anonymized data manifests some formal guarantees. There are several privacy defini-
tions to anonymize data, including, k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, and differen-
tial privacy.
The majority of the syntactic privacy definitions were designed for a one-time release
of data. In contrast to these definitions, differential privacy is for interactively query-
ing a database. However, differential privacy has practical limitations as well; for
instance, differential privacy allows only a limited number of queries to be answered.
Allowing an unlimited number of queries results in higher noise; thus, the ability to
observe correlations between attributes are lost, which is not desirable for richer analyt-
ics [27]. Approaches to detect privacy violations, while allowing an unlimited number
of queries while having richer analytical utility are desirable.
This dissertation discovers that the malicious accesses to the DBMS detected as
anomalies by the traditional (security-)anomaly detection approaches (the proposed
n-gram based anomaly detection approach in this dissertation) on closer analysis re-
veals that those anomalies, in a sense, are privacy violations. In this dissertation, we
1Privacy definitions, in literature, are otherwise known as privacy models, privacy criteria, privacy
metrics, privacy constraints as well as privacy principles.
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carried out a study to investigate whether these privacy violations can be called privacy
violations from a formal privacy definition perspective, that is, violation of a privacy
definition. Additionally, in this dissertation, a novel privacy-oriented interpretation
of behavioural-based detection approach is proposed. It is shown that a behavioural-
based detection approach when applied to the logs of a k-anonymity based interactive
query system, have the potential to detect violation of privacy definition and instances
of privacy attacks (inferences) as anomalies specifically privacy-anomalies.
1.2 Research Hypothesis
The hypothesis in this dissertation is that “behavioural-based anomaly detection tech-
niques for detecting malicious DBMS access can be used to detect violations of pri-
vacy definition and instance of privacy attacks (inferences) as anomalies (referred to
as privacy-anomalies)".
In order to explore this hypothesis, a number of research questions have been identified.
RQ1: Is it possible to build behavioural-based anomaly detection systems to detect
malicious accesses, manifested in sequences of queries rather than a query in
isolation, to DBMS and whether these malicious accesses encompasses privacy
violations?
It is known that behavioural-based approaches are able to detect intrusions in
networks and computer systems [28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. There are techniques
in literature that detect malicious queries made by insiders to DBMS [3, 11,
34, 12, 35, 36]. While such approaches can certainly be used to detect individ-
ual queries that are entirely different from normal (similar queries), they cannot
identify an insider that mimics valid queries. In this case, it is insufficient to
identify the anomaly by the query alone, we must also correlate it with its sur-
rounding (sequence of) queries. The question that arises is whether one can
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build behavioural-based anomaly detection systems for detection of malicious
accesses to DBMS by considering sequences of queries. Chapter 4, addresses
this question, where a behavioural-based approach is built that captures querying
patterns using n-grams in an audit log of SQL queries generated by an applica-
tion system. The normative behaviour is modelled using n-grams by considering
sequences of queries.
A related question that arises by looking at the detected malicious access is what
these malicious accesses represent. Do these malicious accesses encompasses
privacy violations? A closer look at the detected malicious accesses, it was ob-
served that these malicious accesses do encompass privacy violations of individ-
uals privacy as well.
RQ2: Whether one can consider non-sequence based correlations manifested in fea-
tures such as frequencies to model normative behaviour in the context of de-
tecting malicious DBMS access by insiders? Is it possible to capture distant
correlations to model querying behaviour in contrast to short-term correlations
that were captured by n-grams?
Chapters 5 and 6 explore ways of modelling querying behaviour. A DBMS-
oriented perspective of modelling access to DBMS is presented in Chapter 5
by considering record access frequencies. The machine learning domain was
examined, specifically Item-set Mining to model querying patterns that captured
distant correlations, in Chapter 6.
RQ3: A key question is whether we can provide a privacy semantics for these
behavioural-based approaches or relate the notion of privacy-anomaly detection
to the conventional definitions of privacy semantics?
Following on from the discovery that the detected malicious accesses to DBMS
encompass privacy violations of individuals privacy, another question that
emerges is whether we can have an interpretation of detected privacy viola-
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tion in-terms of formal definitions of privacy. Chapter 7 addresses this ques-
tion and explores from various perspectives the privacy semantic interpretation
of behavioural-based approaches. A novel notion of privacy-anomaly detection
systems based on formal definitions of privacy (k-anonymity and Discrimina-
tion rate) is presented. It is examined whether there is an overlap between the
violations of privacy definitions detected by the privacy-anomaly detection sys-
tem and the malicious accesses detected by the security-anomaly detection sys-
tem. Another interpretation of behavioural-based anomaly detection (the n-gram
based security-anomaly detection system) is presented in Chapter 7 which shows
that the behavioural-based anomaly detection system, when applied to the logs
of a k-anonymity-based privacy-anomaly detection system in interactive query
settings, has the potential to detect instances of privacy attacks (inferences) as
anomalies precisely as privacy-anomalies.
1.3 Key Contributions
The key contributions within this dissertation are summarised as follows.
• N-gram based approach to detect malicious DBMS access: a white-box
anomaly detection system based on n-grams of SQL queries is proposed. It is
quite possible that a single query may not be malicious, but a sequence of queries
can result in an undesirable event. Therefore, the n-gram based approach consid-
ers sequences of queries to model normative behaviour. The model of normative
behaviour captures the users querying behaviour instead of considering an SQL
query in isolation. The dissertation describes experiments to judge the effective-
ness of using an n-gram based scheme to detect query anomalies in DBMS logs
and thereby identify insider attacks. The model demonstrates that it is possible
to build a useful query abstractions and that n-grams of these query abstractions
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do capture the short-term correlations inherent in the application. The approach
detects malicious accesses to databases by insiders leading to privacy violations
within the relational database management framework.
• DBMS-oriented behavioural modelling to detect malicious DBMS access:
a different perspective on the construction of the normative behaviour is intro-
duced, that is the notion of DBMS/record-oriented behavioural modelling. Tra-
ditional approaches can be referred to as role-oriented behavioural modelling
where normative behaviour of users are modelled according to the user roles
in contrast to DBMS-oriented modelling. This perspective gives rise to a se-
mantic approach to frequency-based anomaly detection of malicious insider ac-
cesses to databases. The DBMS/record-oriented model of normative behaviour
is constructed and utilizes techniques from statistical process control. Two sce-
narios were considered, in the first scenario, the training data contains outliers,
and in the second scenario, the training data is free from outliers. The experi-
ments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in the detection
of frequent observation attacks as well as anomalies introduced due to human
negligence or human errors. An example of human negligence is an instance
where the doctor or the nurse (caregiver) missed the daily check-up of a patient
and thus forgot to update the patients’ record in the database. To the best of our
knowledge, the proposed semantic approach labels these unique type of anoma-
lies as it not only identifies unseen behaviours but also identifies behaviours that
should have been present in the current behaviours. It is also demonstrated that
the proposed DBMS-oriented behaviour modelling can be transformed into a
role-oriented behaviour modelling.
• Modelling rare query behaviour: an alternative anomaly detection system is
presented for the detection of insider attacks as security-anomalies. The ap-
proach considers sets of queries to model behaviour using item-set mining al-
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gorithms. Based on the notion that behaviours that are rare (infrequent) repre-
sent possible anomalies, while frequent behaviours can be considered safe, rare
(Apriori-Inverse [37] and Apriori-Rare [38]) and frequent (PrePost+ [39]) item-
set mining algorithms are adopted for modelling querying behaviour. Unlike n-
grams, it is shown that the item-sets mining based anomaly detection approach
has the potential to capture distant/long-term correlations inherent in the appli-
cation.
• Privacy semantic interpretation of behavioural-based approach: a novel no-
tion of privacy-anomaly detection is proposed. The idea is to learn user’s past
querying behaviour in terms of privacy and then identifying deviations from past
behaviour in order to detect privacy violations – privacy-anomalies. Two instan-
tiations of privacy-anomaly detection systems are proposed. The first instantia-
tion can be considered a naïve interpretation of k-anonymity [24]. The second in-
stantiation combines k-anonymity and Discrimination Rate Privacy Metric [40].
It is demonstrated that the privacy-anomalies that were being detected by the
privacy-anomaly detection system can also be detected by the n-gram based ap-
proach (security-anomaly detection system).
Privacy definitions when used in interactive query settings are susceptible to pri-
vacy attacks based on query correlations (inferences) leading to privacy viola-
tions. Much attention has been paid on mitigating inference attacks by suggest-
ing stronger privacy definitions, for instance, using differential privacy, but this
has its practical limitation. It is demonstrated that the application of an n-gram
based approach can potentially detect privacy attacks as privacy-anomalies.
• Identification Capability of SQL queries: an interpretation of a recently pub-
lished privacy metric, known as Discrimination Rate Privacy Metric, for SQL
query is presented. The approach is based on information theory and enables
one to measure the identification capability of an SQL query.
On the Detection of Privacy and Security
Anomalies
9 Muhammad Imran Khan
1. Introduction 1.4 Thesis Structure
• PriDe: a model that quantifies the privacy-loss between querying behaviours
is proposed. The proposed approach serves as a good tool to provide a global
consistency, i.e. if firm A’s privacy score is much higher as compared to the rest
of the firms, then this alerts the organization to take imperative measures before a
breach is materialized. The score can augment a privacy dashboard that provides
the health of the system in terms of privacy.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The thesis is organized in the following manner:
Chapter 2 presents a literature review of anomaly-based detection of insider attacks.
The chapter presents the detailed background and preliminaries of the research in fo-
cus, which paves the path to understand the presented work. A taxonomy of anomaly
detection methods that detect anomalous access to a DBMS is also introduced in this
chapter.
Chapter 3 focusses on the literature review that covers the privacy aspects of the disser-
tation. The chapter introduces the notion of privacy and reviews a number of privacy
models (definitions) that fall within the scope of the dissertation.
Chapter 4 presents an anomaly-based detection approach to detect insider attacks. The
proposed approach uses n-grams to capture querying patterns in an audit log of SQL
queries generated by an application system by considering sequences of queries.
Chapter 5 introduces a novel notion of DBMS/record-oriented modelling that leads
to the development of a semantic approach to frequency-based anomaly detection of
malicious insider accesses to databases.
Chapter 6 investigates alternatives approaches to model querying behaviour. An alter-
native approach for detection of insiders malicious access to DBMS is proposed that
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deploys frequent and rare item-sets mining (PrePost+, Apriori-Inverse and Apriori-
Rare algorithms) to model querying behaviour of an insider.
In Chapter 7, a privacy semantic interpretation of a behavioural-based anomaly detec-
tion approaches is presented. A notion of privacy-anomaly detection is also introduced.
Two instantiations of privacy-anomaly detection systems that are, a naïve instantiation
based on k-anonymity and an intricate instantiation by combining k-anonymity and
Discrimination Rate are demonstrated. In the chapter, it is investigated whether pri-
vacy violations can be detected as anomalies by a security-anomaly detection system,
in particular, n-gram based approach. This chapter also puts forward a way to compute
the identification capability of SQL queries. An application of n-gram based approach
to detect privacy attacks based on query correlation as privacy-anomalies is also shown
in this chapter.
Chapter 8 presents PriDe a model that quantifies and measures the privacy-loss be-
tween querying behaviour interactive query session.
Lastly, Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation and outlines the direction for future work.
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Chapter 2
Malicious DBMS Accesses - State of
the Art




Contemporary organization systems rely heavily on Database Management Systems
(DBMS) to store and manage access to their application data. This data can be sensi-
tive in nature, thus giving rise to security and privacy concerns. This chapter presents
background on the Database Intrusion Detection relevant to the thesis. Section 2.1.1
considers the threats to contemporary organizations, while Section 2.1.2 and 2.1.3
defines and discusses the impact of an insider threat. Section 2.2 explores the detec-
tion methods for insider attacks. Section 2.3 presents a taxonomy of anomaly-based
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detection methods and reviews the well-known techniques reported in the literature.
2.1.1 Threats to Contemporary Organizations
Threats to an organization can be classified as external (outsider attack) or internal
(insider attack). External threats come from attackers outside of the organization who
discover network and/or system vulnerabilities and use this information to penetrate
the organization. Outside attackers may, for example, utilize social engineering tech-
niques to accomplish a malicious goal, such as stealing confidential information or
making some resources unavailable using a Denial-of-Service attack. Much research
exists on dealing with external threats, and many security defences have been pro-
posed, including host-based access controls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), and
access control mechanisms [41, 42, 43]. On the other hand, an insider is a person who
belongs to an organization and is authorized to access a range of its data and services.
We are particularly interested in insider attacks as the nature of these attacks make
them challenging to detect. The next section reviews how the understanding and def-
inition of insider has evolved in the literature and provides the definition used in this
work.
2.1.2 Defining Insiders
Several definitions can be found in the literature for an insider [44, 45, 46]; however,
there is no consensus for a single definition [47]. In the 2008 paper, “Defining the
Insider Threat”, Bishop and Gates considered three definitions of insiders [44]. The
first definition was from a RAND report [48] that defines an insider to be “an already
trusted person with access to sensitive information and information systems”. The
second definition was also from the same RAND report, which defines an insider to be
“someone with access, privilege, or knowledge of information systems and services”.
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The third definition, originating from [49], defines an insider to be “anyone operating
inside the security perimeter”. In the first definition, a person needs to be trusted
in order to be called an insider, however, in the second definition, a person having
knowledge of the system and services is also considered as an insider while the third
definition considers everyone within the security perimeter to be an insider.
The first three definitions are regarded as binary definitions because if the person satis-
fies one of these definitions, then that person is called an insider, otherwise, the person
is not an insider. Bishop and Gates [44] also provided a fourth, non-binary, definition
for an insider. The non-binary notion of an insider is based upon a measure of the
damage that an organization would suffer if entities such as resources, important doc-
uments, e-mails, source code, etc. are compromised or leaked. Each entity is assigned
an impact value that specifies this measure of damage. Entities with the same impact
value are grouped in protection domain groups. These protection domain groups are
then paired with groups of users having access to entities in protection domain groups.
Users having access to protection domain groups with the highest impact-value pose
the highest risk of insider threat. This model provides a spectrum on which the degree
to which an insider poses a threat can be identified. We believe that such a model is
useful in developing more fine-grained security mechanisms by taking into account the
threat-level that an insider poses. This proposed model for insider threat that Bishop
and Gates presented is useful in understanding how threats may be traced and aggre-
gated through a system. However, the model does not define what is meant by an
insider.
In a 2008 cross-disciplinary workshop on “Countering Insider Threats” [45], a more
specific definition was proposed. In this workshop, the insider was defined as “a per-
son that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, or decide
about one or more assets of the organization’s structure”. This dissertation adopts this
definition, following its growing support.
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A famously reported case of an insider attack was of an employee at an office that
issues driving licences. The employee exploited access privileges to issue fraudulent
licenses [46]. It has been reported that insider attacks can be unintentional as well. For
instance, the breach resulted from the carelessness of an employee [50].
Once we’ve defined who an insider, we look at the definition of an insider threat is
defined. The definition for insider threat that has consensus on it is put forward by
Predd et. al. in [51] that defines insider threat as “[...] an insider’s action that puts an
organization or its resources at risk” [51].
2.1.2.1 Masqueraders and Masquerade Attacks
It is worth mentioning that this of an insider does not cover the masqueraders. A
masquerader is defined as an attacker who has gained (steals) the credentials of an
employee (insider) of a contemporary organization and subsequently, uses those cre-
dentials to maliciously access organization resources (includes databases) by imper-
sonating as a legitimate employee of that organization. A masquerade attack can take
one of the two following forms (i) - a masquerader is an insider who gains control of
credentials of another employee of the same organization having different a privilege
level than that being held by the masquerader, (ii) - the masquerader is an outside at-
tacker who somehow gains control of legitimate employee’s credentials. A distinction,
in-terms knowledge base, can be drawn between an internal masquerader and external
masquerader. Intuitively, an insider masquerader knows more about the organization
as compared to an external masquerader though this is not necessarily always be the
case. Additionally, an internal masquerader can mimic behaviour similar to the be-
haviour of other employees of the organization, whereas an external masquerader’s
behaviour is likely to manifest differently because of the lack of knowledge about em-
ployee behaviours. In this dissertation, internal and external masqueraders are treated
as one. Figure 2.1 a depiction of insiders, outsiders, and internal and external masquer-
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Figure 2.1: Figure depicting insiders, outsiders, internal and external masqueraders in
organizational settings.
aders in an organizational setting.
2.1.3 The Impact of an Insider Attack
A 2015 report titled Insider Threat Report by Vormetric [5] reported that globally 89%
of the respondent organizations are at risk of insider attack and that among these re-
spondent organizations 34% of them felt extremely vulnerable to this kind of attack.
Of the respondent organizations, 56% plan to increase their spending on tackling the
challenge of insider threat. The 2015 Cost of Cyber Crime: Global Report from the
Ponemon Institute [52] reported that insiders cause the costliest cyber-crimes. Infor-
mation Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA), reported that, globally, in-
sider threat was among the top three threats for 2016 [53]. In the context of healthcare,
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insiders have reported as the cause of most health-care data breaches [54]. For exam-
ple, a health-care data security report from IBM Managed Security Services reported
that insiders were responsible for 68% of all network attacks targeting health-care data
in 2016 [55]. Insider attacks are on the rise, as reported in a 2015 survey report [6]
that internal factors caused 43% of data breaches as compared to 2004 where it was
reported in [56] that insiders caused 29% of the crimes.
Nonetheless, the reporting rate of insider attacks remains very low for a variety of
reasons compared to the actual number of instances, including inconsequential impact
or lack of evidence [56]. Another reason is that organizations are sometimes hesitant
to report insider attacks due to loss of reputation and liability; however, legislations
are now in place directing organizations to report data breaches such as the recently
passed Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2016 in Australia [57] and
the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation that came into effect from 2018 [15].
2.2 Anomaly Detection in Systems
Originally, IDSs were designed to detect network intrusions and can be classified into
misuse detection systems and anomaly detection systems [58]. Misuse detection sys-
tems look for existing misuse patterns and are limited to detect previously known at-
tacks [58, 59, 60]. In general, misuse detection systems have also been referred to
as signature-based systems or knowledge-based intrusion detection systems in the lit-
erature [61, 62, 63]. The majority of commercial intrusion detection systems are
misuse detection systems [64, 65, 66]. Misuse detection systems are circumvented by
sophisticated attackers targeting an organization as these systems only detect known
attacks [67]. A misuse detection system detects attacks by comparing the audit trails
with the existing attack signatures. It provides a guarantee that the known attack is
detected, but it cannot detect an unknown attack. It is difficult to determine attack
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signatures for all the variants of a particular attack as different ways exist to exploit
vulnerability or weakness.
In contrast to misuse detection systems, anomaly detection (also known as
behavioural-based) systems look for a deviation from normative behaviour. In princi-
ple, anomaly detection systems have the potential to detect zero-day attacks – attacks
for which there is not a known predefined pattern. However, in practice, it is a chal-
lenge to model normative behaviour accurately. Existing work has generally focused
on identifying anomalous system operations [68], malicious network events [69] or
malicious application system events [70]. The anomaly detection systems can be dis-
tinguished on the basis of the way in which normative behaviour is modelled, that
is, either the system learns the normative behaviour by automatically mining the past
behaviours (learning-based anomaly detection systems) or the normative behaviour
(specification-based anomaly detection systems) is specified manually [71, 72].
It has been reported that the attacker can evade the anomaly detection system by care-
fully mimicking normative behaviour while exploiting a vulnerability. Such attacks
are known as mimicry attacks [73, 74, 75, 76, 77].
The effectiveness of IDSs is evident in domains like computer networking, operating
systems, and industrial control systems thus making them a favourable choice to be
deployed to protect databases against intrusions [28, 30, 29, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83,
84, 85, 86, 87]. However, IDSs deployed to protect systems in the above-mentioned
domains are not adequate for databases; therefore, IDSs tailored to databases are desir-
able. Such a tailored IDS for DBMS is known as Database Intrusion Detection System
(DIDS). This dissertation focuses on the detection of malicious queries that are made
by an insider to a DBMS. The literature has shown that intrusion detection systems
tailored to databases are effective in the detection of these malicious queries made by
an insider [3, 11, 10, 12]. The following sections of this chapter review DIDS research
and proposes a taxonomy of IDS in the context of DBMS.
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An anomaly-based detection system is further classified into learning-based or
specification-based. While remaining within the scope of detecting malicious access
to DBMS, the literature lacks any specification-based detection system. A naïve way
to design a specification-based detection system would be to list all the legitimate SQL
queries. However, it is impractical to a priori specify every potentially legitimate query.
The development of a complete specification in the case of DBMS is unattainable, es-
sentially for the inherent flexibility of SQL, that is, a SQL statement can be written in
different ways to query the information.In our opinion, the notion of the specification-
based detection system is immaterial in the context of databases intrusion detection
because of its impracticality. In the literature in general, within the context of DIDS
research, the anomaly-based detection systems imply that it is a learning-based sys-
tem. In literature and commercially, the DIDS solutions are routinely referred to as
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) solutions.
2.3 A Taxonomy for DBMS Anomaly Detection
This section introduces a taxonomy of methods that detect anomalous access to a
DBMS. Anomaly-based DIDS research has remained a centre of focus of the research
community, while less attention is being paid on misuse (or signature)-based DIDSs.
The proposed taxonomy is shown in Figure 2.2 that broadly categorizes IDSs to detect
anomalous access in a DBMS. An aspect to keep in consideration while performing
classification of anomaly-based DIDS is the set of features used to model normative
behaviour of a user, for example, time of access, attributes in projection clause, rela-
tions/tables queried etc. Section 2.3.2 and its following sections discuss these classifi-
cations. To address these classifications, we first present the prevalent architecture of
anomaly-based database intrusion detection systems in the following section.
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Techniques may use machine learning to model and comapre behaviours
Figure 2.2: Taxonomy of anomalous DBMS-access detection systems.
On the Detection of Privacy and Security
Anomalies
20 Muhammad Imran Khan
2. Malicious DBMS Accesses - State of the Art 2.3 A Taxonomy for DBMS Anomaly Detection
2.3.1 Prevalent Architecture of Anomaly-based Database Intru-
sion Detection Systems
Figure 2.3: Training phase of an anomaly detection system.
Figure 2.4: Detection phase of an anomaly detection system.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 depict the prevalent architecture of an anomaly-based database
intrusion detection system. The architecture involves two phases: a training phase
and a detection phase. A profile of normative behaviour is constructed during the
training phase and is compared against the run-time profile that is constructed in the
detection phase. The future deviations of the run-time profile from normative profiles
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are labelled as anomalies and necessitate attention. The architecture consists of two
fundamental components: feature extraction (abstraction) and profile constructor. In
feature extraction, the features required to construct the profile are extracted. The
profile construction component is the technique to construct the profile using selected
features.
Profiling “normative behaviour” is non-trivial as many features about queries can be
taken into consideration while constructing profiles, and identifying significant deter-
minant features is a challenge. The classification based on features and the techniques
to construct profiles is discussed in the following next sections.
2.3.2 Feature Classification
Anomaly-based intrusion detection techniques for detecting malicious access to
databases can be further distinguished based on what features they extract from a
DBMS audit log of SQL queries to model behaviours. The modelled behaviour is rep-
resented as a behavioural profile [8, 3]. These features can be syntax-centric, context-
centric, and data-centric, which is sometimes is referred to as result-centric in the lit-
erature [3, 10, 11].
Techniques using syntax-centric features construct behavioural profiles by using syn-
tax features of the SQL query included but are not limited to the attributes in a projec-
tion clause, the relations queried, the attributes in selection clause, and/or the type of
SQL command [3]. Techniques using data-centric or result-centric features construct
behavioural profiles using data returned in response to an SQL query or any other sta-
tistical measurement on returned data, for instance, the minimum and maximum value
in case of numeric data. For example, one could use the amount of information (the
percentage of data returned) returned in response to a query or the returned values of
attributes to model behaviour or a user [11]. The context-centric techniques construct
behavioural profiles use contextual features. Contextual features are associated with
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the context of the query, for example, the time at which the query was made, the user
ID of the person making the query, or the number of queries made in a specified time
period, etc [35]. A combination of the context, syntax and data-centric features, can be
used while modelling normative behaviours. One such anomaly detection technique
that uses syntax and data-centric features is proposed in [10].
An anomaly-based detection system building behavioural profiles that are not under-
standable by humans in a meaningful way is known as a Black-Box anomaly detection
system. On the other hand, an anomaly-based detection system building behavioural
profiles that are understandable by humans are known as White-Box anomaly detec-
tion system. Understandability implies that the actual root cause of the anomaly can
be identified by the administrators (security officer, database administrator, etc.) when
they inspect the anomaly. Intuitively, white-box approaches have the potential to help
explain anomalies.
2.3.3 SQL Query Abstraction
Syntax-centric implies using only factors associated with the syntax of an SQL state-
ment. A question that arises is how much of the SQL statement can be considered
while constructing a behavioural model, that is, should one consider the entire state-
ment or some parts of the statement – the challenge of selecting appropriate SQL query
abstraction. Abstraction is a tuple representation of an SQL statement and consists of
query features like relation name, attribute names, the amount of returned data or any
statistics on the returned data. A number of techniques [3, 9, 10, 89, 90, 91, 92] have
been proposed that transform the syntax of an SQL statement into a more abstract
fingerprint that can be used for comparing queries. SQL query abstractions are also
referred to as SQL query fingerprints [89, 90], SQL query signatures [3] or SQL query
skeletons in the literature [9]. In this dissertation, various specializations of SQL query
abstraction is used and described in their respective chapters. The query abstractions
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used by existing anomaly-based detection approaches are also described in this chapter.
Other than DIDS research, the use of abstraction in practice has also been studied by
audit log summarization research as typically audit logs encompass a large number
of queries and methods to summarize logs in a meaningful way are sought [93]. For
instance, it has been reported in a recent study that within the time period of 19 hours,
approximately 17 million SQL queries were made in a major US bank [9].
2.3.4 Syntax-centric Features-based Techniques
Several anomaly detection approaches to detect malicious accesses to DBMS use
syntax-centric features of the SQL queries to construct behavioural profiles [3, 34, 12].
For instance, the approach DetAnom [3] detects malicious DBMS-accesses by appli-
cation programs. SQL queries executed by an application program are represented
in the form of SQL query abstractions to generate a normative profile of an applica-
tion. In [3], a SQL query abstraction consists of the following elements, (c, t, r, q, n),
where c is SQL command type, for instance, SELECT. Attribute t is the list of attribute
identifiers projected in the query and are relative to the relation to which they belong.
Attribute r is the list of relation identifiers. Attribute q is the list of attribute identi-
fiers in the WHERE clause and n is the number of predicates in the WHERE clause. For




AND bankdb.acc_number = bankdbacc.account;
The corresponding identifiers for relations and the attributes are shown in Table 2.1.
This query is then represented as follows:
{<1> <100:10, 200:20> <100, 200> <100:10, 200:30> <2> }.
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Relation Name Relation Identifier
bankdb 100
bankdbacc 200




The generation of a query abstraction is followed by the exploration of all execution
paths of the application program accomplished by Concolic execution (Concolic test-
ing) which is a technique for program analysis [94, 95, 96]. Once all the paths are
explored, the branching condition is then paired with the SQL query that falls under
that branching condition that was discovered in the process of concolic testing. This
(branch condition, SQL query) pair is referred to as a query record.
In the detection phase of DetAnom, a query is intercepted, and its branch condition is
matched with the branch condition in the corresponding a query record. If the branch
condition is satisfied, then matching of query abstraction is carried out. In case of a
mismatch, the query is said to be malicious. DetAnom works only for application pro-
grams where the SQL queries are embedded in program code, and it is not extendible to
capture users behaviours manifested in a variety of SQL queries made to the database.
Another early approach based on syntax-centric features is presented in [12]. The ap-
proach uses three query abstractions each having different level of granularities, coarse
triplet, medium-grain triplet, fine triplet.
A Naïve Bayes classifier was used to predict a role for the SQL query. If the predicted
role is not the same as from the one SQL query was originated then an alarm is raised.
On the Detection of Privacy and Security
Anomalies
25 Muhammad Imran Khan
2. Malicious DBMS Accesses - State of the Art 2.3 A Taxonomy for DBMS Anomaly Detection
This approach has several limitations including, considering each query in isolation
and it does not consider the sequence of queries, Second, the approach constructed
profiles of roles while ignoring the case where one user can belong to multiple roles.
Syntax-centric approaches, in general, are useful in detection masquerader attacks as
well as SQL injection attacks both these attacks lead to structural changes in SQL
statement.
2.3.5 Data (Result)-centric Features-based Techniques
Little research has been reported on using data-centric features as the basis for anomaly
detection in the context of DIDS. Data-centric features include the amount of data
returned in response to a query or returned values of attributes or any other statics
performed on the returned set of attribute values.
In [11], it is argued that syntax-centric features of a query alone are a poor discrimina-
tor of intent. Syntactically different queries can potentially give the same result while
syntactically similar queries can potentially yield different results. Therefore, a user
can craft a legitimate SQL query to retrieve results from the database which the user
is authorized to retrieve, yet a purely syntax-centric anomaly-based detection system
might label this as anomalous behaviour.
In the approach proposed in [11], user profiles are clusters that are specified in terms
of an S-Vector that provides a statistical summary of the results (tuples/rows). In the
detection phase, clustering algorithms were adopted, that are, as supervised learning
methods, Euclidean k-means clustering, Support Vector Machines (SVM), Decision
Tree Classifier, and Naïve Bayes, and as unsupervised methods, Cluster-Based Outlier
Detection (based on Euclidean distance clustering) and Attrib-Deviation, using L∞-
norm. If a query belongs to the cluster, then it is considered normal else it is regarded as
anomalous. The presented approach is suitable for the detection of a query in isolation
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and does not take a sequence of queries into account.
Data-centric approaches are capable of detecting sophisticated attacks as well. For
instance, data harvesting attacks involving retrieval of a large amount of data, therefore,
exceeding what is retrieved by a legitimate user.
2.3.6 Context-centric Features-based Techniques
Few purely context-centric approaches are reported in the literature. One such context
centric approach is presented in [35] in which contextual features are considered in
modelling user behaviours. The approach took the deployment of anomaly-based IDS
in the medical sector as its use-case and studied the Break-The-Glass (BTG) procedure
which is a procedure that breaks the traditional access control mechanism and enable
access of patients data in case of emergency to employees of different departments. In
this approach in [35], users who supposed to behave similarly are divided into groups
and profiles are constructed for groups. The feature space comprised of contextual
features like access type, time, division, date. Profiles were represented as the sequence
of histograms and were constructed using the concept of Bins. Bins represent the
frequency of features. In the detection phase, the distance between the histogram of
a user and the existing profile is measured, and a larger distance is an indication as
an anomaly. The approach represented user and group profile in terms of a sequence
of histograms of features that can easily be interpreted by a concerned individual like
a security officer. Therefore, the approach in [35] can be classified as a white-box
anomaly detection approach.
Context-centric approaches typically increase the detection effectiveness of an ID ap-
proach when combined with syntax or data-centric approach.
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2.3.7 Hybrid Techniques
An example of an approach using data and syntax-centric features to construct be-
havioural profiles is presented in [10]. Machine learning techniques, in particular,
Naïve Bayes classifiers and multi-labelling classifiers, were also deployed in the pro-
file generation process. User profiles are built in the training phase from logs containing
user activities.
The approach transforms an SQL query into an SQL query abstraction called a quadru-
plet. A quadruplet QT (c, PR, PA, S R) is composed of data-centric and syntax-centric
features including the command type c; the list of relations accessed by the query PR;
the list of attributes accessed by query relative to the relation PA; and the amount of
selected information from the relation S R. This hybrid approach is demonstrated in
two settings that is role-based anomaly detection and unsupervised anomaly detection.
In the detection phase the role of a querier was predicted using a Naïve Bayes classi-
fier. Multi-labelling classification was used in case of an overlap of roles that results
in more than one role. If the predicted role is different from the actual role then the
query is labelled as anomalous. In the unsupervised settings, the COBWEB [97, 98]
clustering algorithm was selected. The query is treated as anomalous if a query made
by a user falls into a cluster that does not contain any query made by this user. This ap-
proach is promising for the detection of a single malicious query in isolation; however,
it ignores sequences of queries while modelling behaviour.
The approach presented in [36] uses context-centric and data-centric features. Norma-
tive profiles are constructed by discovering association rules between context-centric
features and data-centric features using frequent item-set mining [99]. The basic idea
of the approach is to tie the results retrieved by the SQL query with the context in
which they were retrieved. For instance, a transaction made in London in the morning
typically retrieves records for employees of the human resource department. There-
fore, human resource department employees records are tied with the context that they
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are normally retrieved in the morning from London. In the detection phase, for any
incoming query, context-centric features were extracted, and rules conforming to these
features are matched, and then the result of the query is matched with the results as-
sociated with the retrieved rules. A drawback of this approach is that large databases
result in large profiles. Additionally, this approach is too restrictive and less likely to
be scalable. Another drawback of this approach is in general the drawback of context-
centric approaches that is the context can be easily mimicked.
The approach in [88], also employed context and syntax-centric features to model be-
haviours and forms some assumptions for instance that every department in an orga-
nization has a unique IP space, employees work in shifts (there are three shifts in a
day). The features collected for modelling include employee ID, role ID, time, IP ad-
dress, access type (direct or through an application). The approach also records the
SQL query associated with the contextual features. The profile consists of the proba-
bility of each feature’s occurrence observed for every user. In the detection phase, a
new transaction is compared against the constructed profiles to check the closest issuer
(user) of that transaction. The transaction is labelled as an anomaly in case the issuer
of the transaction is different from the one computed. This approach also considered
role hierarchy, meaning, if role r̈1 is above role r̈2 in the hierarchy, then the access priv-
ileges of role r̈2 is a subset of role r̈1. For instance, if a query made by r̈1 is labelled
as malicious, but the same query is legitimate for r̈2 then this is not considered as a
malicious query. The focus of this approach is to augment Role-Based Access Con-
trol (RBAC) to ensure that the query is made only by the authorized users. Similar to
approaches discussed above, this approach also detects only single malicious DBMS
transaction where later in the dissertation it is argued that a single query may be legiti-
mate, however, a group of them made together might result in malicious or illegitimate
action.
In [1] contextual, data and syntax-centric features are considered in modelling. The
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Figure 2.5: List of features considered. Figure cropped from Securing Data Ware-
houses from Web-Based Intrusions by Santos et al. [1]
database intrusion detection approach in [1] is tailored for Data Warehouses in which
applications are enabled to access Data Warehouses via the web. The profiles are con-
structed by considering various features, as shown in Figure 2.5 and are represented in
terms of the probabilistic distribution of each feature for each user and for the entire
population. In the detection phase for this approach, testing is done to match features
distribution with the distributions obtained in the training phase using statistical hy-
pothesis tests like Chi-square, Shapiro-Wilk, and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests [1]. In
case of a non-conformity, the activity involving that feature is labelled as an anomaly.
The approach is focused on web-based malicious access to Data Warehouses though
insiders remain unaddressed. Table 2.2 shows a consolidated presentation of discussed
and well-known approaches proposed in the literature.
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Table 2.2: An overview of the characteristics discussed and well-known approaches proposed in the literature. , , and 7 represents syntax,












Hussain et al. [3]  n 4 6 Tuples ofSQL-branch condition Tuple matching
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Gafny et al. [36]  7 n 4 6 Association Rules FIM, rule matching
Kamra et al. [12]  n 4 6 quiplets, Naïve Bayes
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2.4 Conclusions
Database intrusion detection, specifically behavioural-based database intrusion detec-
tion approaches have seen to be effective in detecting insider attacks. Two significant
aspects in the design of behavioural-based approaches are what level of features ( and
in the case of SQL statement then what level of abstraction) are selected for modelling
behaviours and the technique (algorithm) selected for constructing profiles. The lit-
erature contains approaches using syntax-centric, data-centric, or context-centric fea-
tures or a combination of these features. To construct profiles, machine learning ap-
proach like classification, clustering, as well as distance functions, rule matching al-
gorithms are adopted. In the existing literature, pure data-centric, and context-centric
approaches are not prevalent. Some of the approaches are tailored for specific ap-
plications, i.e., data warehouses; second, these approaches do not allow for regularly
updating normative profiles.
The majority of these approaches reported in the literature are focused on the detec-
tion of a single malicious SQL query in different settings by considering only single
SQL query in modelling behaviours [3, 11, 35, 10, 36, 1, 88]. The drawback of such
approaches is that they are effective in detecting only those malicious accesses by in-
siders that are based on an SQL query in isolation. Little attention has been paid on the
detection of malicious queries sequences. As a single query might not be malicious, but
a sequence of SQL queries might be an indication of malicious activity. For instance,
consider a banking scenario where a query made to check customer’s account balance
is normal and is usually followed by queries pertaining to other banking-related ac-
tions such as withdraws or transfers. In the case, where an insider browses through
the bank’s database by querying each customer’s account balance then each query in
isolation is normal; however, the sequence of queries made by the insider results in
malicious activity. Therefore, such approaches that can detect the malicious sequence
of SQL queries are desirable.
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Chapter 3
Definitions of Privacy
“Right to privacy is really important. You pull that brick out and another and
pretty soon the house falls.”
Tim Cook (1960 - Present)
3.1 Introduction
This dissertation involves the domains of detecting anomalous access to DBMS and
formal definitions of privacy. The state of the art research on detecting anomalous
access to databases was examined in the previous Chapter 2. This Chapter reviews the
formal privacy definitions from the literature. Section 3.2 reviews various aspects of
privacy; for instance, how privacy is understood. Section 3.3 examines well-known
formal privacy definitions. Section 3.4 summarizes the Chapter and presents the key
observations gathered from the literature. Conclusions are drawn in Section 3.5.
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3.2 Countless Shades of Privacy
Privacy is a challenging concept to define because of its culturally subjective basis. A
classic paper [100] considers the philosophical dimensions of privacy in three perspec-
tives: “i. a claim, entitlement or right of an individual to determine what information
about himself may be communicated to others [101, 102]. ii. measure of the control an
individual has over: (a) information about himself; (b) intimacies of personal identity;
or (c) who has sensory access to himself [103, 104, 105, 106]. iii. state or condition of
limited access to a person [107, 108].” This right to privacy is a globally recognised
right as stated in Article 12 of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights that
states [109],
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.”
Taking the privacy concerns of the modern-day digital world, legislators have provided
legal cover to the public to ensure their right to privacy. Dominant examples of such
legislation include the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA,
1996) [110], the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation [111], the OECD privacy
framework [112]. 58% of total countries in the world have data protection and privacy
legislation in place while 10% have draft legislation and 21% of the countries still have
no legislation in place (there is no data for the remaining 12%) [113].
Contemporary organizations collect large volumes of data over which analytics are rou-
tinely carried out for various purposes, including data-driven marketing and informed
decision making. Organizations often delegate this task to third parties specializing in
data analytics. The collection, storage, processing, and sharing of personal data raises
dimensions privacy concerns. The work of Tore Dalenius in [114], points out the prob-
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3. Definitions of Privacy 3.3 Formal Privacy Definitions
lem of publishing the data of populations without risking individual’s privacy. The
research in this domain started to gain momentum in the late 1970s and 1980s, espe-
cially in the context of publishing census data. Recently privacy research is no longer
limited to census data, as emerging new technologies have brought privacy concerns
along, for example, the privacy concerns in social networks [115, 116, 117], internet
of things [118, 119, 120] and e-commerce [121, 122, 123].
The relational data model is the most widely used data model for storage and process-
ing of data [124, 125]; for this reason, the relational data model in DBMS (Relational
DBMS – RDBMS) is considered in this work. To ensure the privacy of individuals, the
data is anonymized. The anonymized version of data is typically made available in two
settings within the RDBMS framework, that are, non-interactive and interactive query
setting. Interactive query setting allows dynamic queries, while in a non-interactive
setting an anonymized version of the entire database is made available. In general,
data is considered anonymized if it complies with a formal privacy definition. Sev-
eral of the formal definitions of privacy have been proposed in the literature that are
reviewed in the next Section 3.3. When an anonymized version of data is made avail-
able, then in that context an adversary aims to strive for identifying individuals and
disclosing their sensitive attributes in the database.
The next section looks further into the formal definitions of privacy research proposed
in the literature to achieve anonymization in the context of databases.
3.3 Formal Privacy Definitions
Several forms of privacy have been formalized in the literature. The two mainstream
definitions of privacy are k-anonymity [3] and differential privacy [126]. k-anonymity
serves as the foundation for several privacy definitions including l-diversity [127], t-
closeness [25], (α, k)-anonymity [128].
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The syntactic definitions of privacy, like k-anonymity, l-diversity, t-closeness, are typ-
ically for one-time release of data. The table, specifically microdata table, that is re-
quired to be released is transformed such that the transformed table complies with
chosen privacy definition. Then the transformed version of the table is later released.
On the other hand, differential privacy can be used in interactive settings, where a
user sends queries and receives responses to those queries. In general, differential pri-
vacy works for statistical databases, and the differential privacy criteria is achieved
by adding noise in the query responses. Statistical databases deal with aggregates in-
stead of microdata tables. Richer analytics requires a release of microdata tables in
interactive query settings which is a challenge as multiple releases may give rise to
inferences being made by an adversary. Therefore, approaches to protect individuals
privacy, while allowing the release of microdata tables in interactive query settings,
having a foundation in formal privacy models are desirable.
This section reviews the well-known formal privacy definitions. The definitions are
described within the framework of relational databases, and therefore, before review-
ing the privacy definitions, the next section defines the key relational database terms
used in this dissertation.
3.3.1 Key Relational Database Terms
In a relational model a relation instance is denoted as T = {r1, r2, . . . , rn} where ri
is a tuple of attribute values that represents a record. T is a subset of some larger
population U. Each tuple represents an individual from U. Let the set of attributes
be denoted by Attr = {attr1, attr2, . . . , attrn}, for example, the table shown in Fig-
ure 3.1, Attr = {Name, City, Country}. The value of attribute attr j for a tuple ri is
denoted as ri[attr j], for example, r1[Country] = (‘Spain’). ri[Attr] denotes the tuple
(ri[attr1], ri[attr2], . . . , ri[attrn]) which is the projection of r onto the attributes in Attr
for example r1[Name, City, Country] = (‘Nicolau’, ‘Barcelona’, ‘Spain’).
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Table 3.1: An example relation T.
ri Name City Country
r1 Nicolau Barcelona Spain
r2 Jordi Barcelona Spain
r3 John New York USA
r4 Sean Cork Ireland
r5 Patrick Dublin Ireland
r6 Matías Berlin Germany
3.3.2 k-anonymity based and Extensions
k-anonymity [24] can be considered among the first formal definitions of privacy. The
following sections presents k-anonymity and its extensions.
3.3.2.1 k-anonymity
In the context of k-anonymity, attributes are classified in the following non-exclusive
categories, Identifiers, Quasi-Identifiers, and Sensitive attributes. The classification is
typically performed based on the risk of record re-identification using these attributes
and the sensitivity of the information these attributes convey.
• Identifier: an identifier is defined as “an attribute that refers to only a particu-
lar individual in the given population U”. Let the set of identifiers be denoted
as I ∈ Attr. An example of an identifier is the Personal Public Service Number
(PPS Number) which can uniquely identify individuals in Ireland. Other exam-
ples include an individual’s passport number, driving license number, and e-mail
address.
• Quasi-Identifier (QI): quasi-identifiers by themselves do not uniquely identify
individuals; however, when correlated with other available external data, an indi-
vidual (or individuals) can be identified. A quasi-identifier is defined in [24, 20]
as a “set of non-sensitive attributes of a relation if linked with external data to
then uniquely identify at least one individual in the population U”. Let the set of
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quasi-identifiers be denoted as QI ∈ Attr. An example of quasi-identifier is the
set of attributes Zipcode, Date of Birth, and Gender. For instance, the set of
attributes Zipcode, Date of Birth, and Gender was used to re-identify gov-
ernor of Massachusetts in [20]. The re-identification was performed by directly
linking shared attributes in two datasets, i.e. voter rolls and insurance company
datasets. It was reported that 87% of the US population could be identified by
these three attributes [20].
• Sensitive attribute: sensitive attributes consist of sensitive person-specific in-
formation. This information includes salary, disability status, or disease. The set
of sensitive attributes is denoted as SenAttr ∈ Attr. All possible values for the
sensitive attribute is denoted as SAV = {sv1, sv2, . . . , svn}.
k-anonymity is defined in [24] as follows, “a relation T satisfies k-anonymity if and
only if each tuple ri[QI] ∈ T appears with at least k occurrence in T”.
k-anonymity [24] provides a degree of anonymity if the data for each person cannot be
distinguished from k-1 individuals in a released dataset with respect to a set of quasi-
identifiers. Given QI ∈ Attr then two tuples ri and r j are quasi-identifier equivalent
if ri[QI] = r j[QI]. The relation T can be divided into quasi-identifier equivalence
classes. Let the set of all the equivalence classes in T be E where each equivalence
class e ∈ E consists of all the rows that have the same values for each quasi-identifier.
Another way to define k-anonymity is that a relation T satisfies k-anonymity if the
minimum equivalence class size is at least k in T. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show an original
and a k-anonymized (3-anonymized) version of the microdata relations, respectively,
where Name is an identifier, attributes Age & Zipcode are quasi-identifiers, and the
attribute Salary is a sensitive attribute. In Table 3.3 the identifier Name is suppressed
and is shown as * while quasi-identifiers Age & Zipcode are generalized – replacing
with a semantically similar but less specific value.
In Table 3.3, records #1, #2, and #3, form an equivalence class, similarly records #4,
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#5, and #6 as well as records #7, #8, and #9 also forms equivalence classes with respect
to the quasi-identifiers {Age & Zipcode}. Originally, k-anonymity was proposed for
a one-time release of data, meaning that the user is not enabled to query the DBMS
interactively.
Though considered to be among the first privacy definitions, k-anonymity, has been
widely applied in many domains to preserve privacy for examples Location-based
services [129, 130, 131, 132, 133], ride-hailing services [134], and webmail audit-
ing [135]. k-anonymity has been used along with cryptographic hashing to develop a
protocol that provides a degree of anonymity while checking for passwords in a com-
promised databases [136].
Table 3.2: A relation with Name as an identifier, Age & Zipcode are quasi-identifiers
and Salary as a sensitive attribute.
# Name Age Zipcode Salary
1 Kenneth 23 3134 77k
2 Hendry 37 3135 77k
3 John 34 3134 83k
4 Noemi 52 7290 65k
5 James 58 7291 77k
6 Amanda 55 7290 83k
7 Miyu 49 3134 65k
8 Vlad 43 3135 65k
9 Alex 46 3134 83k
Table 3.3: A 3-anonymized version of Table 3.2.
# Name Age Zipcode Salary
1 * <45 313* 77k
2 * <45 313* 77k
3 * <45 313* 83k
4 * ≥50 729* 65k
5 * ≥50 729* 77k
6 * ≥50 729* 83k
7 * 4* 313* 65k
8 * 4* 313* 65k
9 * 4* 313* 83k
A weakness of k-anonymity is its susceptibility to the homogeneity attack and the
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background knowledge attack [127]. If all the values for one of the sensitive attributes,
within an equivalence class, are same then it results in a homogeneity attack, for in-
stance, if the adversary knows an individual who is 33 years old and lives in the zipcode
3134 and has record is in an equivalence class where all the salaries are 77k then the
adversary deduces that the individual’s salary is 77k, though the table is k-anonymized.
In [127], it was shown that if the adversary knows that Japanese patients are less likely
to have heart-related diseases (background knowledge) enabled an adversary to predict
the diagnosis for an individual.
3.3.2.2 l-diversity
Another well-known definition of privacy is l-diversity which is an extension of k-
anonymity. The l-diversity principle in [127] states “an equivalence class e is l-diverse
if it contains at least ‘well-represented’ values for the sensitive attribute ∈ SenAttr.
A relation T is l-diverse if all the equivalence classes (q-block) are l-diverse”. The
term ‘well-represented’ is instantiated in three different ways as defined by the authors
in [127] that are Distinct l-diversity, Entropy l-diversity, and Recursive (c-l)-diversity.
The elementary form of l-diversity is distinct l-diversity. The remaining two instanti-
ations are stronger instantiations and take the distribution of sensitive attribute values
into account.
• Distinct l-diversity definition requires l distinct values in each equivalence class
e ∈ E.
• Entropy l-diversity is defined in [127] as “A table l-diverse if for every equiv-
alence class e ∈ E the entropy of the distribution of sensitive values in each
equivalence class is at least log(l)”.
• Recursive (c, l)-diversity requires that the least frequent sensitive attribute values
that do not appear rarely as well as most frequent sensitive attributes values do
not appear too frequently in an equivalence class e.
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Table 3.4 shows an l-diverse (3-diverse) version of Table 3.2, where each equivalence
class has three distinct sensitive attribute values.
Table 3.4: A l-diverse (3-diverse) version of Table 3.2.
# Name age Zipcode Salary
7 * <50 313* 65k
2 * <50 313* 77k
3 * <50 313* 83k
4 * ≥50 729* 65k
5 * ≥50 729* 77k
6 * ≥50 729* 83k
1 * <50 313* 77k
8 * <50 313* 65k
9 * <50 313* 83k
In some scenarios it is difficult to achieve l-diversity. Let us say that a relation consist-
ing of 20, 000 records has only one sensitive attribute, Test Results, where Test
Results can take either negative or positive value. If 99.75% of the Test Results
are positive, while 0.25% are negative, then there can be at most 20, 000 ∗ 0.25%= 50
equivalence classes.
l-diversity is susceptible to a skewness attack and similarity attack [25]. Consider a
class with 9 positive values and 1 negative value, and another class with 9 negative
values and 1 positive value, both classes are 2-diverse but present different privacy
risks – skewness attack. l-diversity doesn’t take the semantic-level closeness of the
sensitive attribute values into account and thus leads to similarity attacks. For exam-
ple, in a given equivalence class with the sensitive attribute diagnosis. Consider all
the values for diagnosis in that given equivalence class are related to heart-related
diseases. Therefore, an adversary knows someone in that given equivalence class then
the adversary concludes that the individual has heart-related disease.
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3.3.2.3 t-closeness
The t-closeness definition is a refinement of l-diversity. The authors in [25] define t-
closeness as “An equivalence class e is said to have t-closeness if the distance between
the distribution of a sensitive attribute value in this class and the distribution of the
sensitive attribute value in the whole relation T is no more than a threshold t.” As
a distance metric, the Earth Mover’s Distance can be used to measure the distance
between two frequency distributions [25].
l-diversity treats sensitive attributes of all the equivalence classes in a similar manner
without taking into account the global distribution of these sensitive attribute values
in the relation. However, in the case of real-world datasets, sensitive attribute values
might be skewed; therefore, it would be desirable to take into account the global distri-
bution of sensitive attribute values. Limitations of t-closeness are discussed in [137],
t-closeness degrades utility, is challenging to be achieved, and under certain scenarios,
it is shown to be NP-hard [138].
3.3.2.4 (α, k)-anonymity
The (α, k)-anonymity is an enhanced version of k-anonymity. The (α, k)-anonymity de-
fines that the frequency of sensitive attribute values α remains within the user-defined
threshold in equivalence classes. The authors introduced an α-deassociation require-
ment in [128], if this requirement is satisfied along with k-anonymity, then it is said
that (α, k)-anonymity is satisfied. Given a sensitive attribute value svi, a relation T is
α-deassociated if the relative frequency of svi in every equivalence class of E, that is
|(e, svi)|/|e| , is no more than α. Where (e, svi) be the set of tuples in equivalence class
e containing svi and α. A limitation of (α, k)-anonymity is that it may result in a high
level of distortion if the values for sensitive attributes are skewed [139].
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3.3.2.5 m-invariance
The m-invariance definition is also built upon k-anonymity. Most of the privacy def-
initions are suitable for the scenario where the relation is to be released once only.
Second or subsequent releases of the relation (with an updated record or insertion of a
new record) may lead to inferences.
The m-invariance definition [140] states that “an anonymized relation T is m-unique if
each equivalence class e ∈ T contains at least m set of records (or tuples) and all the
records in e must have different sensitive attribute values. The sequence of published
relations is said to be m-invariant if all the releases are m-unique, along with the
condition that the set of sensitive attribute values for every e in T must remain same
for subsequent releases of relation T.”
This privacy definition captures dynamic republication of relations. However, the con-
dition that values of the sensitive attribute should remain the same, as are in previous
releases, is strong and limits its applicability.
3.3.2.6 (k, e)-anonymity
The (k, e)-anonymity definition is an alteration of k-anonymity tailored for numeric
data and can only be applied to sensitive attributes having numeric values. (k, e)-
anonymity requires that the range of the equivalence class e to be larger than a certain
threshold [141].
(k, e)-anonymity is susceptible to proximity attack [142]. A proximity breach occurs
when the adversary predicts a short interval for an individual’s numeric sensitive at-
tribute’s value but not the exact value for the sensitive value itself.
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3.3.2.7 (ε, m)-anonymity
The (ε, m)-anonymity definition is a refinement to (k, e)-anonymity to overcome a
proximity breach, and similarly, is only applicable to sensitive attributes having nu-
merical values. The (ε, m)-anonymity requires that given an equivalence class e, for
every sensitive value svi ∈ e, then at most 1/m of the tuples in e can have sensitive
values ‘similar’ to svi. The factor of ε quantifies the similarity. The authors list two
ways to quantify the numerical similarity between two numerical values of sensitive
attributes [142]: two values are similar if their absolute difference is less than the pa-
rameter ε, i.e. |svi−sv j| ≤ ε, and relative similarity where svi is similar to sv j if |svi−sv j|
≤ sv j · ε.
3.3.2.8 Multi-relational k-anonymity
Most of the privacy definitions examined above deal with a single relation. Multi-
relational k-anonymity defines privacy for cases involving multiple relations by modi-
fying k-anonymity to accommodate multiple relations settings.
The multi-relational k-anonymity privacy assumes that there exists a Person-specific
Relation Tper with respect to a population U such that Tper has identifiers (primary key
attribute or set of attributes) that uniquely correspond to an individual in population
U. Given a set of relations T1, T2, . . . , Tn, containing foreign keys along with quasi-
identifiers as well as sensitive attributes. The notion of multi-relational k-anonymity
is to apply k-anonymity at owner level instead of the record level. As there can be
many records, spreading over multiple relations, belonging to a single owner. Multi-
relational k-anonymity requires that for each record owner rid in the join of all relations,
i.e. Tper ./ T1 ./ T2 ./ . . . ./ Tn, there are k - 1 other record owners with the same quasi-
identifier values [143].
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3.3.2.9 δ-disclosure privacy
The delta-disclosure privacy definition can be considered a more restrictive version of
t-closeness. Given a set of quasi-identifiers QI ∈ Attr \SenAttr then tuples ri and r j are
quasi-identifier equivalent if ri[QI] = r j[QI]. The relation T can be divided into quasi-
identifier equivalence classes as done in k-anonymity. The delta δ-disclosure privacy
defines that “an equivalence class e is δ-disclosure-private with respect to the sensitive
attribute in S AV if, for all svi ∈ SAV,
∣∣∣∣∣∣log p(e,svi)p(T,svi)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ < δ. Where p(X, svi) is the probability
that a randomly chosen member of X has sensitive attribute value svi.” A relation T
is δ-disclosure private if for every e ∈ E is δ-disclosure private [144]. However, the δ-
disclosure privacy definition is too strong for practical reasons because an equivalence
class may not be able to cover all the sensitive attribute values.
3.3.3 Differential privacy (ε-differential Privacy)
Differential privacy requires that any given disclosure is, within a small multiplicative
factor that is ε, just as likely regardless of whether or not the individual’s record in
the relation [126]. Intuitively, consider two datasets DS 1 and DS 2, only differing is
in one record. Res1 and Res2 are the result of query Q to DS 1 and DS 2. Res1 and
Res2 must be indistinguishable from each other in order to fulfil differential privacy
requirement. This is usually achieved by the addition of noise to the query results.
Many differential private algorithms have been proposed [145, 146, 147, 148, 149,
150]. Differentially private algorithms are usually designed for interactive query set-
tings; however, with a limitation that they answer only a limited number of queries
– governed by privacy budget. The privacy budget regulates that number of queries
after which the answers to the queries no longer considered free from privacy risk.
Additionally, in general, differential privacy works for statistical databases. Statistical
databases deal with aggregates, in contrast with microdata release. In some scenarios
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the amount of noise added to the output degrades the utility of the data [151].
Besides the reviewed definitions the privacy literature encompasses many formal pri-
vacy definitions and models including integral privacy [152], (X,Y)-privacy [153], and
β-likeness [154].
3.4 Summary
This Chapter introduced some of the definitions of anonymity. Observations from the
literature are summarized as follows:
• k-anonymity as a foundation: k-anonymity being one of the first privacy defi-
nitions, provided a foundation to further privacy research. Several privacy defi-
nitions are based on k-anonymity.
• Majority of the definitions are for one-time publication: the privacy literature
encompasses a large number of privacy definition, mainly for one-time publica-
tion of a single relation [24, 127, 25, 128, 153, 140, 142, 155, 144].
• Research lacks privacy definitions supporting interactive query settings for
microdata release: the privacy research lacks privacy definitions and mecha-
nisms that work in interactive setting. While differential privacy supports inter-
active queries, the mechanisms are constrained in the number of queries permit-
ted, and secondly, it allows aggregate queries instead of microdata (row-level
data), in some scenarios the amount of noise added degrades the utility of the
data.
• Susceptibility to attacks: privacy definitions have a level of susceptibility to
attacks. There exist vulnerabilities and scenarios where the privacy restriction
laid down by the privacy definition is met, but privacy is compromised. Their
weaknesses are widely studied in the literature; for instance, the paper from
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Josep Domingo-Ferrer and Vicenç Torra have discussed the shortcomings of
well-known syntactic privacy models in [137]. Therefore, novel ways to detect
these privacy attacks are always desirable.
• Building privacy-preserving interactive query mechanism – a challenge: in
the present era of big data and data analytics, approaches supporting unlimited
interactive querying along with permitting the queries to return microdata while
preserving privacy is desirable. Therefore, weaker notions of privacy for inter-
active query settings for microdata release are potential starting point. However,
development interactive query settings for microdata release is a challenging task
as multiple releases may give rise to inferences being made by an adversary.
3.5 Conclusions
The privacy literature encompasses a large number of privacy definitions, mainly for
one-time publication of a single relation. Most of these definitions are evolved from k-
anonymity. k-anonymity and differential privacy can be considered the two mainstream
definition of privacy. The privacy research lack privacy definitions and mechanisms
that works for interactive settings for microdata release. Differential privacy supports
interactive querying, but it is contained by the limited number of queries and allows
aggregate queries. Privacy definitions, in various scenarios, are susceptible to attacks
– where privacy definitions are met, but still the privacy is compromised. Therefore,
novel ways to detect these privacy attacks are always desirable.
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Chapter 4
Anomalous DBMS Access Detection
Using N-Grams
“Everything begins with an idea.”
Earl Nightingale (1921 – 1989)
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 reviewed the well-known techniques in the literature that detect malicious
queries made by insiders to DBMS. The reviewed techniques can be used to detect in-
dividual malicious queries made by an insider. However, while a query can be safe in
isolation, when combined with surrounding (in a sequence of) queries, it might result
in an undesirable action. Therefore, it is insufficient to identify the anomaly by the
query alone, and one must also correlate a single query with its surrounding queries.
The research question that arises is whether one can build behavioural-based anomaly
detection systems for the detection of malicious accesses to DBMS by considering
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sequences of queries. This chapter answers this question (the first research question
stated in Chapter 1), that is, whether one can build behavioural-based anomaly detec-
tion systems to detect malicious accesses, manifested in sequences of queries rather
than a query in isolation, to a DBMS and whether these malicious accesses might en-
compass privacy violations? In this chapter, the use of sequences of SQL queries in the
modelling of insider behaviour to detect malicious insider access is considered. While
the insider may hold the correct access permission to make the query, the particular
query may not be considered a ‘normal’ action by the user. This chapter considers
how patterns of normal query behaviour can be learnt from DBMS audit logs using
n-grams, and how these patterns can be in turn used to detect malicious queries made
by insiders.
Section 4.2 describes an approach to anomaly detection in DBMS logs based on n-
grams and describes the steps involved in the construction of a profile that represents
normal sequences of user queries. The training and the detection phases are described
in Section 4.3 and Section 4.4, respectively. A case-study based on detecting anomalies
in a banking application is discussed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 discusses a mimicry
attack. Section 4.7 demonstrates how to achieve precision in modelling querying be-
haviour by considering additional features in constructing profiles.
4.2 Modelling Normative Query Behaviour using N-
Gram
In this chapter, an n-gram based approach is proposed, for detecting malicious accesses
to DBMS that considers sequences of SQL queries instead of considering an SQL
statement in isolation. The inspiration to adopt n-grams comes from early work in [30,
29] that considered the problem of modelling normative behaviour of an application
based on sequences of system calls. In [30, 29] system calls were extracted from the
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Figure 4.1: Training phase of the proposed n-gram based model. The first step is of
data collection in the form of audit logs. Abstraction is chosen in the second step,
followed by the construction of a normative profile.
system logs and used to construct sets of n-grams representing ‘self’. These sets of
n-grams (self) defined the normative behaviour of the application. Past research has
shown that n-grams can capture short-range correlation in application programs, for
example, in Sendmail [30, 29] along with its effectiveness in intrusion detection in
general [156].
The normative profile is a set of n-grams that model the acceptable/normal query se-
quences. This model is ‘mined’ from the DBMS log, subsequent query sequences
are checked against this profile, and a mismatch is considered to be an anomaly. The
training phase of the proposed n-gram approach requires data collection in the form of
audit logs for mining of the model, and an SQL query abstraction step creates abstrac-
tion of the query that is suitable for mining the model followed by the construction of
normative profile. In the detection phase, a run-time profile is constructed and com-
pared against the normative profile to check for deviations from normative querying
behaviour. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depicts the architecture of the proposed n-gram-based
anomaly detection approach.
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Figure 4.2: Detection phase of the proposed n-gram based model. The data collection,
SQL query abstraction and profile construction steps are same as of training phase. In
the detection phase, a run-time profile is constructed from run-time logs. The run-time
profile is compared with the normative profile. Mismatches are an indication of an
anomaly.
4.3 Training Phase
The steps involved in the training phase, including the availability (collection) of safe
audit logs, generating SQL query abstraction, and constructing a normative profile of
behaviour (profile construction phase), are described in the following subsections.
4.3.1 Availability of an Anomaly-free Audit Log
It is assumed that an audit log of SQL statements is available for the training phase.
This audit log is assumed free from any malicious query or transaction. An audit log
L is a sequence of SQL queries Q1, Q2, Q3, . . . , Qn, where each Qi can be any of the
SQL query command types, i.e., SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT or DELETE.
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4.3.2 Chosen SQL Query Abstraction
Section 2.3.3 described the SQL query abstraction that is a tuple representation of
an SQL query and consists of query features like relation name, attribute names, the
amount of returned data or any statistics on the returned data. In this dissertation,
various specializations of query abstractions are used and described in their respective
chapters. A naïve specialization consider only the SQL command type (i.e., INSERT,
SELECT, UPDATE, DELETE) is selected to represent the original SQL query. This naïve
specialization is too coarse grained and does not take into account the queried at-
tributes. Therefore, it gives us a less precise representation of user’s querying be-
haviour and significantly increases the number of false negatives. Intuitively, one
would be interested in using an entire SQL query. However, using an entire SQL
query leads to a high number of false positives in addition to precise but very large
profiles. If a profile is to represent normal behaviour then, the objective of abstraction
is to have a representation between that lies somewhere a naïve specialization and the
entire SQL query.
An abstraction of an SQL query Qi is denoted as Abs(Qi). The adopted query ab-
straction technique in this chapter has also been studied in [9]. This query abstraction
technique in [9] provides an abstraction of a SQL query by representing the query that
lies somewhere between a coarse grained and a fine grained specialization of query
abstraction. The query abstraction approaches are studied in the domain of query log
summarization. An in-depth study on SQL query abstraction falls in the domain of
query log summarization and beyond the scope of this Chapter. The design of pro-
posed n-gram is modular in nature, that is, one can substitute another SQL abstraction
technique from query log summarization domain.
The query abstraction technique replaces the constant values in a query Qi with place-
holders (literal ‘VAR_VAL’), and is denoted as Abs(Qi). Abs(L) is defined as the map-
ping of Abs(Qi) over the elements Qi of L. The reason to chose this query abstraction
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Table 4.1: Examples of deployed SQL abstractions.




WHERE id = 2
SELECT city
FROM bankDatabase




WHERE id = 9
SELECT city
FROM bankDatabase




WHERE id = 3
SELECT city
FROM bankDatabase








WHERE id = VAR_VAL AND
Name = VAR_VAL
is that it gives us a reasonable level of precision in capturing the querying behaviour of
user. A more fine grained abstraction would require some symbolic evaluation of the
queries which was beyond the scope of an n-gram based approach. Table 4.1 shows
example mappings of a query to its abstraction.
4.3.3 Building a Normative Model of Behaviour
This chapter describes a model of normative behaviour built from SQL query audit
logs. Normative behaviour can be constructed, based on a variety of perspectives,
using the SQL log. For example, in case of a user, user(L,Uid) returns the abstract
log Abs(L) containing those queries in L executed on behalf of a user with user ID
Uid. Similarly, role(L,R) returns the abstract log Abs(L) containing those queries in
L executed on behalf of users in the role R. For the sake of clarity and without the
loss of generality, we assume that L contains queries made by a single user and Abs(L)
represents its abstraction.
While n-grams have their origins in computational linguistics [157, 158] and natural
language processing [159], they are well suited for modelling short-range correlations
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between events in logs [28]. N-grams are sub-sequences of event generated by sliding
a window of size ‘n’ over a log of events. When n = 2 the resulting sub-sequences /
n-grams are known as bi-grams while in case of n = 3 the sub-sequences are known as
tri-grams.
Given a sequence L of SQL queries (abstractions), ngram(Abs(L), n) is the set of all
sub-sequences of size ‘n’ that appear in Abs(L). For example, the bi-gram model for
the log abstraction, that is, the sequence of query abstractions (Abs(Q1), Abs(Q2),
Abs(Q3),Abs(Q4)), in Table 4.1 is {〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q1)〉, 〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q4)〉}. An n-
gram profile is denoted as β = ngram(Abs(L), n).
Let βN = ngram(Abs(LN), n) be the n-gram profile constructed from SQL log LN. This
normative profile, in essence, forms a baseline for comparison of later behaviours;
therefore, it may also be referred to as a baseline profile.
4.4 Detection Phase
In the detection phase, a run-time profile is constructed in the same manner as the
normative profile is constructed but with a run-time log. If LR is a collected run-time
log then The run-time profile is denoted as βR = ngram(Abs(LR), n).
A comparison between two profiles (sets of n-grams) is defined as, given Seti =
ngram(Abs(L), n), let Gi be one of the sub-sequences from Seti = ngram(Abs(L), n),
for example, G1 = {Abs(Q1), Abs(Q2)}. Given a normative profile βN and a runtime
profile βR, a mismatch occurs when these two profiles are compared such that an n-
gram Gmissi exists in βR but does not appear in βN. This mismatch is labelled as an
anomaly. Thus, the comparison of run-time profile βR with normative profile βN is
given by βR - βN = ngram(Abs(LR), n) - ngram(Abs(LN), n) = S
βR,βN
miss , where S
βR,βN
miss is
a set of labelled anomalies.
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4.5 Evaluation of the N-Gram based Approach
A challenge in this domain of research is the lack of benchmark datasets. Real-world
datasets of SQL queries, both anomaly-free and with malicious sequences of queries,
may exist in organisations; however, they are not available to researchers. Organisa-
tions are hesitant to share their real-world data due to privacy and security concerns.
Therefore, in order to evaluate the proposed model, a synthetic dataset generator was
used to generate test data and is described in the next section.
4.5.1 A Synthetic Data Generator for a Banking-style Application
The synthetic data generator mimics a banking-style application constructed by con-
sidering the queries made by multiple users (insiders – bank employees). Let us denote
the set of users as U = {Uid1, Uid2, Uid3, . . . , Uidn}. Each user Uid is selected ran-
domly to appear to make queries in the log. Query templates for mimicking typical
banking transactions such as opening an account, closing an account, transferring an
amount from one bank account to another account and depositing an amount to a bank
account, and withdrawal of an amount from a bank account were specified. Each trans-
action consisted of multiple SQL queries. Each transaction T X for a given user Uidi is
randomly selected and executed. These transactions mimicked the transaction carried
out by insiders (bank employees).
For evaluation of the proposed approach, 10, 000 transactions were executed in the
application system that resulted in the generation of an audit log consisting of approxi-
mately 28, 000 SQL statements. Two logs were generated: a log of ‘normal’ behaviour
LN, and a test run-time LR log, initially of normal activity.
It is worth mentioning that in different environments different ways are employed by
insiders to query the databases, for instance, there are scenarios where insiders query
the databases directly while we also have scenarios where insiders query the databases
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via Graphical User Interface (GUI). A well-known scenario where insiders access the
database directly is of analytics, where insiders execute queries and received responses
at run-time and often is the case where the insiders execute batches of queries together
and receive the responses of those batch queries for analytics. In scenarios, where
the insiders often are DBMS non-experts, the underlying complexities of the DBMS
system are covered by a GUI, and in this case, the insider uses the GUI to query the
databases. In general, the contemporary DBMS have features, when enabled, logs the
user interaction with the DBMS and provide more information besides the user ID of
the insider and the executed SQL queries by that insider. In the scenario of database
access via GUI, one can easily extract the executed SQL queries by insiders. Therefore
both the scenarios provide the required information in the form of audit logs, from
which the data, like user Id’s and SQL queries executed by that user, can be extracted
using some preprocessing. The generated synthetic logs mimic that shape of the data
that is actually required to be passed as an input for the proposed approaches.
4.5.2 Selecting Suitable ‘n’
The n-gram profiles ngram(Abs(LN), n) and ngram(Abs(LR), n) (test profile) were
built from the logs LN and LR while varying the size of n-gram, that is, n = 1, 2,
3, . . . , 20. The logs LN and LR consisted of transactions having transactions size
between 3 SQL queries to 7 SQL queries. Figure 4.3 depicts the number of mismatches
arising when comparing the test (but normal) log ngram(Abs(LR), n) against normative
(baseline) behaviour, that is, ngram(Abs(LN), n), for different values of n. As indicated
in Figure 4.3 the number of false positives (mismatches) increases with the size of n,
as expected – a low number of false positives for n =2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. Therefore, n-grams
of sizes 2, 3, and 4 are found to be suitable for constructing a profile.
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Figure 4.3: Discovered number of n-grams when comparing profiles. The zeros on the
x-axis show the comparison of the normative profile with itself.
4.5.3 Attack Scenarios
SQL anomalies can give rise to malicious data observation, malicious data modifica-
tion, or deletion of data from a database. In this chapter, the focus is on the detection
of malicious data observation that arises from anomalous SQL queries. Malicious data
observation can be referred to as a privacy violation of an individual in the case where
malicious observation of data record in the database pertains individual’s personal data.
Intuitively, attacks pertaining to malicious data observation is challenging to identify.
Several different attack scenarios were considered. For these attack scenarios, the test
run-time log LR consisted of malicious (adversary) activities simulating attacks for
experiments. In the attack scenarios, the anomalous statements had the same query
abstraction/skeleton as the statements in the training log; this ensures that a detected
mismatch is not based on the query abstraction alone, but on its correlation (or lack
thereof) with other events in the log. Any malicious SQL query that has a different
SQL query abstraction than that of those in the training log is easily detectable against
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a uni-gram. Thus, for the experimentation, the focus is to detect malicious SQL state-
ments mimicking legitimate queries. However, these malicious SQL statements can-
not be correlated to a legitimate transaction. In one scenario, 50 SQL statements of
malicious observations, matching the structure of the normal SQL statements, were in-
troduced in the log LR. They were inserted into groups of 5 statements at 10 locations
selected at random. This version of LR is referred to as LR1. In the other scenario,
the log LR was perturbed by the insertion of a single malicious SQL query, including
scenarios where a single malicious SQL query was inserted between two transactions,
during a transaction, at the end and beginning of the log resulting in logs LR2, and LR3,
respectively.
Table 4.2: Attack logs and scenarios.
Attack Log Attack
LR1 Attack 1: 50 malicious queries (5 queries at 10 random locations)
LR2 Attack 2: Malicious SQL query inserted between two transactions
LR3 Attack 3: Malicious SQL query inserted within a transaction
We constructed an attack generator, along the line of a synthetic data generator, that
generated various attack sequences in the scenario of the banking environment. The
attack generator generated attack sequences for malicious data observation, malicious
data modification and malicious data deletion attacks. We focused on the generation
of malicious data observations for evaluation. Furthermore, we generated two variants
of malicious observation query sequences, where each variant was based on the intent
of the adversary. The first variant was when the adversary does not target specific data
subjects in the database; rather, the adversaries aim was to reveal sensitive information
of a high number of data subjects in the database. The second variant was when the ad-
versary targets specific data subjects. The attack generator had the ability to generated
malicious query sequences where each generated SQL query in the malicious query
sequences was not malicious in isolation as well as to generate query sequences where
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each query in the query sequence can be malicious in isolation. However, in our exper-
imentation, the main focus was on the generation of malicious query sequences, where
each query in the sequence was a safe query in isolation. As any malicious SQL query
that is different from those in the training log for normative profile is easily detectable
against a uni-gram. Therefore, we were only interested detect the ones that have same
query abstraction as of the queries in training log but sequences of those queries were
resulting in a malicious event.
The considered attacks (Attack 1, Attack 2 and Attack 3) were malicious observation
attacks. The Attack 1 consisted of 50 SQL queries, where the aim of a malicious
insider (adversary) was to disclose information about account balances of high number
of bank’s customers and not targeting specific customers (victims). Therefore the 50
SQL queries in the attack represented the browsing behaviour of an insider. For Attack
2 and Attack 3, the malicious insider carried out targeted observations where the aim of
the adversary was to disclose targeted customer’s details by articulating a SQL query
that narrowed down to a single data subject.
Figure 4.4 shows the number of mismatches, for the various sizes of n-grams, that lead
to the detection of malicious queries, as mentioned above in the attack scenarios. For
instance, malicious query sequences in LR2 resulted in 5 mismatched n-grams when the
size of n-gram was 3. N-grams of size 2, 3 or 4 were used, and detected the anomalous
queries inserted in logs LR1, LR2, and LR3.
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Figure 4.4: The figure shows the number of mismatched n-grams, for various sizes of
n-gram, that indicated the presence of anomalous queries (attacks) in the audit logs.
Attack 1, 2, & 3 represents profiles constructed using logs LR1, LR2, and LR3, respec-
tively.
The considered attack scenarios in this Section were malicious observation attacks by
insiders. The other types of attacks by an insider in the context of DBMS include ma-
licious data modification and deletion attacks. The malicious observation attacks are
more challenging to detect compared to malicious data modification and deletion at-
tacks. The is because in malicious data modification and deletion attacks, besides that
malicious querying behaviour is inconsistent with the normative querying behaviour,
the underlying data also changes due to the carried out modification or deletion, and
this can be considered as one of the indications of an anomaly. Deviation from nor-
mative querying behaviour is a common indication for these attacks. The proposed n-
gram approach, in principle, detects the deviations from normative querying behaviour
which implies its effectiveness for detecting malicious data modification and deletion
attacks as well.
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4.5.4 Computational Complexity
N-grams has been widely used in various domain. The computational complexity of
the algorithm for the generating normative profile in the training phase of the n-gram
approach is linear, that is, O(n) since it requires generating n-grams of query abstrac-
tions. In our case this computational complexity is same as the computational com-
plexity of generating n-grams in any other application [160]. The comparison of pro-
files in the detection phase consists of the algorithm for the generation of a run-time
profile and the algorithm for the profile comparisons (run-time profile is compared
against normative profile). The complexity of run-time profile generation algorithm is
the same as of the algorithm that generates a normative profile in the training phase,
that is, O(n). The algorithm for profile comparison also has the linear complexity O(n).
Therefore, we can say that the n-gram approach has an overall linear complexity.
4.5.5 Anomaly Response
The mismatches are an indication of an anomaly and trigger an alert signal. Response
to an alert signal can range, depending on the level of sensitivity of the environment,
from dropping the response of anomalous SQL queries, revoking the user access priv-
ileges or disconnecting the session. For instance, in a sensitive environment like bank-
ing or health database systems, an immediate response is to suppress the response to
an anomalous query and in the case of a more less critical, a query can be labelled
as anomalous and logged for later manual inspection by an information security offi-
cer or database administrator. Responses to anomalies (response models) is a separate
line of research. A taxonomy of intrusion response systems is presented in [161]. A
refined policy framework that can govern the responses to anomalous SQL queries is
still desirable.
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〈 SELECT first_name, last_name, status, current_balance
FROM bankdb
WHERE account_number = VAR_VAL,
UPDATE bandb SET current_balance = VAR_VAL
WHERE account_number = VAR_VAL,
SELECT first_name, last_name, status, current_balance
FROM bankdb
WHERE account_number = VAR_VAL,
UPDATE bandb SET current_balance = VAR_VAL
WHERE account_number = VAR_VAL 〉
Figure 4.5: A sample n-gram from the normative profile, depicting a transfer of an
amount from one client’s bank account to another client’s bank account.
4.6 Mimicry Attacks
The proposed n-gram based approach uses sequences of queries to model an insider’s
normative behaviour by using n-grams. However, an inside attacker, who is familiar
with the working of the detection system, can mimic normative access patterns to evade
the detection system. Mimicking normative behaviour to carry out malicious tasks by
deceiving the detector into believing the anomalous behaviour is normative is known as
a mimicry attack. Behavioural-based approaches are typically susceptible to mimicry
attacks [162, 163, 164, 165]. In general, an insider knowing the exact working details
of the system has the potential to execute mimicry attacks.
In this section, a mimicry attack on the proposed n-gram based approach is demon-
strated, using the banking case study, where an informed adversary can discover ac-
count balances of victims without detection. Suppose that, an insider, who regularly
helps the bank’s clients to carry out transactions, determines the sequence of queries
that passes the detection system.
This malevolent insider, wanting to know the current account balances of several
clients, evades the intrusion detection system, by articulating queries that fit the n-
gram in shown Figure 4.5. Figure 4.6 shows a possible shape that a malicious insider’s
queries can take. Two valid transactions T X1 and T X2 are shown in Figure 4.6. These
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T X1
Q9
SELECT first_name, last_name, status, current_balance
FROM bankdb
WHERE account_number = 029192;
Q10
UPDATE bandb SET current_balance = 900
WHERE account_number= 029192;
Q11
SELECT first_name, last_name, status, current_balance
FROM bankdb
WHERE account_number = 073846;
Q12
UPDATE bandb SET current_balance = 1384
WHERE account_number = 073846;
T X2
Q13
SELECT first_name, last_name, status, current_balance
FROM bankdb
WHERE account_number = 29192;
Q14
UPDATE bankdb SET current_balance = 1000
WHERE account_number = 29192;
Q15
SELECT first_name, last_name, status, current_balance
FROM bankdb
WHERE account_number = 073846;
Q16
UPDATE bankdb SET current_balance = 1284
WHERE account_number = 073846;
Figure 4.6: This figure depicts queries made by an inside attacker. First, an amount is
transferred from the first victim’s account to the second victim’s account, and then the
same amount is transferred back to first victim’s from second victim’s account.
transactions represent the transfer of the amount from one account to another, thus
resulting in a sequence of queries Q9,Q10,Q11,Q12,Q13,Q14,Q15,Q16. These transac-
tions are kept simple in this example for the purpose of clarity. Only Q9 and Q13 are
needed to reveal current_balance of victims accounts to a malicious insider. While
queries like Q9 and Q13, if made in a sequence, would be expected to give rise to a
detectable anomalous behaviour when the n-gram approach is deployed. However, the
inside attacker bypasses the n-gram based detection system by padding the remain-
ing queries with Q9 and Q13, to make the transaction look legitimate, thus revealing
account balances of clients.
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4.7 Resisting Mimicry Attacks
It is desirable to have a detection system that detects this type of mimicry attack. A
way to detect these attacks is to consider additional features while modelling querying
behaviours and therefore, making the normative profile more precise. The above men-
tioned n-gram model is an approximation of querying behaviour, the addition of more
features (context/data/syntax-centric) into an n-gram model makes it more precise;
therefore, making it hard for an inside attacker to execute mimicry attacks. One way
to add further features is to consider query analytics with respect to the time frames in
which the queries are made – a context-centric feature. In the next section, we show
that considering such query analytics does provide more precision. In subsequent sec-
tions, an approach to constructing a normative profile on the basis of this hypothesis is
described.
4.7.1 Query Analytics-based Model of Normative Behaviour
The n-gram-based modelling of behaviour presented in Section 4.2 is augmented by
considering the additional features of query analytics bounded by time periods. In
the training phase, query frequency related analytics are computed and made part of
the normative profile, while in the detection phase, query analytics are computed at
run-time, and are then compared against the ones in the normative profile.
Given the SQL statements in L are time-stamped. Let τ be the total duration of the
transaction log which is divided into further time frames, τ = [Γ1 , Γ2 , Γ3 , . . . ,
Γl] where l ∈ N. In order to build a model of normative behaviour based on query
frequency, time intervals of uniform length were considered. Let Γl = 〈[X1  Y1],
[X2  Y2], [X3  Y3], . . . , [Xi  Yi]〉 = 〈P1, P2, P3, . . . , Pi〉l = [X1  Yi]l,
where i ∈ N and X denotes the starting time, and Y the ending time. The number
of queries made in Pi are ϕPi while the number of queries made in Pi of time frame
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Γl is denoted as ϕPi,Γl . Thus, the number of queries made in the time frame Γl are
ϕΓl =
∑i
c=1 ϕPc,Γl . The number of queries made for the total duration of transactional




c=1 ϕPc,Γb , so ϕτ is the total number of queries in L. For a fine-
grained representation of normative behaviour defined in terms of query frequencies,
the total number of each type of SQL statement are determined. These determined
frequencies are represented as ϕStatement_typetime_ f rame for example ϕ
SELECT
P2,Γ3
are the queries made
in the sub-frame P2 of the time frame Γ3.
Further refinement can be made by considering the frequencies of combination of the
SQL commands types with respect to various time frames. For demonstration purpose,
the frequencies of only individual command types with respect to various time frames
were considered in this work; however, the approach can be extended to consider the
combination of multiple command types.
To construct a normative profile, it is assumed that the SQL queries in the au-
dit log in the training phase are free from malicious sequences of queries. The
constructed normative profile contains averaged frequencies of queries (or spe-




















c=1 ϕPc,Γb)/l. The choice of selecting τ is
left to the user and depends upon the organization where it is deployed.
4.7.2 Evaluation
The following sections present the results of experiments for the evaluation of the
proposed query analytics-based model.
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4.7.2.1 Experimental Setup
In order to evaluate the query analytics-based model, the same banking-style applica-
tion is used as described in Section 4.5, representing a banking scenario. It includes
transactions including account open and close, withdrawal, deposit and transfer. The
transactions are executed by an insider (a bank employee).
For evaluation, τ and Γ were set to existing time frames of 30 days, 24 hours, and 60
minutes, respectively. Pi was set to 60 minutes such that P1 = 8:00:01 hrs to 9:00:00
hrs, P2 = 9:00:01 hrs to 10:00:00 hrs and so forth.
4.7.2.2 Mimicry Attack Scenarios
Malicious transactions were crafted such that they pass as normal under the n-gram
model, as shown in Section 4.6. Two attack scenarios were considered. In the first
attack scenario, the inside attacker performed 15 malicious transactions in one day
between 10:00:00 hrs to 11:00:00 hrs. In the second attack scenario, the inside attacker
distributes 60 malicious transactions on an entire day. Figure 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10, 4.11
and 4.12 shows the comparison of query analytics in normative profile with the ones
generated for attack scenario 1 and attack scenario 2.
From figure 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 the values of ϕPi , ϕ
S ELECT
Pi
, ϕINS ERTPi and
ϕUPDAT EPi , in attack scenario 1 for the duration of 10:00:00 hrs to 11:00:00 hrs, signifi-
cantly exceeds the threshold determined from the normative querying behaviours, thus
resulting in an indication of an anomaly. For attack scenario 2, the value of ϕINS ERTPi
in Figure 4.7 for the duration of 09:00 hrs to 10:00:00 hrs in attack scenario 2 sig-
nificantly exceeds the value specified in the normative profile. Similarly, as shown
in figure 4.8, 4.9 and 4.11 the values of ϕPi (11:00:00 hrs to 12:00:00 hrs), ϕ
INS ERT
Pi
(11:00:00 hrs to 12:00:00, 14:00:00 hrs to 15:00:00 hrs, 15:00:00 hrs to 16:00:00 hrs)
and ϕDELET EPi (14:00:00 hrs to 15:00:00 hrs, 15:00:00 hrs to 16:00:00 hrs, 16:00:00 hrs
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is also significantly higher then the average values determined in
the normative profile.
Figure 4.7: The figure shows the values of ϕPi for the normative profile as compared
to attack scenario 1 (attack 1 profile) and attack scenario 2 (attack 2 profile).
Figure 4.8: The figure shows the values of ϕS ELECTPi for the normative profile as com-
pared to attack scenario 1 (attack 1 profile) and attack scenario 1 (attack 2 profile).
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Figure 4.11: The figure shows the values of ϕDELET EPi for the normative profile as com-
pared to attack scenario 1 (attack 1 profile) and attack scenario 2 (attack 2 profile).
Figure 4.9: The figure shows the values of ϕINS ERTPi for the normative profile as com-
pared to attack 1 profile and attack 2 profile.
Figure 4.10: The figure shows the values of ϕUPDAT EPi for the normative profile as com-
pared to attack scenario 1 (attack 1 profile) and attack scenario 2 (attack 2 profile).
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Figure 4.12: The figure shows the values of ϕΓl for the normative profile as compared
to attack scenario 1 (attack 1 profile) and attack scenario 2 (attack 2 profile).
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Table 4.3: The table shows the values of ϕPi , averaged over the time frame of τ, made part of the profile of normative behaviour.
ϕPi’s for duration 7:00:00 {Hours} to 13:00:00 {Hours}
AvgϕP1 AvgϕP2 AvgϕP3 AvgϕP4 AvgϕP5 AvgϕP6
AvgϕP1 = 22
AvgϕS ELECTP1 = 11
AvgϕINS ERTP1 = 1
AvgϕUPDAT EP1 = 7
AvgϕDELET EP1 = 3
AvgϕP2 = 83
AvgϕS ELECTP2 = 41
AvgϕINS ERTP2 = 6
AvgϕUPDAT EP2 = 24
AvgϕDELET EP2 = 12
AvgϕP3 = 83
AvgϕS ELECTP3 = 41
AvgϕINS ERTP3 = 6
AvgϕUPDAT EP3 = 23
AvgϕDELET EP3 = 30
AvgϕP4 = 83
AvgϕS ELECTP4 = 41
AvgϕINS ERTP4 = 13
AvgϕUPDAT EP4 = 30
AvgϕDELET EP4 = 23
AvgϕP5 = 86
AvgϕS ELECTP5 = 43
AvgϕINS ERTP5 = 6
AvgϕUPDAT EP5 = 25
AvgϕDELET EP5 = 12
AvgϕP6 = 55
AvgϕS ELECTP6 = 27
AvgϕINS ERTP6 = 4
AvgϕUPDAT EP6 = 16
AvgϕDELET EP6 = 8
ϕPi’s for duration 13:00:01 {Hours} to 18:00:00 {Hours}
AvgϕP7 AvgϕP8 AvgϕP9 AvgϕP10 AvgϕP11 AvgϕP12
AvgϕP7 = 22
AvgϕS ELECTP7 = 11
AvgϕINS ERTP7 = 2
AvgϕUPDAT EP7 = 6
AvgϕDELET EP7 = 3
AvgϕP8 = 85
AvgϕS ELECTP8 = 43
AvgϕINS ERTP8 = 6
AvgϕUPDAT EP8 = 24
AvgϕDELET EP8 = 12
AvgϕP9 = 83
AvgϕS ELECTP9 = 42
AvgϕINS ERTP9 = 5
AvgϕUPDAT EP9 = 24
AvgϕDELET EP9 = 11
AvgϕP10 = 80
AvgϕS ELECTP10 = 42
AvgϕINS ERTP10 = 5
AvgϕUPDAT EP10 = 24
AvgϕDELET EP10 = 11
AvgϕP11 = 23
AvgϕS ELECTP11 = 11
AvgϕINS ERTP11 = 2
AvgϕUPDAT EP11 = 7
AvgϕDELET EP11 = 3
AvgϕP12 = 24
AvgϕS ELECTP12 = 12
AvgϕINS ERTP12 = 1
AvgϕUPDAT EP12 = 7
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Table 4.4: The table shows the values of ϕΓl , averaged over the duration of 30 days,
made part of the normative profile.














Insider attacks go unnoticed for months, and even years [7]. The query analytics ap-
proach complements other intrusion detection systems, including the n-gram approach,
by raising the level of difficulty for an informed malicious insider. There can be a cases
where the run-time query frequencies are significantly lower, for a given time frame,
then the one specified in the normative profile. In those cases, there is a room for an
adversary to execute malicious transactions to match the run-time query frequencies
with the ones in the normative profile, thus bypassing the detection mechanism.
4.8 Conclusions
The original work of Forrest et al. [28] translated the application of n-grams from com-
putational linguistics to computer security and demonstrated the effectiveness while
modelling a behaviour (self) of the computer system using system calls. The objective
of the chapter is to demonstrate that one can use Forrest et al. [28] style n-gram ap-
proach to capture querying behaviours and build an anomaly-based intrusion detection
system. This chapter demonstrates the effectiveness of using the n-grams to construct
expressive profiles from an audit log of SQL queries (or query abstractions) such that
a normative (self) behaviour of user (role) querying the system is captured. The con-
struction of the normative profile gives rise to an anomaly style database intrusion
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detection system that detects SQL queries made by malicious insiders in DBMS logs.
A query abstraction was chosen, as it gives a reasonable level of precision. A naïve
query abstraction considers only the SQL command type rendering in the less precise
representation of user’s querying behaviour and increases the number of false nega-
tives. Usage of an entire SQL query leads to strict rules for normal behaviours thus
resulting in high number of false positives as well as huge profiles. Future research
could look at other query abstractions, as considered in [3, 10] for single uncorrelated
queries. The experiments do show that it is possible to build a useful query abstraction
and that n-grams of these queries do capture the short-term correlations inherent in the
application. This chapter demonstrates an example of mimicry attack on an n-gram
based approach. It is shown that inclusion of additional features, like query analytics,
capture behaviours that raise the difficulty level of an adversary to execute mimicry
attacks.
A query (and its abstraction) that has the same semantics as a query covered by a nor-
mative profile but differs syntactically can give rise to a false positive and approaches
that detect anomalous access to databases are susceptible to it. However, recently,
an approach to query regularization [166] that unfold queries into a syntactic normal
form, has been proposed. The approach attempts to compare queries in terms of their
semantics. The query regularization approach has the potential to improve the SQL
query abstraction part of the presented approaches in this dissertation. Therefore, as
future work, query regularization can be explored to have abstractions of the regular-
ized version of queries to construct n-gram profiles.
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Chapter 5
A Semantic Approach to
Frequency-based Anomaly Detection
of Insider Attacks
“Many of the things you can count, don’t count. Many of the things you can’t
count, really count.”
Albert Einstein (1979 - 1955)
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated the modelling of user query behaviours using n-
grams and proposed a role/user-oriented profile based approach to anomaly detection.
A question that arises is whether one can build approaches to model normative be-
haviour from a different perspective? This chapter considers this question (a part of the
second research question stated in Chapter 1) by exploring a DBMS/record-oriented
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perspective of modelling access in DBMS and proposes the construction of record-
oriented profiles.
In this chapter, the focus is to construct record-oriented profiles, and for that purpose
the considered features to construct these profiles falls under the category of data-
centric features. The data-centric features include, but are not limited to, the amount
of data returned or any other statistics related to the resultant data. Anomaly-based
IDS approaches that construct profiles using data-centric features can also be referred
to as semantic approaches, as they focus on semantics rather than on query syntax [11]
as discussed in Chapter 2.
In this context, we consider the detection of frequent observation attacks whereby an
insider, or group of insiders, make numerous malicious accesses to the same record
in the DBMS. These malicious observations can be in collaboration with others or
in isolation. The attack is detected by the change in the frequency patterns of access.
Real-world examples of frequent observation attacks were reported in [167, 168] where
insiders (hospital staff) looked up the medical records of patients in the public eye. In
this instance, employees at Palisades Medical Center in New Jersey were suspended
after accessing the personal medical records of actor George Clooney who was taken
to the hospital after a motorcycle accident. The employees were suspended because
they violated a HIPAA regulation [167].
This chapter proposes an anomaly-based IDS that constructs record-oriented profiles
by considering the frequency at which the records are accessed - as data-centric feature.
The construction of the model utilizes Control Charts that are prevalent in Statistical
Process Control (SPC) [14]. Section 5.2 describes the record-oriented model. Sec-
tion 5.3 present how the record-oriented model can be transformed into role-oriented
model. The record-oriented model is evaluated in Section 5.4, and Section 5.5 con-
cludes this chapter.
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5.2 Record-oriented Model of Normative Behaviour
In this section, a model for constructing record-oriented profiles of normative be-
haviour is proposed. Let T represent a database relation instance. For ease of ex-
position, it is assumed that each record/tuple r in T is unique. The proposed approach
consists of a learning phase and a detection phase. In the learning phase, a record-
oriented normative profile is constructed by determining a range for the number of
times each record has been accessed in T in a given time period t. The time period is
user-defined, which is dependent on the nature of the target application. For example,
in the case of a hospital where a record of a specific patient is queried frequently as
opposed to an electricity billing system where a specific record might be queried twice
or thrice in a six month period.
We wish to determine the number of times a record (or any attribute of the record)
is queried in the time period t, referred to as record access frequency. Let Fi be a
numeric counter for the ith record ri ∈ T. In contrast to ϕ that represented the query
frequency (as defined in Chapter 4), Fi represents the record access frequency. When
the ith record, or any attribute value in the ith record, is accessed then the value of Fi is
incremented by one. The values of Fi for each day are stored. The value of time period
t is left on the organization and the nature of the application. However, for the purpose
of exposition, the time period is set to 24 hours (one day) for this work.
The training dataset is denoted by L that represents the record access frequencies ex-
tracted from log L. However, it is possible that the training dataset may have included
those behaviours that are infrequent (unusual values for Fi) which we refer to as out-
liers. Here, an outlier is a record access frequency that is significantly different from
record access frequencies for rest of the records in a relation T within a given time pe-
riod and potentially is an indication of malicious accesses. Thus, in order to determine
the spectrum of normal values for Fi, two scenarios are considered, one that is free
from outliers and the other that is susceptible to (with) outliers.
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This work utilizes control charts from SPC, which are described in the next section.
5.2.1 Statistical Process Control and Control Charts
Statistical Process Control (SPC) [14] originated from performance monitoring in
manufacturing processes. SPC was originally proposed with its application in manu-
facturing industries where it was used to observe if the process is working as expected
during production in order to detect defective products. In SPC, measurements are
computed from samples of items produce/manufactured. SPC can be used in the case
where a large number of items are being produced. For instance, in the case of sham-
poo manufacturing, it is not technically possible to fill in exactly the same amount of
shampoo in every shampoo bottle as such process are susceptible to variability. Lesser
than the claimed amount of shampoo in the bottle may lead the customer to file com-
plaints while filling in extra than claimed leads to a loss in revenue. Thus the aim of
SPC is to provide an indication that the production plant is filling the bottles with too
much/too little shampoo and it has deviated from the acceptable limits of variability in
quantity of shampoo.
SPC uses control charts to provide a history of a running process and to monitor the
quality of the processes. Control charts, in essence, are graphs that show measurements
and variation among the measurements that are plotted against predetermined limits,
during a specific time period. This time period is the time during which the process
was being observed. For instance, in the case of the shampoo production plant, the
plotted measurement on a control chart is the quantity of the shampoo filled in a single
shampoo bottle measured for a sample of produced shampoo bottles on a given day.
A conventional control chart (Shewhart Chart) has several components including, a
center line, specification limits (upper and lower), and control limits (upper and lower).
The center line is usually the mathematical average of the data. The customers define
specification limits, that is, the acceptable tolerance of defects for products or services
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while control limits are defined to determine if the process is in statistical control.
In the case of the proposed model, a Centre Line, an Upper Limit, and Lower Limit are
used to define constraints, that is, if record access frequencies fall outside these limits,
then they are considered as anomalies. The adopted variation of the control chart is
shown in Figure 5.1. In the case of the proposed record-oriented model, upper and
lower limits are computed using training datasets as described below and the measure-
ments plotted against these predetermined limits are the values for the number of times
a specific record is accessed in a certain time period at run-time.
Figure 5.1: The adopted variation of control chart.
In this chapter, an application of SPC in the scenario of detecting malicious access to
databases is explored. Where limits of normal access to the database is determined in
training phase and in detection record access frequency (analogous to a sample) are
plotted on control chart to monitor deviation from normal access frequency.
The reason to use a statistical process control analogy, and specifically control charts,
is rooted in the aim of control chart. Their aim is to show how the process changes over
time, and in our case, the changes in the record access frequencies over time. Knowing
this change in how the records being accessed enables us to fine-tune the computed
specification limits in order to handle shifts in record access behaviour in detection
phase.
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The detection phase of the proposed approach can be integrated with a live system
where the record access frequencies can be collected and then plotted over the control
chat at run-time. This requires features, typically found in DBMS auditing and mon-
itoring tools, to obtain record access frequencies at a run-time. However, the value
of time period t needs to determined before the system is live. The selection of an
appropriate time period t depends on the organization and the nature of the application
where the mechanism is deployed.
5.2.2 Outlier-free Scenario
As mentioned earlier, in this chapter, two scenarios are considered, that is, when the
training dataset is free from outliers and the one in which the training dataset has out-
liers. Therefore, to address both outlier-free and with-outlier training dataset scenarios,
a different variation of a control chart is used by each scenario.
This section describes the scenario where an outlier-free training dataset is available.
For the outlier-free scenario, mean and standard deviation are used to determine the
center line and limits. Given functions µ() andσ() that computes the mean and standard
deviation, respectively, then µ(L) and σ(L) gives us the mean and standard deviation
for the record access frequencies L, respectively. For the outlier-free scenario, the
computed limits for the control chart are as follows Center Line = µ(L), Upper Limit
= µ(L) + 3σ(L) and Lower Limit =µ(L)−3σ(L). The record-oriented profiles contain
these computed limits.
In the detection phase, a control chart is generated for each record. The counter Fi,
starts with the value zero at the beginning of a new time period t. The values of Fi are
recorded in Lrun for time period t where Lrun denotes the set record access frequencies
at run-time while L are the ones used for training. Values for Fi are recorded in Lrun
and are plotted on the control chart for each day. For the upper limit and lower limit,
µ(L)+3σ(L) and µ(L)−3σ(L) are chosen, respectively. The ±3σ() limits have shown
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to cover 99.87% of the values in the dataset when normally distributed [169]. The
upper and lower limits can be tuned depending on the environment. Values of Fi above
and below µ(L) + 3σ(L) and µ(L) − 3σ(L), respectively, are considered anomalies.
5.2.3 Handling Outliers
An assumption made before designing anomaly-based database intrusion detection
systems is the availability of an outlier-free dataset. The data used in the training
phase must be free from any malicious behaviours so that the behaviour captured in
the training phase is an accurate reflection of normative behaviour. However, in real-
world scenarios, it may become a challenge to ensure whether the training data satisfies
this assumption. Therefore, modelling of normative behaviour from the training data
that may have malicious behaviours (outliers) needs attention and considered in this
section.
In the scenario, where outliers influence data, Median Absolution Deviation
(MAD) [170] is considered more robust than other measures of central tendency such
as standard deviation [169]. In the case of standard deviation, the distances from the
mean are squared; thus an outlier can have a strong influence on standard deviation,
which is not the case in MAD as it is a distance from the median.
MAD is less sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data and is therefore used to
determine the spectrum of normal values for Fi. Let m(L) denote the median value for
training dataset L. The median absolute deviation is defined as MAD(L) = m(|Li −
m(L)|).
For the with-outlier scenario, the limits are given by Center Line = m(L), Upper Limit
= m(L) + 2MAD(L) and Lower Limit = m(L) − 2MAD(L). Values of Fi above and
below m(L)+2MAD(L) and m(L)−2MAD(L), respectively, are considered anomalies
for the corresponding time period. In both scenarios, the anomalies can be further
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inspected by a security officer.
Past literature has not considered frequent observation attacks, carried out while in-
siders are working in collaboration. The advantage of the record-oriented model is
that when several roles/users (employees) are accessing the same record, the record-
oriented model detects these attacks of collaborative nature.
5.2.4 Oversight-anomalies
The detection mechanism aims to detect records that are frequently queried, such as
the incidents reported in [167, 168]. However, the proposed approach also enables the
detection of records that are less frequently queried as compared to what is normal,
that is when the record access frequency drops below the lower limit. This type of
anomaly is referred to as oversight-anomaly. For instance, in a scenario of a hospital
where a doctor or a nurse missed the daily check-up of a patient represents an absence
of normative behaviour.
5.2.5 Redefining Limits at Run-time
In the detection phase of this proposed approach, a graphically represented control
chart shows the pattern of access to a record over a series of time periods. This gives
us insights that can potentially be used to update the upper and the lower limit for a
particular record. The concept is analogous to feedback loops in control systems where
feedback loops enable the system to fine-tune its performance. For example, consider
the mean, the upper limit and the lower limit for record r0 were 33.5, 49.25 and 17.75,
respectively. In the detection phase, access frequency of record r0 with respect to one
day was plotted for each day for 30 days. After 30 days, a pattern emerged that access
frequency of record r0 is always above 40.25. Using this insight, the upper and lower
limits for r0 can be re-defined provided that this behaviour was inspected by a security
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officer and marks as normal for the case of this particular record r0.
In the scenario described above, record r0 exhibited a continuous consistent level of
deviation from the initially determined limits. There can be a case of an infrequent
accesses relative to the dataset, where a particular record is accessed every quarter or
with a therefore, the fine tuning may be unfitting. This approach of monitoring the past
behaviour in the detection phase enables, in scenarios where there is a particular record
exhibits a continuous consistent level of deviation from the initially determined limits,
the refinement of the existing record-oriented profile. A point worth mentioning is that
it might take time for the record access patterns to emerge.
Refined specification limits are that it allows us to handle shifts in record access be-
haviour in the detection phase. The recalculation of specification limits can be auto-
mated, which requires recalculating the specification limits after regular intervals. For
example, in the case where a record access frequency of a record is always outside the
specification limits for 30 days, then specification limits are redefined for that record.
5.3 Translating the record-oriented Model into a Role-
oriented Model
The record-oriented model does not consider which role is accessing the record. A
role-oriented profile model can be derived from the record-oriented model. In the
proposed role-oriented approach, each record ri has several counters Frolei , one for each
role. For example, Fclinicalspecialisti gives a count of accesses to i
th record by a user in the
clinical specialist role.
In the training phase, a normative profile is constructed by determining a range for the
number of times records are accessed by a specific role. The profiles are constructed
in a similar manner as the record-oriented approach, with the difference that in the
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record-oriented profile construction approach, there is a control chart for each record,
while in this approach, there is a separate record control chart for each role.
Figure 5.2: A fragment of sample relation T from the Patient database.
5.4 Evaluation
As mentioned in Section 4.5, given the difficulty of obtaining real-world data, synthetic
datasets are used. For evaluation of the proposed model, a synthetic data generator
mimicking a health-care application was used. The health-care dataset includes roles
of specialist, house officer, consultant, nurse, IT administrator, clinical specialist, and
medical record clerk. The generated transactions consist of patient’s record lookup
queries mimicking routine lookups made by the hospital staff. A transactions gener-
ated using the data generator included single lookups queries, as well as involved mul-
tiple queries for looking up multiple attributes pertaining to a single patient’s record,
multiple queries for updating a patient’s record, and insertion of a new record.
The generated training datasets (query logs) included a dataset for the outlier-free sce-
nario LOF , a dataset for the with-outlier scenario LWO, datasets for the outlier-free and
with-outlier scenario when roles are considered LOFRoleName and L
WO
RoleName, respectively.
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The generated outliers for the datasets were usually high or low number transactions
accessing a particular record. For the purpose of notational consistency query logs are
denoted as L while the dataset L = {F1, F2, F3, F4, . . . , Fi } is the set of record access
frequency for each record extracted from L.
For training, the datasets were generated for 10 days in both with-outlier and outlier-
free scenarios. A fragment of the queried relation T is shown in Figure 5.2. Record
access frequencies for each record in relation T were extracted for each day for the
duration of 10 days and were then averaged over the duration of 10 days. The train-
ing dataset L, for evaluation, consisted of averaged record access frequencies. For
example, LWORConsultantrepresents the averaged frequencies of record accesses by the role
consultant in the with-outlier scenario.
5.4.1 Record-oriented: Outlier-free Scenario
Experiments were carried out in order to construct an example record-oriented norma-
tive profile for T in the outlier-free scenario. The computed center line µ(LOF), upper
limit µ(LOF) + 3σ(LOF), and lower limit µ(LOF) − 3σ(LOF) for LOF are 274.7, 318.4
and 231.2, respectively. Frequent observations attacks in-terms of frequent queries
were made to various records by a single role as well as in observations of a particular
record made by several roles. These frequent queries were manifested in run-time log
for each day and from which the record access frequency for each record for that was
exacted.
The control chart in Figure 5.3 shows the run-time values of Fi in this scenario; only a
fragment of records are shown for the purpose of demonstration. It can be seen that r4
is accessed more than usual on day 1 and day 5, and r3 is accessed more than usual on
day 5 and 21. In the case of r18, it is observed from days 1 to 15 that the number of times
r18 is accessed above µ(LOF)+3σ(LOF). This persistent high record access frequencies
for r18 are an indication that either it is an anomaly or a false positive in which case
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the limits needs to be re-defined. Refined limits for r18 are computed by looking at
the past behaviour of record for days 1 to 15 provided that this behaviour is inspected
by the security officer and is concluded as a safe behaviour. The refined limits for r18
are µ(LOFrecord18) = 361.6, µ(L
OF) + 3σ(LOFrecord18) = 444.9 and µ(L
OF) − 3σ(LOFrecord18) =
278.2. These refined limits are used for record r18 from day 16 and onwards, as shown
in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: The figure shows the control chart developed during the detection phase,
while the training dataset was outlier-free. The solid coloured circles (•) represents
record access frequencies. The anomalies are indicated in red circles.
5.4.2 Record-oriented: With-outlier Scenario
A training dataset with outliers (LWO) was generated to evaluate the approach in with-
outlier scenario. The computed center line m(LWO), upper limit m(LWO)+2MAD(LWO)
and lower limit m(LWO) − 2MAD(LWO)) for LWO are 274, 306, and 242, respectively.
Malicious frequent observations were made in this scenario as well and indicated in
Figure 5.4, where r5 was frequently accessed relative to normal access on day 2, and
r2 was frequently accessed relative to normal access on day 5 and day 8.
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Figure 5.4: The figure shows the record access frequencies plotted for 10 days over the
control chart while the training dataset is with-outlier.
5.4.3 Role-oriented: Outlier-free And With-outlier Scenario
In order to demonstrate the proposed approach in role-oriented settings in the outlier-
free scenario, the role of Consultant was considered, and a training dataset LOFConsultant
was generated. For role-oriented settings in with-outlier scenario, role of Nurse was
considered and a LWONurse mimicking accesses made by the role Nurse with outliers was
generated.
Malicious frequent observations were made in both scenarios. Figure 5.5 shows the
control chart in role-oriented settings in the outlier-free scenario, where the access
made by role consultant for 10 days is plotted where access frequencies of r3 and r5
on day 6 and day 8 are indications of anomalies. Figure 5.6 shows the control chart in
role-oriented settings in the with-outlier scenario, where the record access frequencies
for r5 and r1 on day 4 and day 9 are also indicated as anomalies as they are below the
lower limit and are examples of oversight-anomalies. These oversight-anomalies, in
essence, are indications of the absence of normative behaviours.
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Figure 5.5: The figure shows the control chart for the role of Consultant in the outlier-
free scenario. The control chart presents the frequency of record accesses by the role
Consultant for the duration of 10 days.
Figure 5.6: The figure shows the control chart for the role of Nurse in the with-outlier
scenario.
5.4.4 Observations and Limitations
During the experimentation, it was observed that in the with-outlier scenarios, that
the limits m + MAD() and m − MAD() resulted in a higher number of false positives
while limits m + 2MAD() and m−2MAD() resulted in lesser number of false positives;
therefore, these limits were chosen. These limits can be fine-tuned by the user of the
system.
It was observed that a control chart with mean and standard deviation was suitable
when the dataset was without outliers, while the control charts with median and me-
dian absolution deviation was suitable for the case where the training data was suscep-
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tible to outliers. It is demonstrated from the experiments that one can model querying
behaviours from a different perspective. In comparison to existing approaches in the
literature (discussed in Chapter 2) the proposed record-oriented approach offers the
following advantages:
• The focus of the existing approaches in the literature is to detect malicious ac-
cesses made by a user or a role in isolation. The proposed record-oriented per-
spective captures collaborative behaviours of roles (or users) thus enabling the
detection of frequent observation attacks - observation of the same record made
by several roles (or users). These attacks may be collaborative in nature.
• Exiting approaches model behaviours in such a way that they only detect the
presence of malicious behaviours as anomalies. It is demonstrated that the
proposed record-oriented approach has the potential to detect normative be-
haviours that should have been present but are not present at run-time - oversight-
anomalies. The detection of oversight anomalies are useful in scenarios such as
the ones in the hospital where the presence of normative behaviour requires an
immediate indication. One needs to select a time period that is appropriate for
the environment where the system is being deployed. For instance, in the case
of the hospital scenario, where check-up of patients is critical, it is desirable
to detect the missed check-up as early as possible thus the time period, in that
case, should be a short one and anything that falls immediately below the lower
specification limit must be notified promptly.
• An assumption made before modelling normative behaviours, for the major-
ity of IDSs, is the availability of outlier-free data. The proposed approach, in
with-outlier scenario, has the potential to model normative behaviour in the case
where the training data is susceptible to outliers.
The observations made in the above experiments are dependent on the scenarios con-
sidered, for example, the health-care system where queries are made to a patient’s
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records on a regular/daily basis. However, there are scenarios where queries are not
made that regularly to the database, for example, a mobile customer service where
only the records of those customers are accessed who have contacted mobile customer
service is probably facing some issue with the mobile network. The majority of the
customers of the mobile company may not have contacted or will contact the customer
service. Therefore, the results may change for these type of scenarios. It is likely that
the proposed approach may not be suited for every scenario where one wishes to detect
malicious accesses to databases.
Another limitation is that it is unlikely that all the records are accessed with the exact
same frequency: this creates room for maliciously accessing records while staying
within the determined limits. This will allow an adversary, knowing the determined
limits in the normative profiles, to maliciously access records and bypass the detection
system.
5.5 Conclusions
The chapter introduced the record-oriented model of normative behaviour for construc-
tion of record-oriented profiles that considers data-centric features. The construction
of the profiles utilizes control charts from Statistical Process Control as a way to detect
anomalies. Two scenarios were considered, in the first scenario, the training data is
outlier-free, and in the second scenario, the training data is susceptible to outliers.
The presented record-oriented models of normative behaviour are easy to integrate
with existing systems because of their simplicity, as well as it can complement other
detection systems. The proposed model enables the detection of frequent observa-
tion attacks, where these attacks can be carried out in isolation (when a single insider
carries out the attack) or collectively (several insiders carry out the attack). It is pos-
sible that these insiders may not be collaborating while accessing a particular record
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with malicious intentions. The experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness of the
proposed approach in the detection of frequent observation attacks as well as anoma-
lies (oversight-anomalies) introduced due to human negligence/errors (that is the case
where the doctor/nurse missed the daily check-up of a patient). The proposed model
can be transformed into a model for the construction of role-oriented profiles.
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Chapter 6
Detecting Malicious Access to DBMS
using Item-set Mining
“Fortunately, most human behaviour is learned observationally through mod-
elling from others.”
Albert Bandura (1925 – Present)
As discussed, previous chapters that organizations are diligent in how they manage,
access, store, use and disseminate their application data, and leakage or misuse of this
application data has severe implications for an organization in terms of financial loss
and reputational damage in cases where this data consists of personal information. As
the individuals (customers) may have given only limited consent to how data about
them can be used or processed. Detection of insider threats is an active area of re-
search, which has been looked at from several different perspectives [171] including
the complexity of insider threats to DBMS [172]. The approach proposed in Chapter 4
considered sequences of SQL queries to model behaviours.
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6.1 Introduction
Detection of insider threats is an active area of research and needs to be investigated
from several different perspectives. In the previous chapters, we proposed behavioural-
based approaches that enable the detection of malicious accesses made by the insiders
to the databases. This chapter considers the second research question stated in Chapter
1, namely whether one can develop approaches, other than the ones described in pre-
vious chapters, to build models of querying behaviour to detect malicious accesses to
the databases. In this chapter, we build a model of behaviour based on constraining the
bound of the frequency of accesses to the database.
We take the position that frequently repeated behaviours can be considered normative
behaviour, while rare behaviour is potentially malicious behaviour. This has also been
pointed out by behaviour analysis research [173]. Therefore, we are interested in mod-
elling frequent queries as normative behaviour while rare queries represent potential
malicious behaviour.
To build models of behaviour in terms of frequency of queries, we investigate Item-set
Mining in order to explore its interpretation for building behavioural profiles. Before
presenting the model, Section 6.2 provides an overview of item-set mining. Section 6.3
describes the proposed model, based on item-set mining, which is evaluated in Sec-
tion 6.4. Some conclusions are drawn in Section 6.5.
6.2 Item-set Mining
Item-set Mining can be categorized into frequent item-sets mining and rare item-sets
mining. The aim of frequent item-sets mining it to discover frequent patterns within
a dataset. A collection of items is called an item-set and which can be a singleton
set. An item-set that occurs frequently is known as a frequent item-set. One of the
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most common examples that are used to describe frequent item-set mining is in mar-
ket basket analysis. In a scenario of a superstore that sells multiple products (items),
the market basket analysis attempts to discover patterns between purchased items by
customers, especially the items that are frequently purchased together from that store.
This provides insight, such as a customer who buys bread, usually buys eggs as well.
This helps the store decide which products should be placed close to each other on
the shelves. In order to determine whether an item-set is frequent, it has to satisfy a
minimum threshold value for support. Let support represent the number of purchase
transactions in which an item-set appears compared to the total number of purchase
transactions.
In the literature, there are several frequent item-set mining algorithms and the well-
known ones include the Apriori algorithm [174], LCM [175, 176], Eclat [177], FP-
GROWTH [178], H-Mine [179], and PrePost+ [39].
In contrast to frequent item-sets mining, one can mine rare item-sets that occur in-
frequently. Algorithms falling under the rare item-sets mining includes AprioriIn-
verse [177], AprioriRare [38], RP-Growth [180], and CORI [181]. In order to de-
termine whether an item-set is rare, the number of times it occurs has to be below a
specified value for support.
6.3 Querying Behaviour Modelled via Item-set Mining
In the context of item-set mining, the input of any item-set mining algorithm is a trans-
action database. A transaction database is a set of transactions where each transaction
is a set of items. For example, continuing the example described in the previous sec-
tion, a transaction would be the set of items bought together by a customer, i.e. {eggs,
bread, butter}. We refer to a database of these transactions as a query-set table in order
to distinguish it from conventional database transactions. It is important to draw this
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distinction as the order of the queries in the query-set is not considered. A query-set
QSi is a set of queries (query abstractions) analogous to an item-set, while each query
(query abstraction) is analogous to an item in item-set.
Given an audit log consisting of SQL queries, let a mapping function QSmap() map
SQL queries in the audit log to the query-set table. Section 6.3.1.1 considers how this
function might be constructed. An example query-set table is shown in the Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: An example of a query-set table where a query-set QSi is analogous to an
item-set, while each query is analogous to an item in item-set.
QSi Queries in QSi
QS1 { Q5, Q6, Q7 }
QS2 { Q2, Q3, Q4 }
QS3 { Q4, Q7, Q8, Q9}
QS4 { Q5, Q6, Q7 }
QS5 { Q5, Q6, Q7 }
QS6 { Q4, Q7, Q9 }
QS7 { Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5}
QS8 { Q4, Q7, Q9 }
Based on the conjecture that frequent querying behaviour is representative of normative
behaviour, we mine frequent sets of queries (query abstractions), where frequent in the
context of item-set mining is defined by a support value. The support value is defined
as the number of times query-set appears in the query-sets table relative to the total
number of rows in the transaction table. If the query-set is above the chosen minimum
support it is considered to be frequent. As an example, Table 6.2 shows frequent query-
sets (item-sets) mined for a chosen minimum support of 3 or 37.5%, i.e. (specified
value for minimum support / total number of entries in query-set table)×100.
Table 6.3 shows all the rare query-sets with support of less than 3. However, mining
all the rare query-sets below a specified support for an audit log may result in a large
number of rare query-sets, effectively repetitions manifesting as subsets of a rare query-
sets as seen in Table 6.3. Therefore, a way to capture all anomalies manifesting as rare
query-sets and at the same time minimizing the number of mined rare query-sets is
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Table 6.2: The table shows frequent query-sets mined from the query-set table shown
in Table 6.1. The minimum support for the frequent query-set is set to 3 (or 37.5%).
# Frequent Item-sets Support
1 { Q9, Q4, Q7 } 3
2 { Q6, Q5, Q7 } 3
3 { Q9, Q4 } 3
4 { Q9, Q7 } 3
5 { Q6, Q5 } 3
6 { Q6, Q7 } 3
7 { Q5, Q7 } 3
8 { Q4, Q7 } 3
9 { Q9} 3
10 { Q7} 6
11 { Q6} 3
12 { Q5} 4
13 { Q4} 5
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Table 6.3: Rare query-sets for the query-set table shown in Table 6.1. The query-sets
in this table have the support of less than 3 (or 37.5%).
# Rare Item-sets Support
1 { Q8 } 1
2 { Q7, Q8 } 1
3 { Q4, Q8 } 1
4 { Q4, Q7, Q8 } 1
5 { Q8, Q9 } 1
6 { Q7, Q8, Q9 } 1
7 { Q4, Q8, Q9 } 1
8 { Q4, Q7, Q8, Q9 } 1
9 { Q1} 1
10 { Q1, Q4} 1
11 { Q1, Q5} 1
12 { Q1, Q4, Q5 } 1
13 { Q1, Q2 } 1
14 { Q1, Q2, Q4 } 1
15 { Q1, Q2, Q5 } 1
16 { Q1, Q2, Q4, Q5 } 1
17 { Q1, Q3 } 1
18 { Q1, Q3, Q4 } 1
19 { Q1, Q3, Q5 } 1
20 { Q1, Q3, Q4, Q5 } 1
21 { Q1, Q2, Q3 } 1
22 { Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 } 1
23 { Q1, Q2, Q3, Q5 } 1
24 { Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 } 1
25 { Q3 } 2
26 { Q3, Q5 } 1
27 { Q3, Q4, Q5 } 1
28 { Q3, Q4 } 2
29 { Q2, Q3 } 2
30 { Q2, Q3, Q4 } 2
31 { Q2, Q3, Q5 } 1
32 { Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5 } 1
33 { Q2 } 2
34 { Q2, Q4 } 2
35 { Q2, Q5 } 1
36 { Q2, Q4, Q5 } 1
37 { Q4, Q5 } 1
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required.
In the context of item-set mining, rare item-sets can be narrowed down to minimal rare
item-sets or perfectly rare item-sets. An item-set is minimal if it is not among frequent
item-sets and all of its proper subsets are frequent item-sets. An item-set is perfectly
rare if it is not among the frequent item-sets, and all of its proper subsets are also not
among the frequent item-sets.
Similarly, in the context of mining query-sets, there can be minimal rare query-sets or
perfectly rare query-sets. The query-set # 37 in Table 6.3 is an example of minimal rare
query-set while query-set # 3, 5, 13, 17, and 29 in Table 6.3 are examples of perfectly
rare query-set.
Perfectly rare query-sets capture anomalies manifesting from the malicious group of
queries made together and the subsets of (and individual) queries within the malicious
group are also malicious. The minimal rare query-sets capture anomalies manifesting
from a group of queries made together that forms a malicious event while the subset of
(individual) queries may not be malicious themselves.
Table 6.4 shows the perfectly rare and minimal rare query-sets for the query-set table
shown in Table 6.1. A total of 10 rare query-sets were discovered as a result of mining
perfectly rare and minimal rare query-sets, while 37 query-sets were discovered in
the case of mining all the rare query-sets. Additionally, the discovered perfectly rare
and minimal rare query-sets, shown in the Table 6.4, are sufficient indication of the
presence of rare (malicious) query-sets and covers the majority of the rare query-sets
with lesser number of mined query-sets in the case of detecting malicious queries. For
this reason, in this work, instead of mining all the rare query-sets, we focus on mining
perfectly rare and minimal rare query-sets.
The next section describes how this interpretation of modelling querying behaviour
translates to a behavioural-based anomaly detection system.
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Table 6.4: The table shows Perfectly rare + Minimal rare query-sets mined from the
query-set table shown in Table 6.1. The query-sets in this table have the support of less
than 3 (or 37.5%).
# Perfectly rare + Minimal rare query-sets Support
1 { Q1 } 1
2 { Q2 } 2
3 { Q3 } 2
4 { Q8 } 1
5 { Q1, Q2 } 1
6 { Q1, Q3 } 1
7 { Q2, Q3 } 2
8 { Q8, Q9 } 1
9 { Q4, Q5 } 1
10 { Q1, Q2, Q3 } 1
6.3.1 Query-set Mining-based Malicious Query Detection System
Similar to conventional anomaly detection systems, the proposed approach has a train-
ing phase and a detection phase. In the training phase, the profile of normative be-
haviour is constructed from the DBMS audit logs. However, the detection phase of
the proposed approach is different from the detection phase of conventional anomaly
detection systems. While comparing the normative profile with the run-time profile,
the detection phase also mines rare querying behaviour from run-time DBMS audit
logs. Any instance of deviation from a normative profile and any mined infrequent
(rare) query-sets are labelled as anomalies. Figure 6.1 depicts the detection phase of
the proposed anomaly detection system.
6.3.1.1 Constructing Behavioural Profiles using Item-set Mining
Deployed SQL query abstraction The deployed specialization of SQL query abstrac-
tion, as shown in Table 4.1 is used. For simplicity, we refer to sets of query abstraction
and sets of queries both as query-sets.
Mining Frequent Query-sets PrePost+ [39], claimed to be one of the fastest algo-
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Figure 6.1: Detection Phase: the first step is data collection; the second step is of
query abstraction, followed by run-time profile construction. The run-time profile is
compared against the normative profile (baseline profile), and infrequent query-sets are
mined.
rithms, is used to generate behavioural profiles.
An SQL query abstraction corresponds to an item in an item-set (query-set). Let
QSmap(L) = QS TL be the mapping from SQL queries in audit log L to query-sets
table QS TL. For this work, for ease of exposition, we use a naïve mapping function
that splits the queries in L into a table of equal-sized groups of queries where each
group maps to one query-set in QS TL. It was observed during the experimentation
that a query-set of size between 7 to 10 was sufficient to have a query-sets table to
discover malicious query-sets. A transaction size outside this range resulted in an
inaccurate representation of querying behaviour. However, a more fine-grained ap-
proach would be to identify transactions from the audit log and then transform them
into a query-sets table. As future work, we are interested in investigating the appli-
cation of the general-purpose framework, proposed in [182] for inferring transaction
like patterns from logs to determine QSmap(L) and construct a query-set table. Let
PrePostPlus(Abs(QS map(L)) be the set of frequent query-sets that are mined from
Abs(QS map(L)). Given an audit log free from attacks Lnorm the baseline profile is
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denoted as βN = PrePostPlus(Abs(QS map(Lnorm))).
The generated logs used in this Chapter consisted of transactions having a size between
3 to 7 thus a query-set size of greater than the size of the transactions, i.e. 10, was se-
lected. The query-set size to construct a query-set table is dependent on the underlying
data; therefore, it is to be selected based on the size of transactions where the system
is to be deployed. Ideally having a mapping function that maps each query-set in the
query-set table to each transaction would be desirable. However, different transactions
having different sizes in the logs adds an additional layer of complexity, and in the case
of millions of transactions per day, it may result in computational overhead.
6.3.1.2 Comparing Frequent Query Profiles
In the detection phase, a run-time profile is constructed that is then compared with the
baseline profile βN. Given an audit log collected at run-time Lrun the run-time profile is
denoted as βR = PrePostPlus(Abs(QS map(Lrun))). The set of anomalies (mismatches)
when the baseline profile and the run-time profile are compared, is given by S missβR,βN =
βR − βN. The comparison between βR and βN detects attacks manifesting themselves
in frequent DBMS accesses that are considered not normal.
6.3.1.3 Mining Rare Query-sets
We use the algorithim AprioriInverse [177] to mine perfectly rare query-sets and Apri-
oriRare [38] to mine minimal rare item-sets. Mining all the rare query-sets results in a
large number of query-sets and most of them are just repetitions in terms of subsets of
mined rare query-sets. That is one malicious sequence results in multiple rare-query
sets; however, only one query-set suffice as an indication of that malicious sequence.
During evaluation we discovered that the minimal rare (AprioriRare) and perfectly
rare (AprioriInverse) query-sets were a suitable approximate cover for the malicious
rare queries.
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Given the run-time audit log Lrun the set of rare item-sets is denoted as Z
Lrun
rare =
AprioriInverse(Abs(QS map(Lrun))) ∪ AprioriRare(Abs(QS map(Lrun))).
6.3.1.4 Selecting a Threshold Value For Support
In the context of item-set mining, the usual practice is that the user defines the threshold
value for support [183]. However, in the case of an anomaly detection system based on
item-set mining, an approximate value for support can be learned from past ‘safe’ logs.
Mining past ‘safe’ logs with a threshold value of 0% will result in all the query-sets
along with their support. Using this information one can determine the normative value
for support, for instance, if a majority of the discovered query-sets have support equal
to or more than 40% in the safe log then 40% can be used as a threshold value in the
detection phase. A learning-based threshold value can be an extension of the proposed
approach. In this chapter, for clarity, we keep the value for support user-defined.
6.4 Evaluation
In order to evaluate the proposed model in this chapter, the banking-style application,
described in Section 4.5.1, is used to generate test datasets. The application system was
executed multiple times, once to collect audit logs to construct baseline profile Lnorm
and multiple times to construct malicious query sequences similar to those generated
in Chapter 4: malicious modification of records, malicious observation of records,
or malicious deletion of records from the database. Malicious observation of a record
pertaining to an individual is considered a form of a violation of an individual’s privacy.
Malicious sequences of queries were inserted into the attack logs Lattack1 , Lattack2 , and
Lattack3 at random locations. Table 6.5 shows the length of the attack logs, the length of
the rare query sequences and the number of times the rare query sequence was inserted
in the attack logs. An example of malicious sequences of queries included queries
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accessing the multiple records of individuals. The length of the query sequence rep-
resents that the number queries the malicious insider executed, for instance, to browse
through the records on individuals in the database. The inserted instances were the
number of instances when the malicious insider carried out the malicious query se-
quence where each instance had different queries, for example, Lattack1 was inserted
with two instances of malicious queries, both the instances had the same length but
were consisted of different queries. The idea behind having multiple instances of at-
tacks, inserted at a different location in the logs, was to evaluate the approach more
rigorously, for instance, to detect that the attack is detected not based on a SQL query
in isolation instead based on that malicious sequence.







# of Inserted Instances
of Malicious Sequence
1 Lattack1 1364 6 2
2 Lattack2 1035 2 1
3 Lattack3 1337 4 4
For the experiments, we used a naïve QSmap() function that maps the query logs to
the query-set table, such that it splits the queries in logs into equal-sized (size cho-
sen arbitrarily 10) groups of queries where each group maps to one query-set in the
query-set table. For experimentation, the threshold for support was set to 40%, that is,
query-sets having support 40% and above are considered as frequent while query-sets
having support less than 40% are considered as rare. However, as mentioned above
the threshold value of support can be learned instead of user-defined. The choice of
selection of a threshold for support is left to the discretion of the user of the system.
Table 6.6 shows the number of mined rare malicious query-sets that are an indication
of anomalies. In the experiments, it was discovered that all of the inserted malicious
sequences were depicted in the mined rare query-sets. Each query-set had one of the
malicious queries from the malicious query sequence in the mined rare query-sets.
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The results are an indication that our initial conjecture, that is, frequently repeated
behaviour can be considered normative behaviour, while rare behaviour is potentially
malicious behaviour, holds when it is interpreted in the scenario of modelling querying
behaviour for detecting malicious queries. However, it is not necessarily the case that
the conjecture always holds in the scenario of modelling querying behaviour that we
discuss in the next section.
Table 6.6: The number of mined rare query-sets that are an indication of anomalies.






6.4.1 Mimicry Attacks: Frequent Queries as Malicious Behaviour
An aware malicious insider can repeat the malicious sequence enough times to exceed
the threshold value set for support and thus bypasses the anomaly detection system.
This, in essence, is a type of mimicry attack as the adversary mimics the frequency of
normal queries. The conjecture that frequently repeated behaviour can be considered
normative behaviour does not hold in the case of mimicry attack. However, the fre-
quent query-sets are mined from anomaly free logs. Therefore, even if the adversary
repeats the malicious query sequence, the mined frequent query-sets from run-time
logs that are representatives of those malicious repeated query sequence will result in
mismatches when the run-time profile is compared to the normative profile.
For evaluation we considered three attack scenarios where three groups of repeated
malicious sequences of queries were executed, and the resultant query sequences were
made part of the attack logs Lattack4 , Lattack5 , and Lattack6 . Profiles were constructed
corresponding to Lnorm, Lattack4 , Lattack5 , and Lattack6 , that is, βN, βattack4 , βattack5 , and
βattack6 .
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Table 6.7 shows the length of the attack logs, the length of the rare query sequences
and the number of times the frequent query sequence was inserted in the attack logs.
Table 6.7: The table shows the length of the attack logs, the length of the query se-







# of Inserted Instances
of Malicious Sequence
4 Lattack4 1366 13 113
5 Lattack5 1431 8 127
6 Lattack6 1253 7 140
Table 6.8 shows number of mismatched query-sets when βN was compared with at-
tack profiles. The inserted repeated malicious sequences were represented by the mis-
matched query-sets and were indication of anomalies. Each query-set had one of the
malicious queries from the malicious query sequence in the mined mismatched fre-
quent query-sets.
Table 6.8: The number of mismatches when the normative profile is compared with
attack profiles.




The number of discovered rare query-sets, shown in Table 6.6, can be referred to as
mismatches. The number of mismatches (and discovered rare query-sets) shown in
Table 6.8 and Table 6.6 are indication of deviation from normative behaviour. During
the experimentation, we observed that all mismatches were an indication of both mali-
cious rare and frequent queries. The number of mismatches are quite high as compared
to the number of inserted malicious group (rare and frequent) of queries. However, the
high number of mismatches for small number of malicious groups of queries may lead
to the wrong perception that the audit logs might have a large number of malicious
queries.
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6.4.2 Frequent, Rare, and In-between
In this chapter, we have used a common threshold support value, so query-sets are
either frequent or rare. The question then arises: why not use two different threshold
values for support, one for mining frequent query-sets and other for mining rare query-
sets? For example, query-sets having support value of and above 60% are considered
as frequent while query-sets having 20% or less are considered as rare. The scope of
the chapter was to test our conjecture; therefore, the experiments were setup in a way
to demonstrate whether one can model rare queries as malicious behaviour. Given this,
it was important to generate data with a support less than a synthetic cut-off point,
which is irrelevant in this scenario as the aim was to test whether or not the conjecture
holds.
Moreover, having two different threshold support values for rare (e.g. 20%) and fre-
quent (e.g. 60%) query-set may leave room for an aware adversary to carry out at-
tacks that may bypass the anomaly detection system. A malicious adversary can make
malicious queries enough times that the representative query-sets of those malicious
sequences may well fall in-between the rare and frequent support values (>20% and
60%<), thus bypassing the anomaly detection system.
6.4.3 Comparison with N-gram Approach
A query-set is an unordered set of distinct query abstractions. The item-set mining-
based approach ignores the order of queries while mining the query-sets. The n-gram
approach in Chapter 4 builds a model of behaviour in terms of query sequences. In the
n-gram approach, the temporal order is important and requires that the event must be
contiguous; that is, the events must be next to each other. Based on this temporal order,
the n-gram approach captures the short-range correlation between events. In the case
of the item-sets mining-based approach, the correlation can be termed as a long-range
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correlation but is bounded by the length of query-sets in the query-sets table which in
our case was chosen to be 10.
Another aspect of the comparison between both the approaches is that in the case of
the item-sets mining approach, the number of mismatches that were an indication of
malicious queries was high as compared to the mismatches flagged by the n-gram
approach. In principle, the number of mismatches for a single malicious query in case
of n-gram approach is equal to the size of n-gram, while in the case of item-sets mining
approach the mismatches depends on the algorithm that is used to mine query-sets and
are in large number as depicted in Table 6.8 and Table 6.6.
6.4.4 Complexity of Item-set Mining Approach
The complexity of the item-set mining approach is mainly rooted in the complexity
of deployed item-set mining algorithms. The training phase consists of the algorithm
for QSmap() function and the item-set mining algorithm PrePost+. The algorithm for
QSmap() function has a linear complexity. PrePost+ is claimed to be one of the fastest
frequent-item set mining algorithms, and its complexity is discussed in [184]. In the
detection phase, we have an algorithm for comparing profiles with the linear complex-
ity along with the algorithms for mining rare query-sets, AprioriRare and AprioriIn-
verse.
6.4.5 Potential Application
Enterprise database systems typically produce a large number of logs, for instance, it
is reported that within a 19 hour time frame, approximately 17 million SQL queries
were made in a major US bank [9]. Manual inspection of an entire set of logs requires
a huge amount of resources in terms of time, and associated cost, therefore, considered
impractical. A practical approach in industry for performing an audit for the purpose
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of detecting anomalies using logs is to audit random samples of audit logs instead of
the entire audit log. The drawback of auditing only random samples is that it is pos-
sible that the random selection of samples may miss those samples that have traces of
malicious accesses, thus significantly reducing the effectiveness of the random sample
inspection approach. Approaches that enables one to audit an entire set of logs in an
automated way with a reasonable time of auditing and its associated cost would be a
good alternative to the random sampling approach. Item-set mining algorithms have
been shown to scale in the literature [185]. For example, in [186], it is used to process
transactions ranging from up to 100 million. The proposed approach in this chapter
is a suitable candidate, for a reason being it built upon existing off-the-shelf machine
learning algorithm, requires minimum manual interference, applied to entire sets of
logs in an automated way, and with a reasonable processing time as item-set mining
algorithms are quite fast.
6.4.6 Sequential Pattern Mining
We saw in previous sections that item-sets mining ignores the ordering of the items
within the sets. Retaining the order in which the queries were made while mining
the audit logs may have the potential to construct a more accurate model of behaviour
while minimizing the scope for sophisticated mimicry attacks. Another aspect of con-
sidering the order between the queries is that it may possibly reduce the numbers of
mined rare sequences and the number of mismatches shows in the Table 6.6 and Ta-
ble 6.8, respectively.
A realted domain to item-set mining within data mining, known as sequential pattern
mining, considers ordering between items [187]. Sequential pattern mining discov-
ers sub-sequences in a set of sequences, and this discovery is typically based on the
frequency of occurrence of the sub-sequences.
A numbers of algorithms exist for mining frequent sequential patterns, including, Pre-
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fixSpan [188], GSP [189], SPADE [190], LAPIN [191], FAST [192], ClaSP [193],
BIDE+ [194], and MaxSP [195]. However, little attention has been paid on algorithms
for mining rare sequential patterns. Recently two algorithms for mining rare sequential
patterns [196, 197] have been proposed in the literature. Interpretation of sequential
pattern mining in the context of modelling querying behaviour is another area for fur-
ther exploration.
6.5 Conclusions
This chapter investigates whether one can develop approaches, other than the ones pre-
sented in previous chapters, to build models of querying behaviour to detect malicious
accesses to the databases. In attempting to answer this question, this chapter presented
an interpretation of item-sets mining for modelling querying behaviour. The interpre-
tation resulted in an anomaly detection system and is based on the conjecture that fre-
quent queries represent normative behaviour, while rare queries represent potentially
malicious behaviour. In order to realize the anomaly detection system based on item-
set mining, algorithms like PrePost+ for frequent, and AprioriInverse and AprioriRare
for mining rare query-sets were used.
The evaluation demonstrated that it is possible to detect a malicious group of queries
(rare or frequent) with the proposed item-sets mining-based approach.
As future work, we plan to use the technique proposed in [182] to infers transaction
like repetitive patterns from logs to construct a query-set table. Additionally, we plan
to explore the interpretation of sequential pattern mining in the context of modelling
querying behaviours.
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“It’s dangerous when people are willing to give up their privacy.”
Noam Chomsky(1982 - Present)
7.1 Introduction
It was demonstrated in Chapter 4, that the n-gram based anomaly detection system
was effective in detecting anomalies. Looking closely at the nature of some of the
anomalies, in particular, the malicious data observation attacks, they are a type of pri-
vacy violations. The behavioural-based detection approaches presented in previous
chapters, including, the n-gram, the semantic and the item-sets mining-based approach
demonstrate the detection of privacy violations. This raises the question as to whether
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these anomalies are true privacy anomalies or whether they are simply a form of se-
curity/access control anomalies, which we know these techniques can detect. In order
to answer the question, a privacy-based semantics for anomaly detection is needed.
This chapter considers the third key research question stated in Chapter 1: whether
behavioural-based anomaly detection approaches have a privacy semantic interpreta-
tion and the detected privacy anomalies can be related to the conventional definitions of
privacy semantics. In order to distinguish them from conventional security anomalies,
these violations are referred to as privacy-anomalies.
In order to answer the above-mentioned questions, the notion of ‘Privacy-Anomaly
Detection’(PAD) is introduced in this chapter. PAD learns privacy criteria from past
interactions (audit logs) and uses this criteria to check whether the current behaviour
is different from past behaviour with respect to privacy. The PAD architecture falls
within an interactive query system setting for microdata release.
We describe a naïve instantiation of PAD using k-anonymity privacy criteria which
we refer to as (k-anonymity)-PAD. A study is carried out to investigate whether a
security-anomaly detection system, in particular, the n-gram approach presented in
Chapter 4, can detect these (k-anonymity)-PAD privacy-anomalies. Additionally, in
order to demonstrate that a PAD system can be realized with other privacy metrics
(or combination of privacy metrics), an instantiation based on the composition of k-
anonymity and a more recent privacy metric – Discrimination Rate Privacy Metric
– is presented. This instantiation is referred to as (k-anonymity, DR)-PAD. The k-
anonymity and discrimination rate based instantiation of privacy-anomaly detection
system can be termed as a semantic instantiation of PAD as it captures the semantics
as it learns the criteria from distribution of attribute values in the database.
In this chapter, we show that PAD-based interactive mechanisms are vulnerable to
privacy attacks. We further investigate: whether these types of privacy attacks (infer-
ences) can potentially manifest themselves as anomalies and whether one can interpret
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a security-anomaly detection system in such a way that it can detect privacy attacks
as privacy-anomalies. We present the result that privacy attacks (like inferences) can
be detected by applying security-anomaly detection system over the logs of interactive
querying mechanisms on the basis of a PAD interpretation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 presents a design of a
privacy-anomaly detection system and an instantiation based on k-anonymity. Sec-
tion 7.3 investigates whether there is a correlation between privacy and security anoma-
lies. Section 7.4 introduces an interpretation of a privacy-anomaly that is based on the
composition of k-anonymity and a privacy metric known as discrimination rate. Sec-
tion 7.5 considers some privacy attacks on these mechanisms. Section 7.6 presents an
application of security-anomaly detection system to detect (unknown) privacy attacks
as privacy-anomalies. Section 7.7 concludes this chapter.
7.2 Privacy-Anomaly Detection (PAD) System
In this section, we introduce the notion of privacy-anomaly detection and present a
naïve instantiation of it based on k-anonymity. We argue that this naïve instantiation
constitutes the basis for a more advanced form of a privacy-anomaly detection system,
analogous with k-anonymity which constitutes the basis for more sophisticated formal
privacy definitions. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, this is an exploratory study
to consider the questions discussed in Section 7.1; therefore, using a well-understood
privacy model like k-anonymity enables better understanding of the subject being ex-
plored and helps to avoid underlying complexities associated with other more complex
privacy definitions. Secondly, k-anonymity served as a foundation of many subsequent
formal privacy definitions, which is a good indicator of the applicability of this study
onto other privacy definitions.
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Table 7.1: A fragment of relation temp_table.
age zipcode county gender salary
>55 989234 Cork Male 60K
>55 989234 Cork Male 92K
>55 989234 Cork Male 77K
>45 839523 Cork Male 50K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 60K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 63K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 85K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 70K
>35 839777 Dublin Male 60K
>50 839567 Cork Female 72K
>50 839567 Dublin Female 62K
>50 839567 Cork Female 92K
>50 839567 Dublin Female 77K
>50 839567 Cork Female 68K
7.2.1 A k-Anonymity based Privacy-profile
In the proposed model k-anonymity is used to specify a privacy limit [[k , q]], whereby
k individual must share the same quasi identifier q values in the result of a query. Intu-
itively, this means for that particular response, for a sufficient value of k, an adversary
can only narrow down to k individuals. In the case where an adversary has a secondary
dataset with overlapping quasi-identifier values, then the query response can be linked
to k different individuals, therefore minimizing the risk of re-identification. In the
model the privacy-profile is defined as a set of privacy limits. In terms of privacy, each
privacy limit means that in a particular instance of a query response an adversary won’t
be able to distinguish an individual’s quasi-identifier values from k individuals for the
set of quasi-identifiers that appeared in the query response.
Consider a relation temp_table, as shown in Table 7.1, having several attributes in-
cluding a sensitive attribute salary, and quasi-identifiers age, gender, zipcode, and
county. For ease of exposition we assume the values for attribute age are aggre-
gated into age ranges, for instance, all the values for attribute age above 55 are rep-
resented as >55. Given a mined privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]], in privacy-profile,
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Table 7.2: A relation TR1 resulting from the query SELECT age, zipcode FROM





then the response to the analyst query SELECT age, zipcode FROM temp_table
WHERE gender = ‘Male’ AND county = ‘Cork’ AND age > 55; as shown in
Table 7.2 is not anomalous since the value of k for the the quasi-identifiers {age,
zipcode} in the response is greater than or equal to 3.
7.2.1.1 Mining k-anonymity based Profiles for PAD
The privacy-anomaly detection consists of two phases, similar to traditional anomaly
detection approaches, that are, learning phase and a detection phase. The instances
of the privacy model are mined from audit logs in order to generate privacy-profiles.
We refer to a privacy-profile that is mined from past logs in the learning phase as a
normative privacy-profile. The idea is to learn the k values for sets of quasi-identifier(s)
by mining past audit logs and interpret those mined ‘privacy limits’ as ‘normal’.
Given an audit log L∗, consisting of query responses (L in previous chapters repre-
sented logs of queries), Pri(L∗) gives a privacy-profile consisting of privacy limits
mined from log L∗, where q ∈ QI represent a set of quasi-identifier. A normative
privacy-profile is generated from an anomaly-free past log L∗norm and is denoted by
Pri(L∗norm) = { [[k1, q1]], [[k2, q2]], . . . , [[km, qm]] }. For example, consider the relation
TR2 shown in Table 7.3, the mined value of k for the set of quasi-identifiers {age,
zipcode, county} is 4, that is, [[4, {age, zipcode, county}]] ∈ Pri(L∗norm). In essence
we are constructing privacy limit (L∗, q) which returns k as a limit to the privacy in the
table for a given q. The normative privacy-profile is effectively a set of these privacy
limits mined against the logs for a given set of quasi-identifiers. Intuitively, the tuples
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Table 7.3: A relation TR2 resulting from the query SELECT age, zipcode, county
FROM temp_table WHERE gender = ‘male’;.
age zipcode county salary
>55 839523 Cork 60K
>55 839523 Cork 92K
>55 839523 Cork 77K
>45 839523 Cork 50K
>35 839777 Dublin 60K
>35 839777 Dublin 63K
>35 839777 Dublin 85K
>35 839777 Dublin 70K
>35 839777 Dublin 60K
in the normative privacy-profile shows to what extent one narrows down to individuals
records in normative settings.
7.2.1.2 Detecting Privacy-anomalies
The detection phase, in terms of privacy, checks if an adversary is able to narrow
down to fewer than k individuals for a given set of quasi-identifiers in the normative
profile. In the instance, where the adversary is able to narrow down to fewer than
specified k individuals for a given set of quasi-identifier then this instance is labelled as
a privacy-anomaly and poses higher risk of re-identification relative to normal. During
the detection phase, the run-time profile Pri(L∗run) constructed given a run-time log L
∗
run.
Pri(L∗run) is the constructed run-time profile. Given privacy limits [[ki, qi]] and [[k j, q j]]
then [[ki, qi]] subsumes [[k j, q j]] (denoted [[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]]) if imposing privacy limit
[[k j, q j]] instead of [[ki, qi]] leads to no additional loss of privacy. Formally,
[[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]] ≡ qi ⊆ q j ∧ k j ≥ ki
In the case where [[ki, qi]] ∈ Pri(L∗norm) and [[k j, q j]] ∈ Pri(L
∗
run) then [[ki, qi]]  [[k j, q j]]
means that [[k j, q j]] can be safely replaced by [[ki, qi]] without any loss of privacy. If
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Table 7.4: A relation TR3 resulting from the query SELECT age, zipcode FROM







a privacy limit subsumes another intuitively it means if the subsumed privacy limit is
replaced by the one that subsumes it then there is no loss of privacy.
Consider the response of a query at run-time shown in Table 7.4, and that there exists
a privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]] in Pri(L∗norm). The mined value k of the set of quasi-
identifier {age, zipcode} is greater than 3 therefore this privacy limit [[5, {age, zipcode}]]
in Pri(L∗run) is considered to be subsumed by the privacy limit [[3, {age, zipcode}]] in
Pri(L∗norm). In terms of privacy, it means given that this instance of query response an
adversary can narrow down so many individuals as one normally is able to for a given
set of quasi-identifiers. This naïve instantiation acts as a stepping stone to describe
later investigations on privacy-based interpretations of behavioural-based approaches
presented in this chapter.
7.2.2 Computational Complexity
The algorithm for profile generation in the training phase of privacy anomaly detection
system based on k-anonymity has linear complexity. The detection phase consists of an
algorithm to run-time profile generation and an algorithm for matching privacy limits
with both the algorithms having linear complexity. The overall complexity of privacy
anomaly detection system based on k-anonymity is O(n).
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7.3 Security-anomaly Detection System Detecting Privacy-
anomalies
This section explores whether privacy-anomalies (as identified by the model in this
chapter) are also identified as security-anomalies (as identified by the model in Chap-
ter 4). We consider a variation of the hospital dataset, a fragment of the dataset is
shown in Table 7.5. Logs were generated for construction of a normative profile and
another for the construction of a run-time profile. The training logs (anomaly-free) for
the n-gram based approach are denoted by Lhospnorm, while the anomalous run-time logs
for the hospital datasets are denoted by Lhosprun .
To construct normative and run-time profiles using the n-gram model, selection of an
appropriate value of the size of n-gram was desirable for the hospital dataset. To se-
lect an appropriate size of an n-gram in this scenario, test logs Lhosptest1 and L
hosp
test2 were
generated in a safe environment (anomaly-free). N-gram profiles were constructed
with varying n-gram size, that are, ngram(Abs(Lhosptest1), n) and ngram(Abs(L
hosp
test2), n),
and generated profiles were compared. Figure 7.1 depicts the number of n-
gram mismatches arising when comparing the normal test ngram(Abs(Lhosptest1), n) and
ngram(Abs(Lhosptest2), n), for different values of n. Experiments along the lines, as shown
in Section 4.5.2 were carried out to determine the suitable value for n. From the exper-
iments, the n-gram of the size of 4 (n = 4) was considered optimal as it resulted in an
acceptable number of mismatches.
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Figure 7.1: The figure shows the number of mismatches between ngram(Abs(Lhosptest1), n)
and ngram(Abs(Lhosptest2), n) for different values of n.
Once the value of n was decided upon, the normative and run-time profiles were con-
structed for the experiments. Given the training logs Lhospnorm and L
hosp
run n-gram profiles
were constructed such that ngram(Abs(Lhospnorm), 4) and ngram(Abs(L
hosp
run ), 4), and subse-
quently the normative and runtime profiles were compared.
The same queries in logs Lhospnorm and L
hosp
run were executed in the presence of the privacy-
anomaly detection system (described in Section 7.2) resulting in logs of query re-
sponses Lhosp∗norm and L
hosp∗
run . Subsequently, a normative privacy-profile Pri(L
hosp∗
norm ) and
a run-time Pri(Lhosp∗run ) profiles were constructed and compared.
The attribute patient_ID and e-mail_ID were considered as a unique identifier,
the attribute diagnosis was considered as a sensitive attribute while the rest of
the attributes including first_name, last_name, status, dob, gender, city, and
marital_status were considered as quasi-identifiers. For the experimentation, two
categories of privacy-anomalies were injected as described in Table 7.6. Using this
anomaly-containing run-time log, from 15 privacy-anomalies 13 were detected by
the n-gram based security-anomaly detection system proposed in Chapter 4 and the
privacy-anomaly detection system proposed in this chapter.
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Table 7.5: A fragment of hospital dataset.The strike-through attribute values represents
a deleted row.
dob city gender diagnoses country ...
1981 Dublin Male Flu Ireland ...
1981 Dublin Male Flu Ireland ...





1981 Galway Female Acne Ireland ...
1984 Galway Male Flu Spain ...
1984 Galway Male Diabetes Ireland ...





... ... ... ... ... ...
... ... ... ... ... ...
1981 Dublin Male Flu Germany ...
Table 7.6: Description of Privacy-anomalies injected.
Description of privacy-anomalies Number of anomalies injected
Addition of one or more attributes to the base relation
shown in Table 7.5. For instance, a new attribute,
like country, was inserted in the relation and queries
were made to retrieve this attribute values.
5
Update or Deletion of records from relation
shown in Table 7.5 10
7.3.1 Detected Privacy-anomalies
The n-gram based security-anomaly detection system detected all those privacy-
anomalies that were generated by injecting one more attribute into the relation. The
privacy-anomalies injected by adding one more attribute were identified as privacy-
anomalies by both systems. The reason that they were identified was because there
were no n-gram that contained a reference to new attribute in its query abstraction.
One of the detected privacy-anomalies corresponds to the query shown below.
SELECT diagnoses, dob, city, country
FROM hospitalDB
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Table 7.7: Response to a undetected privacy-anomalous query.
dob city diagnoses
1920 Cork Heart Disease
WHERE dob = ‘1981’
AND city = ‘Dublin’;
The normative privacy-profile contains no privacy limit reference to the new (or com-
bination of new) attribute.
7.3.2 Undetected Privacy-anomalies
A privacy-anomaly undetected by the n-gram based approach but detected by the pri-
vacy model is:
SELECT dob, city, diagnoses
FROM hospitalDB
WHERE dob = ‘1920’
AND city = ‘Cork’ ;
The query returns a relation with one record as shown in Table 7.7. It is identified as a
privacy-anomaly by the privacy model for the reason being that the specified value of k
for the specified set of quasi-identifier meant that an adversary was able to single out an
individual. This anomaly is undetected by n-gram based security-anomaly detection
approach because there was an n-gram in normative profile contained a reference to
this query abstraction.
A similar set of experiments were carried out in the banking scenario and results along
the same lines as of hospital scenario were obtained.
In the examples above, the privacy-anomalies illustrated are based on a single query
rather than a query sequence. In Section 7.5 we consider privacy-anomalies that are
based on query correlations, where sequences of queries in isolation are safe, but taken
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together as a sequence result in a privacy-anomaly.
7.3.3 Identifying Appropriate Privacy Limits
In order to find the appropriate values of k, in the mining process, in theory, all the
combinations of quasi-identifiers need to be considered. This, in essence, is a combi-
natorial explosion, especially in the case of a large number of quasi-identifiers. Ad-
ditionally, one may discover either very large or very small values of k in practice for
certain combinations of quasi-identifiers. Therefore, in order to discover reasonable
values of k, one may define a range while mining the values of k such that the values
falling within the range and their corresponding combinations of quasi-identifiers are
considered for privacy-profiles.
7.4 k-anonymity and Discrimination based Privacy-
anomaly Detection System
For ease of exposition, k-anonymity was picked as a foundation for the study and
we argue that our approach can be adapted to other definitions of privacy. In this
section, we consider another definition of privacy that is based on a combination of
k-anonymity and a recently proposed privacy metric known as Discrimination Rate
Privacy Metric (DRPM) , and we refer to it as (k-anonymity, DR)-PAD.
In terms of privacy, discrimination rate provides a way to compute the identification
capability of an attribute (or set of attributes) according to how knowledge of particular
attribute values effects the adversary’s capability to re-identify someone in the dataset.
Interpretation of DRPM for interactive query settings provides a way to compute the
identification capability of an SQL query instead of computing the identification capa-
bility of a single attribute or a set of attributes. Intuitively, the identification capability
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of SQL query means that how likely it is for an adversary to re-identify someone from
the dataset if that particular query is to be executed. In the next section, we review
DRPM with an example, and use DRPM to the compute identification capability of an
SQL query in (k-anonymity, DR)-PAD system.
7.4.1 Discrimination Rate (DR)
The discrimination rate [40] measures how the knowledge of a particular attribute val-
ues (or set of attributes values) refines the adversary capability to re-identify someone
from the dataset. The discrimination rate privacy metric considers the attribute as a
discrete random variable, while the result set is considered as the set of outcomes of an-
other discrete random variable. For instance, consider two discrete random variables,
X and Y , where X is the set of outcomes, and Y is the attribute for which the measure-
ment of the identification capacity is desired. H(X) (entropy) represents the amount of
information carried by X. The entropy of X conditioned on Y , that is, (H(X|Y)) [40], is
computed as the measure of the effect of Y on X. Therefore, the amount of information
carried by Y (attribute) according to X is given by H(X) − H(X|Y). H(X) − H(X|Y) is
divided by H(X) to get a normalized value. The discrimination rate of an attribute is
a value from the interval [0, 1]. The discrimination rate value 0 for an attribute means
that the attribute does not contribute to refining adversary’s knowledge who is attempt-
ing to re-identifying a subject(s). Attributes are treated as discrete random variables
where X are the identifier attribute and Y is the attribute for which the identification
capability is being computed. The discrimination rate is computed using Equation 7.1.




Where H(X) is the entropy of a discrete random variable X, and is computed by Equa-
tion 7.2. H(X|Y) is the conditional entropy of a discrete random variable X given a
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discrete random variable Y , and is computed by Equation 7.3. The discrete random











Where p(x, y)log(p(x|y) are the joint and conditional probability distributions for dis-
crete random variables X and Y . The discrimination rate is computed for the combina-
tion of attributes that is known as Combined Discrimination Rate (CDR). A discrim-
ination rate value of 1 for an attribute means that the knowledge of the values of this
attribute leads to re-identification of a subject(s). The combined discrimination rate for
Y1,Y2, . . .Yn given X is shown in Equation 7.4 (see [40] for more information).
CDRX(Y1,Y2, . . .Yn) = 1 −
H(X|Y1,Y2, . . .Yn)
H(X)
(7.4)
As an example, consider the relation shown in Table 7.8. The discrimination rate values
for the attributes shown in the relation of Table 7.8 are shown in Tables 7.9 and 7.10.
Table 7.8: An example relation companyTable.
firstName designation location drivingLicense
Zacharin Application Developer London Yes
Alex Project Manager Rome Yes
Sylvie Application Developer London Yes
Nisha Project Manager Paris Yes
Lukas Security Analyst London Yes
Scott Project Manager New York Yes
Cynthia Application Developer London Yes
Ariel Security Analyst New York Yes
Kate Security Analyst New York Yes
James Security Analyst New York Yes
Tom Project Manager London Yes
Steve Application Developer Stuttgart Yes
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Table 7.9: Discrimination rate values for attribute shown in Table 7.8.





Table 7.10: Computed combined discrimination rate (CDR) values for attributes in the
relation shown in Table 7.8.







firstName, designation, location 1
firstName, designation, drivingLicense 1
firstName, location, drivingLicense 1
firstName, designation, location, drivingLicense 1
designation, location, drivingLicense 0.779
The computational complexity of simple discrimination rate and combined discrimi-
nation rate is linear O(n). An aspect of combined discrimination rate is to get all the
combinations of the quasi-identifiers, typically the number of quasi-identifiers are lim-
ited; therefore even though in theory the complexity of the algorithm that outputs all
combination is O(2n), the process is practically is less computational costly because of
the limited (small input size) number of quasi-identifier.
7.4.2 DRSQL: Computing Identification Capability of SQL
Queries
The query abstraction used in order to translate the discrimination rate for SQL queries
is shown in Table 7.11. The specialization of SQL query abstraction for DRSQL con-
sidered in this section, includes the attribute names as part of the abstraction. Given an
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SQL query Qi, its abstraction is denoted as Abs(Qi), where the elements of Abs(Qi)
are the attributes in the SQL query.
Table 7.11: Deployed specialization of SQL query abstraction. The elements of
Abs(Qi) are the attributes in the SQL query.
Query (Qi) SQL Query Abstraction Abs(Qi)
SELECT firstName, designation {firstName, designation}
FROM companyTable;
SELECT firstName, location {firstName, location}
FROM companyTable;
Let the attributes in relation T be denoted as {attr1, attr2, attr3, . . . , attrn}. Let L
be an audit log consisting of SQL queries executed on relation T. The abstraction of
L is represented by Abs(L) and the abstraction of an individual SQL query Qi ∈ L is
represented as Abs(Qi). The identification capability of an SQL query Qi is denoted
as DRSQL(Abs(Qi)) = CDRX(attr1 , attr2, . . . , attrk ) where attr1 , attr2, . . . , attrk ∈
Abs(Qi). In a case where only a single attribute attr is queried, then the identification
capability of that query Qi is DRSQL(Abs(Qi))= CDRX(attr) = DRX(attr).
Table 7.9 and Table 7.10 show the computed discrimination rate values for the at-
tributes in the table shown in Table 7.8. Here, X represents the number of unique
records or individuals in the relations. In the case of the table shown in Table 7.8,
there are 12 records where each record belongs to a unique individual. For instance,
the identification capability of query Q1, shown in Table 7.12, is DRSQL(Abs(Q1)) =
CDRX(firstName, designation, drivingLicense) = 1. Similarly, the identifi-
cation capability of query Q4, shown in Table 7.12, is computed as DRSQL(Abs(Q4))
= CDRX(designation, location) = 0.779. This means that the response of Q1 re-
sults in re-identification of subjects in the table while the response of Q4 may results in
re-identification of subjects if combined with other attributes with high discrimination
rate.
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Table 7.12: Sample SQL queries used to query the companyTable relation shown in
Table 7.8.
Q1 SELECT designation, firstName, drivingLicense
FROM companyTable;
Q2 SELECT designation, firstName
FROM companyTable;




WHERE location = ‘London’;
Q5 SELECT designation
FROM companyTable
WHERE location = ‘New York’;
7.4.3 Application of DRSQL: Privacy Comparison v/s Simple
Comparison
A stand-alone application of computing identification capability of SQL queries is in
the comparison of SQL queries. The higher the identification capability of an SQL
query, the higher the risk of re-identification it carries when compared to an SQL query
with lesser identification capability. There exist extensive literature on the comparison
of SQL queries [93], however, the literature lacks approaches to compare two SQL
queries using the privacy-risk they carry - privacy comparison.
In order to demonstrate the difference between a simple comparison and privacy com-
parison of two SQL queries, consider the relation companyTable as shown in Ta-
ble 7.8. Suppose a first SQL query asks for the values for the attributes location,
designation and drivingLicense. While a second query asks for the values of the
attributes location and designation. A simple comparison of both queries syn-
tactically as well as in terms of results indicates that both the queries differ by one
attribute and one can say the result of second query is a subset of the results returned
by first query. However, in terms of privacy, both the queries are equal as the attribute
drivingLicense does not affect the privacy of an individual in the relation.
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To facilitate the privacy comparison between SQL queries, we propose Privacy order-
ing relations in the next section.
7.4.3.1 Privacy Ordering Relations
To perform a privacy comparison between SQL queries, we define the following
relations: privacy-equivalence relation, less-private relation and more-private rela-
tion. Given two SQL queries Qi and Q j and their abstractions as Qi is more-private
than Q j or Q j is less-private than Qi denoted as Abs(Qi) v Abs(Q j). Intuitively, if the
contribution of Qi in refining the adversary’s ability to re-identify subject(s) is lesser
than of query Q j, then Qi is said to be more private than Q j. Formally,
Qi v Q j ≡ Abs(Qi) ⊆ Abs(Q j) ∧ DRSQL(Abs(Qi)) ≥ DRSQL(Abs(Q j))
Given two SQL queries Qi and Q j and their abstractions Abs(Qi) and Abs(Q j), then the
privacy equivalence between Abs(Qi) and Abs(Q j) is defined as Abs(Qi) v Abs(Q j) ∧





In order to assist the privacy comparison and for a better explanation to compute the
identification capability of the SQL queries, based on the discrimination rate and com-
bined discrimination rate, one can then articulate a privacy-aware attribute relationship
diagram for a relation T. A fragment of the privacy-aware attribute relationship dia-
gram is shown the Figure 7.2.
Consider the relation shown in Table 7.8 that is queried using the SQL queries Q1,
Q2, Q3, Q4, and Q5 shown in Table 7.12. The records returned in response to Q2 are
a subset of those returned in response to Q1, and the records returned in response to
Q2 are also a subset of those returned in response to Q3. Q1 and Q2 have privacy
equivalence; however, Q2 and Q3 are not privacy equivalent. For the table shown in
Table 7.8, the discrimination rate for the attribute drivingLicense is 0; therefore we
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deduce that Q1 and Q2 hold privacy equivalence between them i.e. Q1
p
= Q2. While Q1
and Q3 do not hold privacy equivalence between them because of the Discrimination
Rate for the attribute location is not zero, even though the result set of Q2 is a subset
of the result set of Q3, i.e., Q2
p
, Q3.
Similarly, the case where one query is a subset of another query is consid-
ered as well; for instance, consider the SQL queries Q2 and Q3 from Ta-
ble 7.12. The CDR for the sets of attributes {firstName, designation,
location} and {firstName, designation} is computed. The CDR for
{firstName, designation, location} is greater than the CDR of {firstName,
designation}; therefore one can say Q2 is a privacy subset of Q3, that is, Q2 is more-
private then Q3 or Q3 is less-private then Q2. The DRSQL value for Q4 and Q5 is
0.779 where the combined discrimination rate value for {designation, location}
is 0.779.
In order to facilitate the comparison of queries, a privacy-aware attribute relationship
diagram can be formulated, a fragment of which is shown in Figure 7.2. As an example,
suppose one wants to compare the following two queries:
• SELECT location, designation FROM companyTable;
• SELECT location FROM companyTable;
Figure 7.2: A fragment of privacy-aware attribute relationship diagram.
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From the privacy-aware attribute relationship diagram it is implied that the
set {location} is a subset of {location, designation} therefore, (SELECT
location FROM companyTable;) w (SELECT location, designation FROM
companyTable;).
The identification capability of an SQL query can be computed in many ways and with
various specialization of query abstractions. One way to compute the identification
capability of an SQL query is to compute it over the returned records. Identification
capability depends on the distribution of attributes values in the database. For in-
stance, a fine-grained specialization of query abstraction, denoted by Abs∗(Q) can be
employed where the attribute values and the operators used in the WHERE clause are part
of query abstraction. For example, consider the following SQL query: Q = SELECT
designation FROM companyTable WHERE location = ‘Stuttgart’; Abs∗(Q) =
{designation, location=‘Stuttgart’ } will result in DRSQL(Abs∗(Q)) = 1.
7.4.4 A k-Anonymity and Discrimination Rate based Privacy-
profile
There are various formal definitions of privacy in the literature. A question that arises
is whether one can compose these definitions in a way, in the context of interactive
querying, such that if one definition for the response is satisfied, then it is labelled
as ‘normal’. An alternative way of satisfying one privacy definition to be considered
as ‘normal’ is compose the privacy definitions in a way such that if all of the pri-
vacy definitions are satisfied then it is considered as ‘normal’. This is a much stricter
notion of privacy which intuitively means less utility. We argue that for ease of ex-
position that satisfying one notion/definition of privacy constitutes ‘normal’. We are
interested in mining privacy limits using different privacy metrics to build a norma-
tive privacy-profile. For this reason, we use discrimination rate privacy metric along
with k-anonymity to mine privacy limits and we refer to this instantiation of PAD as
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(k-anonymity, DR)-PAD. For this proposed model, privacy is defined in the scenarios
where records are returned in the response of a query where k individuals must share
the same quasi-identifier values in the result of the query as well as the identification
capability of that particular query must remain under some threshold. Intuitively, this
means that for a particular instance of a relation (response of a query) one of the fol-
lowing two conditions must be satisfied: i) for a sufficient value of k, an adversary can
only narrow down to k individuals, or ii) the knowledge of response does not increase
adversary’s capabilities to re-identify someone in the database.
7.4.4.1 Composing Privacy Criteria
We compose the privacy criteria k-anonymity and discrimination rate privacy metric
whereby a query is said to be query passed if it satisfies one of the privacy criteria in
the (k, anonymity, DR)-PAD profile. Given a k-anonymity privacy limit [[ki, qi]] with
quasi identifiers qi and a discrimination rate based privacy limit DRSQL(Abs(Qn)) then
define the aggregate privacy limit measure Pkqi ,Qn as the minimum of the k-anonymity
privacy limit measure and the discrimination rate privacy limit measure, where mini-
mum implies either of the privacy limit is satisfied.
Learning Phase In the learning phase, the values of k, for quasi-identifier (a set
quasi-identifiers), are mined in a similar fashion to (k-anonymity)-PAD. The values
of DRSQL are also learned for queries in the training phase. Using this information,
a privacy limit Pkqi ,Qn is formed. We refer to the computed during the learning phase
as P
kqi ,Qn
Norm and that computed at run-time during the detection phase as P
kq j ,Qm
Run . In this




In terms of privacy, the privacy limit in the normative privacy-profile represents what
normative values of k are acceptable for a set of quasi-identifiers and what are the
normative identification capabilities values associated with the SQL statements, both
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learned from safe settings.
Detection Phase The detection phase, in terms of privacy, checks whether an adversary
is able to narrow down fewer than k individuals or the adversary learns more from the
query response as compared to what is normative. Where k for a given set of quasi-
identifier is defined in the normative profile In the instance where the adversary is
able to narrow down fewer than k individuals or the adversary learns more from the
query response as compared to what is normative, then this instance is labelled as a
privacy-anomaly as in terms of privacy it means higher risk of re-identification relative
to normal.
Given privacy limits Pkqi ,Qn and Pkq j ,Qm then Pkqi ,Qn is no less private than Pkq j ,Qm if
imposing privacy limit Pkq j ,Qm instead of Pkqi ,Qn leads to no additional loss of privacy.
Formally,
Pkqi ,Qn  Pkq j ,Qm ≡ (qi ⊆ q j ∧ k j ≥ ki) ∨ (Qm v Qn)









Run , then it is labelled as a safe, in all other cases the query is labelled as
an anomaly.
7.4.4.2 Example Run of (k-anonymity, DR)-PAD
Consider the queries shown in Table 7.14 the were executed on the table_smp relation
shown in Table 7.13.
Suppose that the mined value of k for the set of quasi-identifier qi in Q1 and Q2 is 4
and the mined DRSQL(Abs(Q1)) and DRSQL(Abs(Q2)) is 0.5. The result set of query
Q1 is shown in Table 7.15 with the value of k = 5 for the set of quasi-identifier qi in Q1
which is greater than the mined value of k. The value for DRSQL(Abs(Q1)) is 0.4184
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Mark Single New York [30 - 40] 112k
James Single New York [30 - 40] 34k
John Single New York [30 - 40] 56k
Henry Single New York [30 - 40] 78k
Imran Single New York [30 - 40] 91k
David Married London [30 - 40] 112k
Alice Married London [30 - 40] 30k
Bob Married London [30 - 40] 45k
Aron Married London [30 - 40] 115k
Harry Married London [30 - 40] 180k
Jordan Separated Cork >40 65k
Ryan Separated Cork >40 100k
Bentley Separated Cork >40 80k
Table 7.14: Sample SQL queries executed over the relation table_smp shown in Ta-
ble 7.13
Q1
SELECT MaritalStatus, Salary, age
FROM table_smp
WHERE City =‘New York’;
Q2
SELECT MaritalStatus, Salary, age
FROM table_smp
WHERE City=Cork;
that is lesser than the mined value of DRSQL(Abs(Q1)). The query Q1 satisfies both the
thresholds, and it can be said to query Q1 as Query passed. The result set of query Q2
is shown in Table 7.16. In the case for query Q2, the value of k at run-time is 3 which
is less then the mined value. The DRSQL(Abs(Q2)) is 0.4184 which is lesser than the
mined value of DRSQL(Abs(Q2)). As one of the threshold is passed so it can be said
that query Q2 as Query passed. Intuitively, for both the queries the adversary does not
learn about the individuals in the dataset more than what is considered as normative
and cannot further narrow down to less then k individuals.
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Table 7.15: Records returned in the response to query Q1.
MaritalStatus Age Salary (sensitive attribute)
Single [30 - 40] 112k
Single [30 - 40] 34k
Single [30 - 40] 56k
Single [30 - 40] 78k
Single [30 - 40] 91k
Table 7.16: Records returned in the response to query Q2.




7.5 Privacy Attacks (Inferences)
This section demonstrates a privacy attack whereby an adversary discovers information
about an individual while the privacy-anomaly detection system is in place. Consider
the relation shown in Table 7.17 that is the same relation as shown in Table 7.13 but
with one more record added.
Suppose the sequence of queries Q1, Q2 and Q3, shown in Table 7.18, are executed
over the relation updated_table_smp shown in Table 7.17.
Query Q1 is labelled as an privacy-anomaly (and the query response is suppressed)
because the threshold is not satisfied as k-anonymity and DRSQL is not satisfied by
the query Q1. Whereas query Q2 passes the threshold and the response to the query is
shown in Table 7.19 that results in 14 records, that is, the value of attribute Salary,
being returned. Query Q3 also passes the privacy criteria and returns 13 records, as
shown in Table 7.20. The adversary, knowing that Simon’s record is in the table
(as background/external knowledge) and that Simon lives in Rennes, reveals that last
remaining entry blocked by the query mechanism is of ‘Simon’ and the corresponding
salary attribute value is 150k.
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Table 7.17: Relation updated_table_smp: updated version of the table_smp rela-
tion shown in Table 7.13.




Mark Single New York [30 - 40] 112k
James Single New York [30 - 40] 34k
John Single New York [30 - 40] 56k
Henry Single New York [30 - 40] 78k
Imran Single New York [30 - 40] 91k
David Married London [30 - 40] 112k
Alice Married London [30 - 40] 30k
Bob Married London [30 - 40] 45k
Aron Married London [30 - 40] 115k
Harry Married London [30 - 40] 180k
Jordan Separated Cork >40 65k
Ryan Separated Cork >40 100k
Bentley Separated Cork >40 80k
Simon Married Rennes >40 150k
Table 7.18: Sequence of queries executed over the relation updated_table_smp









SELECT MaritalStatus, Salary, Age
FROM updated_table_smp
WHERE City= ‘New York’ AND city =‘London’ AND city = ‘Cork’;
In particular, the described attack is a form of a differencing attack [198]. Differencing
attacks have been seen previously on aggregates. This demonstrates that k-anonymity
in interactive settings is also susceptible to these differencing attacks. For the purpose
of demonstration, the example of a differencing attack is kept simple; however, real
world differencing attacks can take more sophisticated forms, where the adversary can
make multiple queries to narrow down the aggregate data until the subject’s informa-
tion is not revealed.
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Table 7.20: Records returned in response of query Q3.
MaritalStatus City Age Salary (sensitive attribute)
Single New York [30 - 40] 112k
Single New York [30 - 40] 34k
Single New York [30 - 40] 56k
Single New York [30 - 40] 78k
Single New York [30 - 40] 91k
Married London [30 - 40] 112k
Married London [30 - 40] 30k
Married London [30 - 40] 45k
Married London [30 - 40] 115k
Married London [30 - 40] 180k
Separated Cork >40 65k
Separated Cork >40 100k
Separated Cork >40 80k
7.6 Applying Security-anomaly Detection to Detect
Unknown Privacy Attacks
In general, interactive query mechanisms are susceptible to the attacks described in
the previous section, and as a consequence there is little privacy-preserving interactive
query mechanisms (specifically for microdata release) in the existing literature. The
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existing differentially private interactive mechanisms allow a limited number of inter-
active queries for aggregate data. Restricting the number of queries is a significant
barrier for an analyst in achieving the true potential for data analytics. Privacy attacks,
similar to the one presented in the previous section, are violations of formal privacy
definitions.
Another aspect of these privacy attacks is that the querying pattern to infer informa-
tion about the subject(s) is unknown, therefore, we refer to them as unknown privacy
attacks. Unknown privacy attacks lead to inferring information about the subject(s).
An adversary can articulate the queries in different ways to reveal information about a
subject(s). In this work, inference implies privacy attacks, that is, the adversary infers
information about the subject(s) while a formal privacy definition is in place result-
ing in a violation of formal privacy definition. Additionally, these privacy attacks are
based on query correlation, that is, an individual query is safe in terms of privacy but
when considered as sequence they result in the violation of formal privacy definition.
This section presents an investigation into whether the inferences can be detected as
anomalies.
We present a novel perspective on the detection of privacy attacks by proposing an
interpretation of the behavioural-based detection approach. We investigate the appli-
cation of n-gram approach, proposed approach in Chapter 4, to detect unknown privacy
attacks as anomalies in the next section.
7.6.1 Detecting Inferences as Anomalies
A behavioural-based approach to detect inferences as anomalies is described in this
section where the n-gram based approach is applied to the audit logs of the (k-
anonymity)-PAD system. The idea is to model querying behaviours in the presence of a
privacy-preserving interactive query mechanism and compare the normative querying
behaviour with the run-time querying behaviour to detect deviations.
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For the SQL query abstraction, the specialization of the abstraction, as discussed in
Section 4.3.2, is employed. Examples of the employed SQL query abstraction tech-
nique are shown in Table 4.1.
The n-gram profiles are generated in the same manner as discussed in Section 4.3.3
that is given a safe audit log of SQL query Lppnorm and a run-time log L
pp
run then the
constructed normative profile and run-time profile are βnorm = ngram(Abs(L
pp
norm), n)
and βrun = ngram(Abs(L
pp
run), n). The mismatches are given by S missβrun−βnorm = βrun - βnorm.
In order to evaluate the detection of privacy attacks by applying the n-gram based
approach to the logs of interactive querying mechanism, a synthetic query generator
was designed that had defined a set of SQL query templates. The underlying database
was populated with a fragment version of well-known Census (Adult) dataset [199].
Query templates were designed to be executed on the Census dataset. The queries were
count queries mimicking a data analytics scenario. For example, the count queries were
for the form: how many subjects are Female, how many subjects have a Bachelors
degree, so on and so forth. For the experimentation, a safe log Lppnorm was generated for
the construction of normative profile using the synthetic data generator.
In order to construct privacy attacks, five unique records were inserted into the database
that leads to inferences, where unique implies that one of the attribute or combination
of the attributes existed only once in the entire database. For example, a record was
inserted with occupation as post-doc, that is, in the underlying database there was
only one record where the value for occupation was post-doc. Another record was
inserted where the value for native-country was set to Malaysia, that is, there was
only one record where the native-country was Malaysia. Table 7.21 shows the
make-up of the inserted records to enable privacy attacks.
Queries were made to infer the associated salaries for these five unique records. Ta-
ble 7.22 shows the number of queries made to reveal the salary for the records shown
in Table 7.21. The length of the sequences differs for each attack; this is because, in
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Table 7.21: Inserted unique records in the database to enable privacy attacks.
# Description of Unique Record
1 Attribute occupation with value as post-doc
2 Attribute native-country with value as Malaysia
3 Attribute native-country with value as Spain and Attribute age as 33
4
Attribute native-country with value as Singaporean
and Attribute age as 32
5
Attribute native-country with value as Singaporean
and Attribute occupation as Academics
each scenario, the number of queries required to reveal information about salary was
different. This can be best described from a simple example; for instance, consider a
database with 100 employee records where record consisted of their salaries as well.
There are 99 male employees and 1 female employee. In order to find the salary for
1 female employee, an adversary will have to execute the first queries to discover the
sum of salary for all the employees and then a query to discover the sum of salaries for
all the male employees. The difference between the sum of the salaries of all the em-
ployees and the sum of the salaries for male employes will reveal the salary for the one
female employees. Thus, in this case, the adversary has to execute only two queries to
reveal the salary for the female employees. This can become complex depending on
the what personal information the adversary is aiming to reveal about an individual in
the database and the length of the sequence increases or decreases based on that. These
malicious query sequences were made part of the other logs Lpprun for the construction
for the run-time profile.
Table 7.22: Length of the query sequences to reveal salaries.






A normative profile βnorm and a run-time profile βrun were constructed using L
pp
norm and
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Lpprun, respectively and compared. The size of the n-gram was kept at 4 for the generation
of profiles. The sequence of queries made to infer injected unique records was labelled
as anomalies the detection phase by the n-gram approach. The Table 7.23 shows the
number of mismatches for each privacy attack.
Table 7.23: Detection of privacy attacks (inferences) as anomalies: the table shows the
number of mismatches that resulted from each of the 5 privacy attacks with the n-gram
of size 4.






The query sequences resulting in inferences were detected as privacy-anomalies, which
is a indication of potential effectiveness of n-gram based approach to detect inference
and unknown privacy attacks as privacy-anomalies.
7.7 Conclusions
While previous chapters considered anomalies arising from anomalous queries of
users, this chapter explores a anomalies characterised in terms of formal definitions of
privacy. This chapter explores privacy semantic notion of behavioural-based anomaly
detection systems. The notion of privacy-anomaly detection (PAD) introduced in this
chapter enables one to learn a privacy model from the past log of interaction with
the DBMS and detects deviations as privacy-anomalies. Two instantiations of PAD
was presented, one based on k-anonymity and the second instantiation (k-anonymity,
DR)-PAD was based on the composition of k-anonymity and discrimination rate pri-
vacy metric. A study was carried out to examine whether the privacy violations based
on a single query detected the privacy-anomaly detection system are also detected
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by n-gram security-anomaly detection system as anomalies. Results showed a num-
ber of single query based privacy violations that had no reference n-gram in norma-
tive profiles were labelled as anomalies by n-gram based anomaly detection system.
This chapter also considered privacy attacks that were violations of formal privacy
definitions and were based on query correlation where a single query is not privacy-
anomalous but a sequence of queries results in a violation of formal privacy defini-
tion. Results showed that an n-gram based approach detected these privacy attacks as
privacy-anomalies. This led to a discovery of another aspect of the n-gram based ap-
proach whereby when it is applied on the logs generated by interactive query settings
with the presence of formal privacy definition, it has the potential to detect privacy
attacks based on query correlation as privacy-anomalies.
As a topic of future work, we plan to explore how to compose and compare mul-
tiple privacy definitions using multi-criteria decision-making method found in fuzzy
logic [200, 201], in particular, known as triangular-norms (t-norms).
On the Detection of Privacy and Security
Anomalies
139 Muhammad Imran Khan
Chapter 8
PriDe: A Quantitative Measure of
Privacy
“Obviously, the highest type of efficiency is that which can utilize existing mate-
rial to the best advantage.”
Jawaharlal Nehru (1889 - 1964)
8.1 Introduction
This chapter considers the question of whether it is possible to quantitatively measure
the deviation from normative with respect to privacy. In order to address this ques-
tion, we introduce the notion of Privacy Distance (PriDe). The privacy distance is
the distance in terms of privacy between normative querying behaviour and run-time
querying behaviour. We refer to the privacy distance as a (single) score because PriDe
is a semi metric as discussed in Section 8.3.2; therefore, we refer to it as privacy-loss
score. Section 8.2 describes the design of PriDe and how the score is computed. Sec-
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tion 8.3 describes the computation of cumulative score. Section 8.4 evaluates the PriDe
model. Conclusions have been drawn in Section 8.5 .
8.2 PriDe - The Model
In this section, the design of the PriDe model is outlined. Intuitively, PriDe quantita-
tively measures the information gain by the user (can potentially be an adversary) or
the amount of privacy lost by individuals due to the disclosure of information while
the adversary was engaged in the interactive querying session. The proposed approach
uses n-gram profiles, constructed in Chapter 4, to model the querying behaviour of a
user. Once n-gram profiles are generated, a comparison of the profiles is carried out
for computation of the score.
In this work, we consider an adversary model where a user/analyst (Insider) who have
been granted access to the database, potentially have malicious intent and attempt to
gain insights about the database by sporadically querying the database. The adversary
(insider) is information greedy; therefore, the goal of the adversary is to gain as much
information as possible. The database is maintained by a contemporary organization
(data curator), and the database consists of distinct records of numerous individuals.
In the next section, we demonstrate using a simple example privacy score by demon-
strating the difference between a naïve calculation for the amount of data released in
the response of SQL queries made by an analyst and the distance in terms of privacy.
8.2.1 Difference between Naïve Calculation and PriDe Model
Consider the relation having attributes including firstName, lastName, department,
gender, city, and departmentHead, as shown in Table 8.1. Assume that every en-
try for the attribute city in the relation is Vancouver. Suppose that the very first five
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queries that an analyst makes to the relation are of selecting only the value for the at-
tribute city. A naïve calculation of the amount of data retrieved by the analyst would
be 5 values (the number of records selected) for the attribute city; however, the re-
turned values (Vancouver) do not affect the privacy of any individual in the database.
The PriDe model calculates the amount of information, through attribute values, re-
leased to the analyst in-terms of privacy. From ‘in-terms of privacy’ we mean whether
or not this release affects the privacy of any individual. Suppose an analyst makes
queries to get values for the attribute gender followed by queries to get values for
the attribute department by specifying the condition in the WHERE clause of the SQL
statement as WHERE city = ‘Vancouver’. We would expect that this behaviour re-
sults in increasing the score. Again, if the analyst makes another query asking for
the value for the attribute firstName, this further increases the score. However, after
making these queries, the analyst makes a query asking for the value of attribute city,
then this does not increase the score as this query does not affect the privacy of any
individual in the database.
Another aspect in computing the score is of the consideration of ‘safe’ past behaviour
or ‘safe’ queries. For instance, we know that it is a usual practice that a query to get
the value of the attribute department is followed by the query to get the value of the
attribute departmentHead and vice versa. This sequence of queries, if appeared at
run-time, does not increase the score.
8.2.2 The Design
The computation of the score is based on behavioural profiles representing querying
behaviour. In PriDe model the behavioural profiles are inferred from a DBMS log of
the SQL queries (audit logs) using the n-gram based approach presented in Chapter 4.
The idea is to capture the normative querying behaviour of a user in one profile (base-
line profile) and capture the posterior querying behaviour of the user in another profile
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Table 8.1: An example table having records of five individuals.
firstName lastName gender department city departmentHead
John Smith Male Oncology Vancouver Dr.George
Bob Lopez Male Oncology Vancouver Dr.George
Alice Miller Female Oncology Vancouver Dr.George
Bob Smith Male Cardiology Vancouver Dr.Albert
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(run-time profile). Then a comparison (in a privacy sense) of the baseline profile and
the run-time profile results is quantified in a single score.
8.2.3 Constructing Profiles of Querying Behaviour
Behavioural profiles are n-gram profiles inferred from a DBMS log of the SQL queries
(audit logs) in the same manner from audit logs as described in Section 4.3.3. The audit
log L consists of SQL queries including SELECT, UPDATE, INSERT and DELETE state-
ments. The queries in the audit log L are a mix of simple queries as well as complex
queries that involve joins, GROUP BY statements, HAVING clauses, nested queries, and
so forth. Let Abs(L) denote the log with each query abstracted. The first element of a
deployed query specialization consists of the command type, that is, SELECT, UPDATE,
DELETE, INSERT. The second element of is the attribute and relation names of the
command. Furthermore, to differentiate the attribute values queried and the attributes
in a WHERE clause, the attributes of the WHERE clause are affixed with a subscript ‘w’
indicating that the attribute occurs in the WHERE clause, for example, genderw. An
example of deployed query abstraction specialization is shown in Table 8.2. The set
ngram(Abs(L), n) gives us the set of all of the sub-sequences of size n that appear in
Abs(L). The unique n-grams in the set ngram(Abs(L), n) results in a profile consisting
of unique n-grams of the SQL query abstractions.
Table 8.2: Deployed SQL query abstraction.
Query SQL Query Abstraction
SELECT lastName, dob, company
FROM tabledb
WHERE firstName = ‘Smith’;




WHERE firstName = ‘John’;
{SELECT, lastName, street,
tabledb, firstNamew}
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8.2.3.1 Comparison of Profiles
Intuitively, the privacy score, indicates the objective changes between the past and the
current querying behaviour of the analysts in terms of privacy. The proposed approach
computes score by comparing past and current analyst querying behaviour. Both of
these behaviours are represented by n-gram profiles. We denote an n-gram profile as β.
SQL audit logs collected for the construction of baseline n-gram profile and run-time
n-gram profile are denoted as LN and LR, respectively. The baseline profile and the
run-time profile constructed from these logs are denoted as βN = ngram(Abs(LN), n)
and βR = ngram(Abs(LR), n), respectively.
Let the set of mismatched n-grams, when the baseline profile and the run-time profile
are compared against each other, is denoted by S βR,βNmiss = βR − βN. Let |S
βR,βN
miss | be
the number of mismatches or the number of elements in the set S βR,βNmiss . We denote a
mismatched n-gram as Gmissi ∈ S
βR,βN
miss .
We need to go beyond the simple comparison of n-gram profiles (subtracting baseline
profile from run-time profile) and would like to have a more fine-grained comparison
at n-gram level and subsequently at query (abstraction) level for the following two
reasons:
• We are interested in determining the closest match in baseline profile βN for
the mismatched n-gram Gmissi . Because when we perform a simple subtrac-
tion comparison, we tend to do a binary comparison, that is, either the n-
gram is the same as the other n-gram, or it is not. For instance, consider fol-
lowing three n-grams G1 = 〈(SELECT, firstName), (SELECT, department)〉,
Gmiss2 = 〈(SELECT, firstName , lastName), (SELECT, department)〉, G
miss
3 =





If we compare Gmiss2 and G
miss
3 against G1, intuitively, G
miss
2 have some degree of
similarity with G1, while on the other hand, Gmiss3 is entirely different from G1.
Thus we need to take into account the degree of the similarity of the mismatched
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n-gram from its closest match if we desire to have a ‘refined’ comparison be-
tween two profiles.
• When we talk about privacy then we have to consider the zero-identifier that is
an attribute (or a set of attributes) if known to the attacker, does not contribute
in affecting the privacy of the individual in the database. A zero-identifier is
an identifier for which the Discrimination Rate (DR) privacy metric value is
0 [40]. In our running example relation shown in Table 8.1, the attribute city is
a zero-identifier. The adversary, who is engaged in an interactive query session,
initially may not know the values for zero-identifier. The adversary can discover
the values of zero-identifier in response to the queries; however, knowledge of
zero-identifier values does not affect the privacy of the data subjects.
8.2.3.2 Distance Between n-grams
In order to find the closest match of the mismatched n-gram Gmissi ∈ S
βN,βR
miss , that is,
how far Gmissi is from its closest match in βN, a measure to compare two n-grams is de-
sired. To find the closest match, we deploy the strategy of comparing the corresponding
SQL query abstraction of two n-grams. In SQL query (abstraction) similarity research,
Jaccard distance has been commonly used to find similarity between two SQL query
abstraction [202, 203, 204]. For comparing two query abstractions using Jaccard dis-
tance, we have to consider an SQL abstraction as a set for comparison. The Jaccard
distance between two query abstraction Abs(Qi) and Abs(Q j) is given in Equation 8.1.
JaccardD(Abs(Qi), Abs(Q j)) =
(|Abs(Qi) ∪ Abs(Q j)| − |Abs(Qi) ∩ Abs(Q j)|)
|Abs(Qi) ∪ Abs(Q j)|
(8.1)
If two SQL queries abstractions are entirely dissimilar, then the value is 1, and if they
are exactly the same, then the value is 0. We define the function for the comparison
of two n-grams as follows: given two n-grams Gi and G j the distance between them is
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JaccardD(Gir ,G jr ) (8.2)
Where r in Equation 8.2 is the index (position) of the item in the n-gram. N-grams of
length n result in n comparisons of SQL query abstractions. The value of Dist(Gi,G j)
fall in the interval [0, n], where if two n-grams are identical then the value is 0 and if
two n-grams of length n are distinct, then one gets the value n.
Table 8.3: Sample SQL queries.
Q1 SELECT lastName, gender, city
FROM hospitaldb;
WHERE firstName = ‘Bob’
Q2 SELECT lastName, gender
FROM hospitaldb;
WHERE firstName = ‘Bob’
Q3 SELECT lastName, gender, department
FROM hospitaldb;
Q4 SELECT lastName, department
FROM hospitaldb ;
WHERE firstName = ‘Alice’
8.2.3.3 Privacy Equivalence
Consider the relation shown in Table 8.1 is queried using the SQL queries Q1, Q2,
and Q3 shown in Table 8.3. The records returned by Q2 is a subset of that returned
by Q1, and the records returned by Q2 is also a subset of that returned by Q3 in-terms
of privacy. Q1 and Q2 have privacy equivalence; however, Q2 and Q3 are not privacy
equivalent. The notion of privacy equivalence relation
p
= introduced in Section 7.4.3.1
was employed here to compare two SQL query abstraction.
For the relation shown in Table 8.1 the Discrimination Rate for the attribute city is 0,
therefore, we deduce that for the queries shown in Table 8.3, Q1 and Q2 hold privacy
equivalence between them while Q1 and Q3 do not hold privacy equivalence between
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them because the Discrimination Rate value for the attribute department is not zero,
although the result set of Q2 is a subset of the result set of Q3. An example of the
comparison of n-grams with privacy equivalence relation is shown in Example 1.
Example 1. Consider the following two n-grams 〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q3)〉 and 〈Abs(Q2),
Abs(Q4)〉 where the queries Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 are shown in Table 8.3. Using the
technique in Section 7.4.2 and Section 7.4.3, we determine Abs(Q2)
p
= Abs(Q1) for
the Table 8.1. The distance between the two above mentioned n-grams is given by
Dist(〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q3)〉, 〈Abs(Q2), Abs(Q4)〉),
Dist(〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q3)〉, 〈Abs(Q2), Abs(Q4)〉) =
JaccardD(Abs(Q1), Abs(Q2)) + JaccardD(Abs(Q3), Abs(Q4))
= 0 + (6 − 4)/6
= 0.33
2
8.2.3.4 Computing The Score
The score is essentially the sum of the distances between the closest match, in the
baseline profile, of the mismatched n-grams. We drive formula for the score as follows:




2 , . . . , G
miss
k } and βN = {G1, G2, . . . , Gm}. Each n-gram
Gmissi ∈ S
βN,βR
miss is compared with each n-gram Gi in the baseline profile βN. Thus
resulting in the total number of k ×m comparisons that is 〈Dist(Gmiss1 , G1), Dist(G
miss
1 ,
G2), Dist(Gmiss1 , G3), . . . , Dist(G
miss
1 , Gm)〉, 〈(G
miss
2 , G1), Dist(G
miss
2 , G2), Dist(G
miss
2 ,
G3), . . . , (Dist(Gmiss2 , Gm)〉, . . . , 〈Dist(G
miss
k , G1), Dist(G
miss
k , G2), Dist(G
miss
k , G3), . . . ,
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Dist(Gmissk , Gm)〉. We denote each iteration as Iterl = 〈Dist(G
miss
i , G j), Dist(G
miss
i ,
G j+1), Dist(Gmissi , G j+2), . . ., Dist(G
miss
i , G j+m)〉. Where a single iteration here is defined
as the comparison of one n-gram from S βN,βRmiss with every n-gram in βN. We take the
minimum value of Dist from each iteration, i.e., Min(Iterl) that belongs to the interval
[0, n]. Subsequently, the summation of all the Min(iterl) results in a deviation score.
Formally, given two n-gram profiles, the baseline profile βN and the run-time profile







Min(Dist(Gmissi ,G j)). (8.3)
Where Gmissi ∈ S
βN,βR
miss = βR − βN and G j ∈ βN. It is worth mentioning that the design
of PriDe can be considered as modular in nature. Therefore, one can use in any other
similarity measure for query abstractions. Example 2 shows a comparison of two n-
grams. The process of profile comparison is also depicted in Figure 8.1.
Example 2. Consider the following two n-grams 〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q2)〉 and 〈Abs(Q3),
Abs(Q4)〉 where queries Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4 are shown in Table 8.3. The comparison
of the two n-grams is given as follows,
Dist(〈Abs(Q1), Abs(Q2)〉, 〈Abs(Q3), Abs(Q4)〉) =
JaccardD(Abs(Q1), Abs(Q3)) + JaccardD(Abs(Q2), Abs(Q4))
= (7 − 4)/7 + (6 − 4)/6
= 0.76
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2
Figure 8.1: The run-time profile is compared with the baseline profile resulting in a
score. Each n-gram from the set of mismatched n-grams is compared with each n-gram
in the baseline profile. The minimum value of the Jaccard distance is taken from one
iteration of comparison and, subsequently, all the minimum values are added together
to get the score.
8.2.4 The Scenario of Cold Start
The PriDe model also considers the special scenario of the cold start, which is the
absence of normative querying behaviour. In this scenario, only a run-time profile
is generated, and the score is computed solely using this run-time profile because a
baseline profile to compare against the run-time profile is unavailable. In the case of a
cold start, the privacy score is the distance between run-time querying behaviour and
point zero. One can think of the comparison in the cold start scenario as comparing
the run-time profile with an empty (baseline) profile. The score in this scenario is
computed as the ‘total number of unique n-grams × n’, where n is the size of the
n-gram in the run-time profile i.e. |βR| × n.
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8.3 Cumulative Score
To compute the score, one generates a baseline profile and a run-time profile and sub-
sequently compares both the profiles with each other. The question that arises is, ‘when
to construct the run-time profile?’. As for the construction of the baseline profile, one
can construct it before the information system is up and running. On the other hand,
the run-time profile is constructed when the information system is operational, mean-
ing access to the analyst has been granted, and the analyst has started making queries.
A possible answer to the question of ‘when to construct the run-time profile?’ is to
divide the time horizon into equal intervals. The time horizon is the total time period
for which the analyst was granted access to the database. For simplicity, we opt to con-
struct a run-time profile by the end of each day. That is to say, audit logs are collected
by the end of each day and then, the run-time profile is generated using these logs.
We denoted, the run-time profile constructed by the end of the xth day as βX. β0 rep-
resents profile constructed on day 0 or the baseline profile. It is worth mentioning that
the baseline profile is generated only once. We denote the score computed on xth day
as P〈β0,βX〉 for example, the score computed on day 2 is denoted as P〈β0,β2〉. In the cold
start scenario, where the baseline profile is unavailable, we denote the score as P〈{},β1〉
computed on day 1 and similarly score computed on day 2 as P〈{},β2〉, and so forth.
Imagine the user of the system gets a score for each day but desires a cumulative score
till day 10. A naïve addition of scores for all 10 days (from day 1 to day 10) is not an
accurate representation of the cumulative score. For instance, a user can make identical
queries in the same order everyday for 10 days, thus resulting in identical n-gram
profile for each day. Therefore, one must take into account a combination of n-gram
profiles for 10 days in such a way that only unique behaviours (unique n-grams) for
all 10 days are part of the combined n-gram profile of all 10 days. To unravel this, we
denote the cumulative score as ∆. The cumulative score from day 1 to day X is denoted
as ∆[< β0 >, < β1, β2, . . . , βX >], where < β1, β2, . . . , βX > = (β1∪β2∪β3∪β4, . . . ,∪βX)
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Figure 8.2: Variations of score computations: This figure shows a variety of ways
in which individual scores and cumulative scores can be computed. For example,
∆[< β0 >, < β1, β2 >] represents the cumulative score for day 1 and day 2. P〈β0,β3〉
represents the individual score for day 3.
= β(1,2,...,X) . The cumulative score is computed using Equation 8.4.





Min(Dist(Gmissi ,G j)) (8.4)
Where Gmissi ∈ S
β0,β(1,2,...,X)
miss = β(1,2,...,X) − β0. The union defined over the profiles considers
the profiles as sets and n-grams being the elements of the sets.
The algorithm for score computation, where the baseline profile is available is shown in
Algorithm 1. Figure 8.2 shows some scenarios of the score computation with respect to
a baseline profile (reference point). In the case of the cold start scenario, the cumulative
score for day 1 to day 3 is denoted as ∆[< {} >, < β1, β2, β3 >]. The cumulative score in
the cold start scenario from day 1 to day X is computed as follows: |β1 ∪ β2∪, . . . , βX |
× size of n-gram.
8.3.1 Max (worst-case) Score
One, for example the data curator, could be interested to know what could have been
the maximum or worst-case score possible? Availability of the worst-case score en-
ables the data curator to make well-informed decisions by comparing the worst-case
score with the actual score. For instance, an insignificant difference between the
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worst-case score and the actual score is indicative of potentially malicious querying
behaviour. The Max (worst-case) score is denoted by MβX . In the proposed model, the
maximum score (worst-case score) is calculated using the Equation 8.5.
MβX = |βR| × n. (8.5)
Where n in Equation 8.5 is the size of the n-gram in the run-time profile.
8.3.2 Properties of PriDe
We examined the PriDe function from the point of view of the properties it fulfils. The
metric space considers properties, including non-negativeness, identity, symmetry, and
triangle inequality, to be fulfilled for a function that defines the distance between two
points. Consider the three profiles β0, β1, andβ2 and PriDe function P〈,〉. PriDe function
meets the non-negativeness property as the distance between two profiles is positive,
i.e. P〈β0,β1〉 ≥ 0. In terms of identity, the distance given by PriDe from a profile to itself
is zero, i.e. P〈β0,β0〉 = 0. For symmetry, the distance between β0 to β1 is the same as the
distance from β1 to β0. The symmetry does not hold for PriDe as S
β0,β1
miss = β0−β1 , S
β1,β0
miss
= β1 − β0, therefore, P〈β0,β1〉 , P〈β1,β0〉. The triangle inequality property requires that the
direct distance between β0 to β2 is less than or equal to the sum of the distance between
β0 to β1 and β1 to β2. The triangle inequality property holds for PriDe as the distance
between β0 to β2 will always be less than or equal to the sum of the distance between β0
to β1 and β1 to β2 i.e. P〈β0,β2〉 ≤ P〈β0,β1〉 + P〈β1,β2〉. This is because the property is reflect
the computation for cumulative score that is ∆[< β0 >, < β2 >] ≤ ∆[< β0 >, < β1 >] +
∆[< β1 >, < β2 >]. Therefore, we refer to PriDe as a function that computes score.
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8.4 Evaluation
We are interested in evaluating the proposed model in two scenarios. In one scenario
we desired an application where generic users (or roles of users) have a standard be-
haviour, as a result, a baseline profile can be constructed and a contrasting scenario of
a cold start. For the first scenario, we considered a synthetic banking application - a
transaction-oriented system, as discussed in Section 4.5.1. Reasonably, a user with a
role in the bank has similar behaviour to the users with the same role. For the cold start
scenario, we considered health-care predictive analytics settings where users looked up
information in the hospital database to gain insights. In the cold start scenario, when a
new user is appointed, we don’t have a baseline profile for their behaviour.
Audit logs for six days, i.e., the audit log of day 0, day 1, day 2, . . . , day 5, were
generated using the synthetic banking application. The audit log of day 0 was used
to generate a baseline profile. The application system was run with 2500 random
transactions for each day. In total generating 7200 SQL statements for each audit log.
In the health-care predictive analytics settings, audit logs for day 1, day 2, . . . , day
5 were collected, as day 0 was undesired in the cold start scenario. Each audit log
consisted of computer-generated queries such that more attributes (combination of at-
tributes) were queried as compared to the attributes (combination of attributes) queried
the previous day. The audit log of day 1, day 2, day 3, day 4, and day 5 consisted
of 700, 1200, 2200, 3000 and 5500 queries made. We denote the profiles constructed
from the audit log of each day as βday. The profiles constructed on day 0, day 1, day
2, day 3, day 4, and day 5 were denoted as β0, β1, β2, β3, β4, and β5 for both scenar-
ios. PriDe was deployed in both the scenarios and both the individual score and the
cumulative score are shown for both scenarios in Figure 8.3 (with baseline profile) and
Figure 8.4 (cold start scenario).
Figure 8.3 shows the scenario of the banking settings. The individual scores in banking
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Figure 8.3: This graph shows the results for the scenario of the banking settings. The
red bar in the figure shows the actual score while the green bar in the figure indicates
the maximum possible score (worst-case score – MβX ) for each day. The blue line
shows the cumulative score.
Figure 8.4: This graph shows the results of the cold start scenario. The red bar shows
the actual score, and the blue line shows the cumulative score over the time horizon.
settings for day 1, day 2, day 3, day 4, and day 5 are 35.0, 37.65, 35.15, 35.15, and 7.65
are respectively. The red bar in Figure 8.3 shows the actual score while the green bar
in Figure 8.3 indicates the max (worst-case) score MβX . These scores for each day in-
dicates that there are newly discovered querying behaviours resulting in a reduction of
privacy with respect to the attribute values previously retrieved by the user. However,
the score for each day when compared to potential worst-case score is insignificant,
particularly, for day 5.
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On the other hand, from the cumulative score, one can obtain more meaningful in-
sights. The cumulative score for day 1 indicating the discovery of new querying be-
haviour resulting in a reduction of privacy; nevertheless, a further reduction in privacy
is indicated by a minor increase in cumulative score for day 2. The little increase in cu-
mulative score on day 3 implies that there are further new behaviours discovered apart
from the ones discovered on day 1 and 2; therefore, a further reduction in privacy.
Identical cumulative scores for day 3, 4, and 5 indicates that at this point the unknown
querying behaviours have been discovered; however, these querying behaviours are
repeated on day 3, 4, and 5 as indicated by individual scores. This kind of trend was
expected because of the nature of the banking application as a set of identical transac-
tions are being repeated daily resulting in less diverse SQL queries, and insignificant
individual score each day while a stable cumulative score over several days provided
that the baseline profile is well captured. However, an unexpected increase in cumula-
tive score, as well as individual score, is an indication of peculiarities.
It could be the case where the baseline profile has some privacy cost that is not con-
sidered at run-time. However, it is worth mentioning that in the availability of baseline
profile scenario, the idea is that the privacy cost associated with baseline profile is
normative privacy cost in the settings where the PriDe system is deployed.
Figure 8.4 shows the individual and cumulative score in health-care predictive analytics
settings. The individual scores for day 1, day 2, day 3, day 4, and day 5 are 20,
60, 170, 215, and 395, respectively. In contrast with banking settings, the baseline
profile is not present; additionally, the audit logs do not consist of repeated transactions.
In contrast to the cumulative score in banking settings, the cumulative score here is
significantly increased each day. The cumulative scores on day 1 and day 2 are same
as the individual scores indicating that querying behaviour on day 1 was repeated on
day 2 along with new querying behaviours resulting in the reduction of privacy. There
is an increasing trend for cumulative score for day 3, day 4, and day 5, these cumulative
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score are higher than the corresponding day’s individual scores indicating a reduction
of privacy with respect to the attribute values retrieved on day 1 and day 2, by the
analyst from the database. The increasing trend in cumulative score is the indication
that the user is making diverse queries and this is being validated by the cumulative
score.
8.4.1 Computational Complexity of PriDe
We look at the complexity of computation of privacy-loss score for each scenario. For
the scenario where the baseline profile is available, we look at the complexity for each
phase, that is, the phase when the baseline profile is generated and of scoring phase.
The baseline profile generation phase has the same level of complexity as of the profile
generation phase of the n-gram approach, that is, linear complexity O(n). The scoring
phase requires two levels of comparison. The first level of comparison is of comparing
the run-time profile with the baseline profile for which we have an algorithm with a
linear complexity O(n). At the second level of comparison, the mismatched n-grams
arising from this comparison is searched for there closest match and has quadratic
complexity O(n2). The cold start scenario has linear complexity O(n), this is because,
in the cold start scenario, the comparison of run-time profile with baseline profile is
not carried out due to absence of baseline profile. The cumulative score computation
also has linear complexity O(n). At the implementation level, the calculations can be
performed in a much more efficient manner when using big data processing techniques
like MapReduce [205] for processing large volumes of data. Overall the complexity of
computing the score is quadratic O(n2) provided the identification capabilities of each
attributes are already computed. This quadratic complexity is the worst case, that is,
the algorithm won’t take more than this number of steps as here we use big O notation
for upper bounds (worst case) for algorithm analysis.
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Algorithm 1: The scoring algorithm takes two profiles as an input and returns a score.
The algorithm, Dist, computes the similarity between the two n-grams.
Algorithm: Quantitative Privacy Score
input : Two profiles: a baseline profile and a run-time profile
output: A Score
1 Procedure PriDe(Pro f ileA, Pro f ileB):
2 pscore← 0
3 temp[m]← 0
4 S miss = Pro f ileB - Pro f ileA for every ngram ′i′ in S miss do
5 k ← 0 for every ngram ′ j′ in Pro f ileA do
6 temp[k]← Dist(i, j)
7 k ← k + 1
8 end
9 pscore← pscore + min(temp[j])
10 end
11 return PriDe
input : Two ngrams
output: Distance between two n-grams
12 Procedure Dist(ngram1, ngram2):
13 D← 0
14 for l← 0 to length-of-ngram do
15 F ← 0
16 E ← 0
17 F = JaccardD(ngram1[l], ngram2[l] ) . ngram1[l] and ngram2[l] is the lth
element of the n-grams E = E + F
18 end
19 return E
input : Two SQL Query Abstractions
output: Distance between two SQL query abstractions
20 Procedure JaccardD(Abs1, Abs2):
21 D← 0




25 D = (|A(Q1) ∪ A(Q2)| − |A(Q1) ∩ A(Q2)|)/|A(Q1) ∪ A(Q2)|
26 end
27 return D
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input : Two SQL Query Abstractions
output: Distance between two SQL query abstractions
29 Procedure Priveq(ngram1, ngram2):
30 if (Ab2.issubset(Ab1)) == true . issubset returns a Boolean stating whether the
set is contained in the specified set.
31 then








8.4.2 Use-case: Global Consistency
Consider three data analytics companies known as ‘Acme Analytics’, ‘Wayne Analyt-
ics’, and ‘Smart Analytics’. An organisation named ‘Ozon enterprise’, that focuses
on e-commerce, collected a huge amount of data over some period of time. The data
consists of the purchases made via their online shopping portal. Motivated by the fi-
nancial gains, the Ozon enterprise decided to grant access to their application data to
all three data analytics companies. Following the defence-in-depth strategy, the Ozon
enterprise already had a number of security controls in place. Due to growing concerns
over data privacy, this time, the Ozon enterprise management reached a decision to in-
crease a layer by adding a technology, PriDe, that monitor information gain in privacy
sense. Granting access to third-parties has been a regular practice by Ozon enterprise,
and no privacy incidents took place in past. However, Ozon enterprise has a policy to
keep the audit logs of all the sessions of interactive when the access to their data is
granted. Using these past logs with PriDe Ozon enterprise integrated PriDe in their
privacy and security dashboards. Whereas the third-parties performed their analytics,
the Ozon enterprise kept an eye over the scores of these third-parties to have a consis-
tency check to monitor for peculiarities; for instance, if firm Acme Analytics’s score is
much higher as compared to the rest of the firms, then this alerts the Ozon enterprise
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to take imperative measures before any unforeseen breach is materialized.
8.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we introduced the notion of Privacy Distance (PriDe) that measures
the privacy-loss between the current querying behaviour from the normative behaviour.
Experiments were carried out to evaluate the approach in two scenarios; wherein one
scenario, a dataset was available for constructing the baseline profile while the second
scenario was of a cold start. Results suggest that PriDe provides with a quantitative
score in-terms of privacy that enables organizations to monitor and gain insights about
the data that is being shared with a third-party from a privacy perspective, allowing
organizations to have more sense of control over their application data. The proposed
approach serves as a suitable tool to provide global consistency. In cases where several
data analytics firms are simultaneously granted access to the organization’s database.
Additionally, PriDe can be integrated into a privacy dashboard that provides the health
of the system in terms of privacy and enables a check if something is wrong with the
way the database is being accessed.
The score computed by PriDe model relies on the similarity metric for comparing
SQL query abstractions that in our case, is Jaccard distance. As future work, we plan
to explore approaches for comparing two query abstraction besides Jaccard distance
for the PriDe model.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
“Every end is a new beginning.” – Proverb
9.1 Conclusions
Threats to a contemporary organization’s data come from external and insider attack-
ers. Traditional security controls sufficiently mitigate external attacks. A more subtle
threat comes from insiders, whereby legitimate users of the system abuse the access
privileges they hold. Insider threats can be of two types; one is an insider threat to data
security (security attacks), and the other is an insider threat to data privacy (privacy
attacks). The insider threat to data security means that insider steals or leaks sensi-
tive personal information. The insider threat to data privacy is when the insider access
information maliciously that results in the violation of an individuals privacy, for in-
stance, browsing through customers bank account balances or attempting to narrow
down to re-identify an individual who has the highest salary with malicious intents.
This dissertation addressed data privacy and data security concerns by considering the
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research questions stated in Chapter 1.
The first question (RQ1) that is addressed in this dissertation is whether one can build
behavioural-based anomaly detection systems by considering the sequence of queries
(query correlations) to model insider’s querying behaviour to detect malicious accesses
manifested in sequences of queries rather than a query in isolation, to DBMS. The dis-
sertation (Chapter 4) proposed a scheme to model querying behaviour of an insider
using n-grams that captures short-terms SQL query correlations. The model used ab-
stractions of SQL query audit logs to construct insider profiles, a normative profile
using safe logs and a run-time profile using run-time audit logs. The run-time profile is
compared with normative profile and deviations are an indication of anomalies. Suit-
able size for ‘n’ was determined empirically. The model, in general, is useful in cap-
turing the querying behaviour by considering query sequences, but there is potential
for mimicry attack. Therefore, mimicry attacks were also considered and were then
mitigated using query analytics-based technique. The dissertation described experi-
ments to judge the effectiveness of using an n-gram based scheme to detect malicious
sequences of queries (attacks based on query correlations) as anomalies in DBMS logs
and thereby identified insider attacks.
Another question (RQ2) addressed in this dissertation is whether there are alternatives
to n-grams for modelling insider querying behaviour. This dissertation looked at the
modelling of behaviour from a DBMS’s perspective (Chapter 5). A record/DBMS-
oriented approach (also referred to as a semantic approach) is proposed that considers
frequency-based correlations to detect insiders malicious accesses as anomalies. A
notion of DBMS/record-oriented modelling of normative behaviour for construction
of normative profiles that considers data-centric features, known as the semantic ap-
proach, is also introduced in this dissertation. The construction of the profiles utilizes
control charts from statistical process control as a way to detect anomalies. Two sce-
narios were considered, in the first scenario, the training data for modelling normative
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behaviour contains outlier. In the second scenario, the training data for modelling
normative behaviour is free from outliers. The experiments demonstrated the effec-
tiveness of the proposed approach in the detection of frequent observation attacks by
insiders as anomalies. It was discovered that the semantic approach not only identified
unseen behaviours but also identified behaviours that should have been present in the
current behaviours as anomalies, which we refer to as oversight-anomalies. Oversight-
anomalies are the anomalies introduced due to human negligence or human errors, for
example, an instance where the doctor or the nurse (caregiver) missed a daily check-up
of a patient. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the oversight-anomalies
are considered in the DBMS setting. It was also demonstrated that the proposed model
for the construction of record-oriented profiles could be transformed into a model for
the construction of role-oriented profiles.
This dissertation examined further alternative approaches for modelling querying be-
haviour and introduced the notion that behaviours that are rare (infrequent) represent
potentially malicious access by an insider, and frequent behaviours are possibly safe
behaviours (Chapter 6). The domain of item-set mining was explored. Item-set min-
ing algorithms including PrePost+, Apriori-Inverse, and Apriori-Rare were adopted to
mine frequent and rare query-sets to model querying behaviours. Results point to-
wards the potential effectiveness of modelling insiders malicious querying behaviour
as rare behaviour that also enables detection of insider’s malicious databases accesses
as anomalies.
The SQL query-based insider attacks considered in Chapter 4, 5, and 6, are referred
to as security attacks, and these security attacks that were detected by the proposed
approaches as anomalies were referred to as security-anomalies. As these approaches
were considering security attacks and detecting them as anomalies, these approaches
are referred to as security-anomaly detection approaches.
This dissertation also considers the question (RQ3) whether a privacy semantics for
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these behavioural-based anomaly detection approaches can be provided or the notion
of privacy-anomaly detection can be related to the conventional (formal) definitions
of privacy semantics such as k-anonymity and the discrimination rate privacy metric.
It was discovered that the anomalies identified by the n-gram based security-anomaly
detection; some of those anomalies were a type of privacy violations. This disserta-
tion proposed the notion of ‘Privacy-Anomaly Detection’ (Chapter 7). The idea is to
learn privacy criteria from past interactions (audit logs) and uses this criteria to check
whether the current querying behaviour is different from past behaviour with respect
to privacy. An instantiation of a privacy-anomaly detection system using k-anonymity
referred to as (k-anonymity)-PAD was demonstrated. The privacy attacks considered
initially for testing instantiations of (k-anonymity)-PAD were based on a single SQL
query in isolation. It was shown that privacy-anomaly detection systems could be con-
structed by composing multiple existing formal privacy definitions and an instantiation
using the composition of k-anonymity and discrimination rate privacy metric referred
to as (k-anonymity, DR)-PAD was designed.
A spin-off of this work was a translation of the discrimination rate privacy metric that
can be used to measure the identification capability of SQL queries (DRSQL). Chapter
7 describes how it can be used as a stand-alone metric to measure the identification
capability of SQL queries and enables a privacy comparison of SQL queries. The
majority of existing work on the comparison of SQL queries compares SQL queries
syntactically. The proposed work on comparing SQL queries in terms of privacy pro-
vides a foundation on this topic.
Privacy attacks, violations of formal privacy definition, based on a sequence of SQL
queries (query correlations) are also considered (Chapter 7). It is shown that inter-
active querying settings are vulnerable to privacy attacks based on query correlation.
Investigation on whether these types of privacy attacks can potentially manifest them-
selves as anomalies, specifically as privacy-anomalies was carried out. A promising
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result is that privacy attacks (violation of formal privacy definition) can be detected
as privacy-anomalies by applying behavioural-based anomaly detection using n-gram
over the logs of interactive querying mechanisms.
Lastly, Chapter 8 introduced the notion of privacy score and proposed PriDe a tech-
nique to quantitatively measures the privacy-loss in the form of a single score within
the framework of the relational database management system. A strategy for a refined
comparison of n-grams (query and query abstraction) in terms of privacy equivalence
enables the computation of a single score. Experiments were carried out to evaluate
the approach in two scenarios; wherein one scenario, a dataset was available for con-
structing the baseline (normative) profile while the second scenario was of a cold start
(absence of baseline profile). Results suggests that PriDe is a step toward the quantifi-
cation behavioural changes in-terms of privacy that enables organizations to monitor
and gain insights about the data that is being shared with a third-party from a privacy
perspective. PriDe allows organizations to have more sense of control over their appli-
cation data and serves as an excellent tool to provide global consistency.
9.2 Future Work
This section outlined the planned future work that stems from this dissertation and
consider challenges that were identified from the results.
9.2.1 Similarity Index for SQL Statements
This dissertation relies heavily on the ability to compare query abstractions. In this
work, the abstractions were compared based on the syntax. The questions that arise
are whether one considers semantics or just syntax while comparing two queries or
query abstractions? Is an exact match required or is an approximation sufficient? An-
swers to these questions are desirable. Comparing two statements based only on the
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syntax is challenging because of the inherent flexibility of SQL. Two SQL statements
can be written differently though resulting in the same output. The literature lacks a
query similarity index that measures how close two queries are syntactically as well as
semantically.
Aditionally, a recently proposed approach [166] of query regularization is an inter-
esting avenue to be explored, thus augmenting the query abstractions. The idea of
query regularization is to regularizing SQL queries syntactically which are seman-
tically similar. The query regularization approach can potentially improve the SQL
query abstraction part of the presented approaches in this dissertation.
A new topic of research is introduced in this dissertation (Chapter 7) where a tech-
nique for comparing SQL queries in terms of privacy instead of semantics or syntax is
proposed.
9.2.2 Scarcity of Real-world or Benchmark Datasets
During the course of our work it became evident that there is a lack of standard bench-
mark datasets and this impacts the veracity of results in the area. Because of this lack of
real-world datasets, it is hard to assess the performance of a system in order to enable
a comparison with the performances of other systems. This challenge is not only for
the ‘detection of malicious DBMS access’ research but for the insider threat detection
in general [206].
9.2.3 Handling Concept Drift in Behaviours
Concept drift, in the context of modelling querying behaviours, is not generally
considered in research literature. Concept drift, in machine learning and data-
mining, is defined as the unexpected changes in underlying data distribution over
time [207, 208, 209, 210]. In the context of modelling querying behaviour, it is pos-
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sible that the behaviour changes after the passage of time. That is to say that it is
possible that behaviour that was legitimate last year and us malicious behaviour today.
A straight forward approach to handle concept drift is to update the model regularly,
thus, the normative profiles need to be generated periodically. This is a relatively new
challenge in this line of research.
The semantic approach proposed in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4, Figure 5.3) captures the
drift of normative behaviour overtime by relearning normative from current behaviour.
Concept drift, in general, is a broad topic to be covered here. Approaches to handle
concept drift tailored to modelling user’s querying behaviour, such that as used in other
domains [207, 208, 209, 210], is a topic for future research.
9.2.4 Defence in Depth: Privacy Perspective
Stronger notions of privacy definitions constrain data utility in interactive query set-
tings, while weaker notions of privacy in an interactive query setting may result in
privacy attacks (inferences and violations of formal privacy definitions). It is worth
noting that the privacy attacks can manifest itself in a variety of unexpected ways. A
way forward is to utilise defence in depth in privacy controls. For future work, we
plan to compose various privacy controls, including privacy-anomaly detection sys-
tem, security-anonymity detection system, and privacy score for a defence in depth
approach from a privacy perspective.
9.2.5 Translation onto Other Data Models
The research work in this dissertation is based on a relational data model. Future
research should consider how the techniques - n-gram based approach, DBMS/record-
oriented model, the item-set mining-based approach, privacy-anomaly detection sys-
tems and PriDe - might be applied to other data models, for instance, deductive
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databases and object-oriented databases. This requires, for example, determining the
right level of abstraction for OQL statements in object oriented database [211].
9.2.6 Explaining Anomalies
Explaining anomalies is not only a challenge within the context of the work carried
out in this dissertation, but it is a challenge in general in anomaly detection domain.
In order to generate explanations for anomalies, systems that act as white-box are de-
sirable, which will enable humans to easily comprehend why the anomaly is flagged
off and subsequently generate an explanation for that anomaly. In the case where an
anomaly is flagged, there are all set of possible things that could be wrong. A question
that arises is which one of them is used to give an explanation about the anomaly and
what will the simplest explanation. For instance, in the case where k-anonymity-based
PAD flags an anomaly, a possible explanation is that there is a privacy issue because
the query is narrowing down to less than k individuals. In order to form an explana-
tion, one has to look at the available information in case of an anomaly in our case;
this information includes the value of k, collection of violated n-gram, frequencies that
were violated. It would be interesting to see how existing anomaly explanation tech-
niques [212, 213, 214] would be used to provide a more understandable explanation
for the proposed detection systems in this dissertation.
9.2.7 Instantiation of PAD with Multiple Privacy Models
In future work, an exploration of PAD with other variations of multiple privacy model
is desirable. An exposition using hierarchical constraints framework to compose mul-
tiple privacy criteria will be an interesting line of research. Where an investigation into
the trade-off between multiple privacy criteria, intuitively, improve privacy guarantees.
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